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Résumé 
 
Cette thèse étudie l’innovation et la coordination dans les standards des Nouvelles 
Technologies d’Information et de Communication (NTIC). Dans cinq contributions 
économétriques, j’analyse le rôle des brevets essentiels. Les brevets essentiels sont des 
brevets qui protègent des inventions indispensables à toute mise en application d’un 
standard technologique. Le nombre croissant de ces brevets essentiels nourrit l’inquiétude 
que l’innovation dans les NTIC puisse être étouffée dans un véritable buisson de brevets. 
Les firmes actives dans la standardisation ont réagi à ce défi en créant des mécanismes 
innovateurs de coordination, et notamment des consortia informels de standardisation et des 
pools de brevets. 
La compréhension des mécanismes et incitations liés aux brevets essentiels se heurte 
actuellement à un manque d’études empiriques. Je contribue à la recherche économique à 
travers la construction d’une large base de données sur les brevets et les standards, des 
avancées méthodologiques dans l’analyse scientométrique ainsi qu’une analyse 
économétrique fondée dans la littérature théorique actuelle. La thèse est organisée selon 
trois axes de recherche, qui explorent respectivement les caractéristiques des brevets 
essentiels, le nombre de brevets déposés autour des standards, ainsi que des mesures du 
progrès technologique des standards.  
Mes recherches mettent en lumière le caractère spécifique des brevets essentiels. En 
particulier, je montre que parmi les brevets essentiels, les brevets qui protègent des 
inventions plus significatives n’ont pas plus de valeur pour leurs propriétaires. Cette 
particularité des brevets essentiels incite à des stratégies opportunistes, notamment la 
multiplication des dépôts de brevets essentiels incrémentaux et étroits. Les pools de brevets 
peuvent contribuer encore davantage à cette inflation de brevets, et permettent notamment à 
leurs membres fondateurs d’introduire un grand nombre de brevets peu significatifs, mais 
très ciblés sur le standard.  
Les pools de brevets incitent par ailleurs à augmenter le nombre de brevets déposés autour 
des standards technologiques. Dans le cas de pools dont la création a été attendue, cet effet 
a lieu dans les années qui précèdent le lancement du pool. Les consortia informels associés 
à la standardisation ont également des effets sur le nombre de brevets déposés autour des 
standards. Dans le cas de standards caractérisés par un niveau insuffisant d’investissements 
en R&D spécifique, les consortia induisent une augmentation du nombre de dépôts de 
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brevets. Dans le cas de standards pour lesquels un niveau excessif de redevances pour les 
brevets essentiels induit des courses aux brevets, les consortia informels peuvent réduire le 
nombre de brevets déposés.   
J’étudie également l’effet des brevets essentiels sur le progrès technologique des standards. 
Je montre que l’inclusion de technologies brevetées dans un standard augmente le taux de 
mises à jour du standard, mais réduit le risque de remplacement. J’en déduis que les brevets 
essentiels induisent les organismes de standardisation à substituer le progrès technologique 
continu au progrès discontinu. Cependant, le taux plus élevé de mises à jour n’est pas 
suffisant pour expliquer l’augmentation de l’espérance de vie des standards. Les brevets 
essentiels donc réduisent le taux de remplacement de standards également à travers 
d’autres mécanismes, notamment à travers des blocages institutionnels et des conflits 
d’intérêts.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Context: 
In April 2011, Apple and Samsung started a huge legal battle over patent infringement in 
mobile communication. Currently, these two companies alone are opposed in 19 ongoing 
lawsuits in 12 different courts. This clash is however just one episode in a series of litigations 
and antitrust investigations regarding the licensing of standard-essential patents. Essential 
patents are property rights on technology that is necessary for any implementation of a 
technological standard. Recent generations of standards in Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT) incorporate an increasing number of such essential patents. The 
interplay between patents and standards is thus increasingly important, but also increasingly 
problematic. While the objective of standardization is to foster the dissemination of new 
technology, the function of the patent system is to grant an innovator the temporary right to 
exclude others from any use of an invention. As several recent important technology 
standards incorporate hundreds or even thousands of essential patents held by dozens of 
different firms, there is a risk that the development and spread of innovative ICT standards is 
jeopardized by legal disputes between holders of mutually blocking patents. In response to 
these disputes, standardizing firms have developed new institutions and mechanisms to 
reconcile the conflicting objectives of standardization and the patent system. The most 
important of these mechanisms are patent pools, licensing out bundles of essential patents 
owned by different firms, and informal consortia, coordinating the contribution of proprietary 
technologies by rivaling firms in the process of developing new standards. 
The regulatory challenges and the original mechanisms emerging around patented 
technologies in standards have triggered much attention both by practitioners and economic 
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researchers. Economic analysis has guided important regulatory decisions at the interface 
between patents and standards, such as the adoption of a permissive stance with respect to 
patent pools and an increased recognition of the role of informal standards consortia. In 
particular competition authorities have redefined their policy, striking a new balance between 
their traditional suspicions against coordination among competitors and the risk that single 
holders of essential patents abuse of their dominant position.  Nevertheless, these important 
decisions are so far insufficiently grounded in solid empirical evidence. The economic 
research has left many important empirical questions unanswered: how do patent pools 
affect the incentives to innovate and file essential patents? Do consortia contribute to 
increase efficiency in the development of proprietary technology for standards? What is the 
effect of essential patens on the technological progress of standards? 
My Ph.D. thesis addresses this gap in the economic literature and provides empirical 
answers to the aforementioned questions. I build up large databases of standards, consortia, 
patent pools, essential patents and standard-related patent files. I assess various 
methodologies to match standards with patents, and I evaluate the use of different 
quantitative patent and standard characteristics as indicators for economic research. Based 
upon these methodological advances, I carry out a sophisticated econometric analysis 
grounded in recent economic theory. I find empirical evidence for a particularity of essential 
patents: within the sample of essential patents, patents protecting more important inventions 
are not more valuable for their owners. This characteristic of essential patents induces 
incentives to file numerous narrow and relatively insignificant patents on standard-essential 
technology. I furthermore show that on the one hand patent pools increase the incentives to 
file and declare essential patents, and I provide evidence for opportunistic strategies of 
patent introduction into patent pools. Informal consortia on the other hand can increase the 
efficiency of patenting with respect to standardization: consortia have a positive effect upon 
the number of patent files in situations where R&D incentives are insufficient, and a lower 
positive or even a negative effect in situations of excessive patenting. Analyzing the effect of 
essential patents on the technological progress of standards, I find that patents induce a 
more continuous progress of standards, increasing the number of incremental upgrades and 
reducing the rate of discontinuous standard replacements.  
My research goes beyond the imminent policy debate on the regulatory framework for ICT 
standardization. I also contribute to the economic literature on innovation and standardization 
through an original analysis of the role of standards and essential patents. I describe 
standardization as a continuous selection mechanism, streamlining the distributed R&D 
efforts of numerous actors towards the frontier of cumulative technological progress. 
Essential patents are an original appropriation mechanism specially tailored to this 
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distributed innovation. Rather than exclusive property rights on units of technology, essential 
patents are a right to partake in the control over a jointly developed technology. Essential 
patents function as bargaining chips, allowing for coordination and contracting among the 
various firms participating in the joint development of technological standards. 
 
2. Innovation and standardization:  
Standards establish interoperability between technologies in a network of users. 
Interoperability results from a selection process: network participants can interoperate when 
they agree on a common, standard technology. Such a common standard can emerge as 
dominant design or de facto standard from uncoordinated adoption decisions, when each 
adopter decides individually to adopt a technology, but takes the adoption choices of other 
users into account. In other cases, the users explicitly agree on a de jure standard (David 
and Greenstein, 1990; Farrell and Simcoe, 2011). In both cases, the function of 
standardization is to select one technological solution among a possibly broad set of options 
for the sake of variety reduction (Tassey, 2000).  
The selection is often a matter of discretionary choice: ex ante, there are few objective 
criteria for choosing the exact width and length of a paper format, the optimal disposition of 
letters on a keyboard, or the side of the road on which vehicles have to drive. Nevertheless, 
once a standard has emerged, users of the standard incur complementary sunk investments 
which are specific to the selected format, and the standard becomes increasingly costly to 
replace. Standardization is thus a crucial event in the history of a technology: through 
standardization, one specific way of doing things gets chosen as a stable basis for the future 
technological progress, while alternative technologies, many of which ex ante equivalent or 
even superior to the elected standard, are almost irreversibly abandoned (Arthur, 1989).  
This mechanism can be illustrated by an example from telecommunication standardization: 
multiple access to a single channel such as a phone line or frequency bandwidth can be 
governed by splitting access time into different time intervals (TDMA), by assigning each 
communication a precise frequency range (FDMA), or by spreading the signals of each 
communication over a spectrum, identified by a code signal (CDMA). Each of these options 
can be developed into a viable telecommunication technology. Inside a common network, it 
is however necessary that all users abide by the same multiple access technology. 
Interoperability and communication without interference thus require the selection of a single 
technology for each communication channel. This is precisely the role of standardization. 
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The development of a modern telecommunication standard is a long series of many, 
increasingly incremental technological choices. Once CDMA was selected as technological 
option, standard setters had to agree upon the details of the coding and decoding technology 
and many other features in order to develop a particular standard such as CDMA2000. This 
standard is in turn an integral component of a yet more complex system such as UMTS. 
Standardization thus eliminates variety on one technological level, after which a variety of 
technological options is developed to address related technological problems on a more 
incremental level, until once again standardization eliminates variety and the focus of 
technological progress moves further on. 
There are however crucial differences between a complex technology standard and our 
earlier examples of simple standards. While no particular science or technique is required to 
drive on the right side of the road, coding speech data in certain syntax or transmitting 
signals in a determined frequency range requires specific technology. It is not enough to 
agree upon a particular technological option, these options have to be developed in costly 
R&D. The firms, universities or individuals developing these options can patent their 
inventions, and use these patents to recoup their costs. If the patent covers a technology 
which is selected as standard component, it becomes a valuable essential patent with 
blocking power over any adoption of the standard. If another option is selected for the same 
functionality, the patent is practically worthless. Another crucial difference is that 
technological standards need to respond to an advancing state of the art. Driving on the right 
side of the road works equally well for horse carriages and modern cars. In case of 
telecommunication standards, different coding or signal transmission technologies are 
needed for transmitting speech signal or huge data loads such as video streaming over 
mobile internet connection. Furthermore, scientific and technological progress can open up 
technological opportunities which were unforeseen at the moment of standardization. 
Technology standards need to respond to technological change, and in spite of the 
numerous costs of standard replacement, this response often implies reversing prior 
technological choices. 
My thesis focuses on this interplay between the development of new technologies and their 
adoption as technological standard. In my analysis, standardization is a central aspect of 
innovation. Through the selection of a specific technological solution, standards set a solid 
basis for the next step in a cumulative technological progress (Blind, 2004 pp.186-218).  The 
features of this selection process are taken into account by those who develop the variety of 
technological options: indeed, R&D in cumulative technologies is targeted at problems of 
existing systems, and innovators aim at selection of their technologies as part of a standard. 
Standardization is thus not only a selection between existing technological options: the 
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expected outcome of standardization implicitly or explicitly specifies the requirements for 
future technology, and streamlines R&D investments towards specific problems of an 
existing technological system. Standardization thus plays a role in coordinating continuous, 
cumulative technological progress.  
But standardization is not less important in the coordination of disruptive technological 
progress. In order to replace an installed technological system, innovators need to develop a 
fully viable alternative complex system. This implies streamlining R&D investment towards 
proposing solutions for specific technical problems of a technology which is not currently 
used. Such coordination on discontinuous change can only be successful if a large number 
of innovators can agree on the basic features of the future technology, commit to specific 
practices, and contract on the assignment of different tasks.  
 
3. Coordination around technological standards 
and the role of patents 
The technological progress of standards requires a coordinated cumulative R&D effort. In 
many cases a single company can coordinate this effort: many standards have been 
developed by single large firms, who can use patents to gain the exclusionary control over a 
proprietary standard. With strong property rights, single firms can also coordinate the 
technological progress through distributed innovation: as a platform leader for a standard 
technology, a firm can for instance contract targeted R&D investments from those who have 
specific technological capacities, and streamline the R&D of its suppliers and customers on a 
focal technology. De facto standards such as Apple’s IOS and Microsoft’s Windows evolve in 
such ecosystems coordinated by a strong leader (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002). 
In other cases, especially in very complex systems involving large numbers of actors, various 
companies decide to join their capacities and technologies, share the risk and the cost, 
commit on adopting the future technology and thus guarantee the existence of a demand. 
This coordination requires a lot of communication, signaling, and strong commitments. Many 
important standards, such as the CD or DVD formats, have been developed by such informal 
coalitions of firms, called in the literature ad hoc standards consortia. Ad hoc coordination on 
new technological standards requires identifying potential partners, building trust and 
reputation, agreeing on a modus governandi, and detailed contracting on the respective 
investments and gains. Intellectual property rights are vital in this coordination process to 
allow contracting and credible commitment. 
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The building of a coalition and the construction of a viable contractual frame for the 
development of a new standard constitute sizeable sunk investment. Most of the important 
technological standards are therefore developed in institutionalized formal Standard Setting 
Organizations (SSO), providing a framework for the continuous development of new 
standards1. Represented in early models of standardization as ideal-typical social planners, 
these SSOs are in fact economic institutions, shaped by incentive structures and relations of 
power. Like in de facto standardization and ad hoc consortia, patents play an important role 
as coordination device among SSO members. Patent protection is an important incentive for 
developing standard-essential technology (Geradin, 2006), and it is an important condition 
for technology holders agreeing to contribute to standard development (Layne-Farrar et al., 
2011). Nevertheless, patents can also exacerbate coordination failures and opportunistic 
strategies. Participants to standardization have engineered ad hoc solutions to address these 
problems, and over time, sophisticated mechanisms have emerged to coordinate corporate 
strategies with respect to patents in formal standardization. More recently, also these 
mechanisms exhibit symptoms of coordination failures, and there is an ongoing process of 
organizational innovation for addressing the coordination failures inside the coordination 
mechanisms.  
The birth of the current institutional framework for formal standardization is intimately related 
to the liberalization of the international telecommunication industries, which can be dated 
back to the International Telecom Regulations in 19882. Through this process of 
liberalization, formal standardization gradually emancipated from intergovernmental decision 
making, opening up the possibility for corporate participation and the inclusion of proprietary 
technology. In response to these new possibilities, a broad variety of SSOs and consortia 
have emerged, including nowadays dominant players such as ETSI and the IETF3. These 
new actors and their corporate standardization participants have contributed to an 
unprecedented technological evolution of ICT standards in the past twenty years, but also to 
a very large number of patents on components of formal standards. 
 The first important conflicts around patents on standard components emerged around the 
European 2G mobile phone standard GSM, when the cross licensing practices of 
Motorola allegedly drove large numbers of handset manufacturers out of the market (Bekkers 
et al., 2002). In response to these allegations, the newly founded ETSI (emanating from the 
                                                          
1
 Examples of SSOs include national organizations such as the American National Standards Institute 
(ANSI) or the French Autorité française pour la normalisation (AFNOR), regional bodies like the 
European Telecommunication Standardization Institute (ETSI), and worldwide SSOs such as the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU). 
2
 http://www.itu.int/osg/csd/wtpf/wtpf2009/documents/ITU_ITRs_88.pdf  
3
 The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is responsible for many of the most important internet 
standards 
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ad-hoc GSM consortium) adopted an IPR policy specifying the obligations to disclose 
essential patents, and to provide licenses on a fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory 
(FRAND) basis. This policy is nowadays practiced by almost all significant SSOs. The 
disclosure obligation and the notion of FRAND licensing terms constitute the basis for the 
emergence of essential patents as a specific legal institution with sui generis obligations and 
mechanisms.  
Nevertheless, these notions initially lacked tangible content. This lack became apparent in 
two cases of alleged anti-competitive conduct: in 2006, Broadcom and eventually Nokia filed 
formal complaints to the European Commission against Qualcomm, arguing that the 
licensing conditions for Qualcomm’s patents related to ETSI’s 3G standards did not respect 
the company’s FRAND commitment. In another widely cited case, in July 2007, the 
European Commission launched investigations against Rambus, which allegedly had failed 
to disclose its patents to the semiconductor standards consortia JEDEC4. Even though these 
cases did not result in clear-cut decisions from competition authorities, they triggered an 
important amount of legal and economic research, policy initiatives and practitioner 
discussions which considerably sharpened the notion and particular status of essential 
patents. In December 2010 the European Commission adopted new guidelines for the 
application of European Competition law to horizontal agreements, including standardization 
agreements5. These guidelines condition the presumption of pro-competitive effects of 
standardization upon disclosure policies and FRAND licensing terms. While the precise 
implications of the rules regarding essential patents are still open to a lively debate, this 
choice of the European Commission consecrates the notion of essential patent as regulatory 
principle for standardization of proprietary technology. More recently, the European 
Commission launched a new series of investigations into disputes regarding the licensing of 
essential patents, including the litigations between Apple and Samsung. The motivation for 
these investigations is the authorities’ commitment to further define the content of the rules 
on disclosure of essential patents and FRAND licensing.  
In parallel to this evolution, standardizing companies have come up with industry-driven 
mechanisms tailored to the problems of essential patents on standards. In 1997 and 1999, 
the coalitions including almost all the holders of essential patents on the DVD and MPEG2 
standards created the first large contemporary patent pools. While many patent pool 
licensing schemes had existed until World War 2, strict antitrust enforcement had impeded 
the pooling of patents held by different companies since 1945. In order to overcome this 
                                                          
4
 Both the Rambus and the Qualcomm case also triggered antitrust investigations in the US, even 
though the focus of the European and US investigations differed significantly 
5
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2011:011:0001:0072:EN:PDF  
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resistance, the pool initiators proposed a list of safeguards, including non-discriminatory 
access to the pool for all holders of essential patents, third-party evaluation of the patent 
essentiality, FRAND licensing terms and the unrestricted possibility to license out all the 
included patents individually. The American and European competition authorities granted a 
favorable business review for these licensing schemes, reflecting their intention not to take 
action against the companies joining these pools. After this successful precedent, the 
organizational principles of the DVD and MPEG2 patent pools constituted a template for 
patent pools that do not run afoul of competition law, and since then around 50 patent pools 
following the same basic rules have been initiated for standardized technology. 
While patent pools have contributed to the wide implementation of standards such as 
MPEG2 (licensed out to 1.421 firms), the experience of the last fifteen years has also 
revealed the pitfalls of the current pool design. For instance, the failure of several important 
patent pools, most noticeably for the 3rd generation of mobile phone standards, demonstrates 
the difficulties to build up comprehensive coalitions of patent holders for creating a pool. 
Pools seem to find it particularly difficult to attract the holders of most valuable patents, who 
fear that their share in the royalty revenue is unduly diminished through opportunistic 
patenting by other pool members. The problems of pool creation have triggered initiatives by 
SSOs and consortia to facilitate timely agreement on pool licensing. Furthermore, companies 
have engineered innovative organizational designs for new patent pools. The most striking 
example is the One-Blu pool licensing scheme for BluRay patents. This pool is indeed a 
“pool of pools”, including patents for various complementary standards. Furthermore, the 
pool includes new rules on differentiated remuneration of different kinds of essential patents 
and restricts the possibilities to introduce various patents related to the same invention. 
These mechanisms deviate from the practices previously cleared as pro-competitive in the 
1997 and 1999 business review, thus giving rise to a renewed policy interest in patent pools.  
Another mechanism for addressing problems generated by essential patents is upfront 
coordination of standard-related R&D through informal consortia and alliances. Informal 
consortia have long been conceived as competitors for formal SSOs. While formal SSOs 
deliver standards with a strong legitimacy facilitating wide implementation, the discussions 
inside their working groups are reputed to be tedious and lengthy. The consensus decision 
making of SSOs is prone to wars of attrition, time-consuming battles between different 
stakeholders trying to push their patented technology into a standard. These standard battles 
also burn precious resources, as companies duplicate R&D efforts in races to assure control 
over as many standard components as possible. Informal consortia and alliances of firms 
with a common objective can be much faster and more efficient in streamlining R&D. While 
consortia have sometimes successfully competed with formal standards, more recently, 
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formal SSOs have increasingly understood to value informal consortia as complement rather 
than a competitor to formal standardization. Several formal SSOs have accredited consortia 
as members, signed liaison agreements for cooperation on single standardization projects, 
and even engaged into long-term alliances with informal consortia.  
In sum, the emergence of the institutional framework for standardization of proprietary 
technology can be described as a bottom-up process, a series of increasingly incremental 
industry-driven organizational innovations. Many of the institutional features result from 
discretionary choices. The strong initial opposition to FRAND policies by open source 
communities and liberal business advocates reveals that the choice of essential patents as 
sui-generis regulatory principle was not an uncontested unique solution. But since then, 
policy makers and practitioners have invested heavily in defining what FRAND means, in 
innovating solutions to specific related problems, and not least in subsidizing economic 
research analyzing the effects, incentives and strategies induced by essential patents. 
Twenty years after its beginnings, there is no available alternative to the regulatory principle 
of essential patents which is comparably refined and well-understood.  
This fact is mainly due to the specific policy landscape in which the regulatory framework for 
standardization has emerged. ICT standardization takes place on a worldwide scale, and is 
driven by firms and a continuously growing number of diverse SSOs. A fundamental 
institutional innovation could only be assured by overarching institutions that are robust to 
institutional change and can coordinate organizational investment by many different actors. 
In many fields of economic policy, national governments and bureaucracies successfully play 
this role of catalysts of institutional innovation. In our field of interest, only competition policy 
has provided a policy framework for organizational progress. The specific obligations 
ascribed to holders of essential patents and the clearly circumscribed rules for the creation of 
patent pools both are enforced by antitrust policy. However, the role of competition policy is 
necessarily limited and confined to restrictive measures. Economists have for instance 
proposed auction mechanisms (Swanson and Baumol, 2005) or non-assertion policies 
(Rysman and Simcoe, 2011) to substitute for the vague FRAND commitments. There is 
however no overarching regulatory framework in which such mechanisms, designed from the 
scratch and founded in economic theory, could be enforced. Therefore there is no alternative 
to the continuous, bottom-up progress of the institutional setup through local solutions to 
specific problems. This must be borne in mind by the economic researcher who aims to 
contribute to improving the system through his policy recommendations. 
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4. Review of the relevant economic literature   
The continuous progress of the regulatory framework for standardization is indeed 
increasingly informed by a growing body of economic literature specializing on the analysis of 
technological standards. The economic research can be roughly divided into three strands of 
literature, culminating respectively at the end of the 1980s, at the end of the 1990s and in the 
past couple of years.  
The first period of research is dominated by theoretical analysis. The theoretical economic 
literature on technology standards dates back to the seminal articles of Farrell and Saloner 
(1985, 1986). These articles initiated an important strand of literature (Katz and Shapiro, 
1986, Matutes and Regibeau, 1992, Economides, 1996, Kristiansen, 1998, Clemens, 2005), 
which has analyzed the basic mechanisms underlying the economics of compatibility, 
network effects and the dynamics of standard adoption. A contribution of this strand of 
literature which has been particularly important for my thesis is the finding in Katz and 
Shapiro (1985) that sponsorship of standards, i.e. a firm holding exclusionary property rights 
on the standardized technology, can overcome excessive inertia in the spread-out of 
innovative standards.  Notwithstanding its importance, this literature is however 
characterized by the striking absence of standard setting itself. Indeed, standardization is 
analyzed as a convergence of markets on a network technology, as a result of the choices of 
uncoordinated consumers between technologies provided by single firms. Eventually, Farrell 
and Saloner (1988) introduce an abstract SSO in the models – a consensus based decision 
making process, which can substitute for the market mechanisms. This model however still 
characterizes an ideal-typical SSO akin to a social planner. 
The second strand of literature is driven by the empirical features of real world 
standardization, and consists mainly in qualitative analysis. The literature on path 
dependency, initiated by Arthur (1989), spurred strong interest in the dynamics of the 
technological progress of standards. In this debate, Liebowitz and Margolis (1994) raise the 
argument that strong IPR provide a safeguard against inefficient path dependencies. The 
idea of path dependency in the technological evolution of standards is largely explored in the 
evolutionary literature on technological trajectories, for which the analysis of standards 
provides empirical support (Metcalfe and Miles, 1994, Bekkers and Martinelli, 2012). Another 
focus of interest lies on the competitive strategies in standardization. Besen and Farrell 
(1994) analyze the rich set of strategies in the competition between standards and between 
technologies inside a SSO. Case studies on recent standardization projects (Bekkers, 2001; 
DeLacey et al., 2006) discuss into details the strategies induced by the inclusion of essential 
patents. Lemley (2002) provides a detailed overview over the rules on essential patents in 
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various SSOs. This strand of literature has yielded two special issues on standardization in 
important journals and a first anthology of the economics of standards (Blind, 2004). Most 
importantly, this literature has considerably broadened the scope of the analysis of 
standards : indeed, standards’ economic role does not resume in ensuring compatibility 
between goods in a network, but standards are comprehensive coordination tools in 
innovation – they ensure reduction of variety and mitigation of risks. Standard setting is 
understood as part of a joint innovation effort combining competition and collaboration 
(Besen and Farrell, 1994).  
My Ph.D. thesis is part of a more recent stream of analysis combining the qualitative insights 
on real world standardization with the fundamental theoretical models, yielding a quantitative 
empirical analysis of standardization grounded in formal economic models. These models 
picture SSOs as complex economic institutions, characterized by a formal decision making 
process (Farrell and Simcoe, 2012). Furthermore, it is understood that the rules of SSOs are 
the result of the rivalry between SSOs, competing to attract holders of valuable technology 
and potential users alike (Lerner and Tirole 2006). These models can be successfully applied 
to the analysis of the speed of standard setting in real world SSOs such as the IETF 
(Simcoe, 2012), and to economically explain the rules of a large variety of contemporary 
SSOs (Lernier, Chiao and Tirole, 2007).  
Furthermore, the recent literature increasingly focuses upon the quantitative analysis of 
strategies relating to the interface between patents and standards. While the interest initially 
focused upon the vagueness of FRAND royalty terms (Lévêque and Ménière, 2008) and 
attempted an economically grounded clarification (Swanson and Baumol, 2005), there is a 
trend towards a more comprehensive analysis of patenting and standardization strategies 
(Blind and Thumm, 2004). The analysis of the inclusion of essential patents into 
technological standards is formalized by Layne-Farrar et al. (2011) and Tarantino (2011), 
who describe the SSO as a coalition to build standards by acquiring technology competitively 
provided by innovators. Several recent contributions empirically investigate the incentives 
and strategies of these innovators. Rysman and Simcoe (2008) highlight the increase in the 
value of a patent induced by its inclusion into a standard, Bekkers (2012) analyzes the 
factors determining that a patent is included into a standard, Berger et al. (2012) shed light 
on patenting strategies used to match patents with ongoing standardization and Ganglmair 
and Tarantino (2012) study the timing of patent essentiality declaration. There is thus an 
increasing body of research analyzing the driving factors of the increasing number of 
essential patents. The consequences of essential patents for standardization are however 
still poorly understood.  
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In parallel to the advancing research on standardization, many recent economic analyses 
have shed light on the emergent coordination mechanisms related to standards and essential 
patents. Shapiro (2001) describes SSOs, consortia and pools as a way to navigate through 
thickets of overlapping patents. Especially the growing number of patent pools has triggered 
much formal theoretical analysis. Lerner and Tirole (2004) provide an economic justification 
for the assumption that the current patent pools are welfare-enhancing. Other important 
contributions analyze the difficulties in building coalitions for patent pools (Aoki and Nagaoka, 
2004, Brenner, 2009, Lévêque and Ménière, 2011), the effect of patent pools on innovation 
incentives (Dequiedt and Versaevel, 2012, Aoki and Schiff, 2007, Llanes and Trento, 2010, 
Schmidt, 2010) and the effect of patent pools on the incentives to file and litigate weak 
patents (Choi, 2011, 2012). The more scarce empirical literature analyzes which rules are 
adopted by what kind of rules (Lerner et al., 2007) and how the rules of patent pools 
determine firms’ decision to join (Layne-Farrar and Lerner, 2011). Other recent analyses 
study the impact of pools upon the efficiency of patent enforcement (Delcamp, 2012) and on 
subsequent patenting and technological progress (Lampe and Moser, 2010, 2011, 2012 for 
historical patent pools, Joshi and Nerkar, 2011-1). There is so far however no empirical 
analysis of the effect of prospective patent pools on the incentives to file essential patents to 
be included into a pool. 
In contrast to patent pools, and in spite of their high number6 and significant importance, 
informal standardization consortia have received little attention in the economic literature. 
Several qualitative contributions have analyzed the emergence of new consortia, the 
competition between consortia and formal SSO, and the strategies of optimally combining 
formal and informal standardization (Cargill and Weiss, 1992, Updegrove, 1995, Hawkins, 
1999, Cargill, 2002). The first formal analysis of the interplay between SSOs and informal 
consortia however dates back only to Leiponen (2008), who shows that participation in 
informal consortia increases firms’ ability to influence formal standardization. Blind and 
Gauch (2008) show on a firm level that membership in consortia and formal SSOs is 
complementary, and Delcamp and Leiponen (2012) find evidence that consortia coordinate 
the R&D efforts of their members. While these contributions shed light on the benefits for 
companies to join informal consortia, there is so far no empirical analysis of the effect of 
consortia on the overall efficiency of standardization. 
In spite of its diversity, the contemporary economic research on standardization is 
characterized by important binding elements, which have also guided my research for this 
thesis. This literature has shifted the focus of the analysis from the coordination of 
                                                          
6
 700 consortia are currently listed in the CEN standardization survey and in the list updated by Andy 
Updegrove 
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technology adoption decisions in a network of users towards the coordination among 
innovators in the development of new technology. The literature has furthermore moved from 
a dichotomy between abstract economic models and qualitative empirical work towards a 
formal quantitative empirical analysis grounded in explicit economic models. Furthermore, 
the focus of attention of economic research has moved on with the policy debates, 
continuously integrating emergent economic mechanisms and institutions. The theoretical 
and empirical research got closer in time to the emergence of the issues; and thus 
increasingly synchronous with the relevant policy debates. 
Over time, the economic research has increasingly taken part in the process of institutional 
innovation. Economic models such as Lerner and Tirole (2004) have been rapidly absorbed 
by policy makers, and there are now a considerable number of venues for a dialogue 
between policy makers, stakeholders and economic researchers7. In order to inform policy 
making, abstract economic reasoning needs to be applied to precise, technical real world 
situations in a continuously evolving institutional context. This is a deep challenge especially 
for quantitative, empirical work. In order to increase the reliability of the empirical research, it 
is necessary to gain some distance, to let the evidence accumulate and to fully observe even 
the long term effects – but in the meantime the process of institutional innovation moves 
further, and if the evidence is presented too late, the issues are already irreversibly settled. 
The empirical researcher needs to strike a balance between the robustness of his results, 
and the timeliness of his contribution. To circumvent this tradeoff, empirical economic 
research has sometimes used historical evidence to inform current policy debates (for 
instance Lampe and Moser studying 19th century patent pools). Nevertheless, the insights 
that can be drawn from historical data for contemporary problems are limited. FRAND 
licensing commitments, informal standardization consortia and ICT patent pools are 
contemporary and unique institutions which have evolved as a part of the specific institutional 
architecture around essential patents in ICT standardization. Decision making with respect to 
these institutions and the related mechanisms needs to rely upon the short-lived empirical 
evidence on contemporary phenomena. This evidence is however seriously limited, as 
essential data is missing, and facts and figures are open to various speculative 
interpretations. There are thus today two important tasks for empirical economic research: 
first, produce robust quantitative data, and second, gradually restrict the range of possible 
interpretations for the revealed facts through econometric techniques. 
                                                          
7
 A regular exchange of ideas between standardization practitioners and economic researchers for 
instance takes place at the Standardization and Innovation in Information Technology (SIIT) 
Conference, where two chapters of my thesis have been presented. I also presented my findings to 
IPR practitioners at the EPO/OECD conference « Patent Statistics for Decision Makers »,  and I 
communicated policy implications of my research to the European Commission through a public 
consultation by DG Competition.  
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5. The contributions of this dissertation 
My Ph.D. thesis contributes to the literature on standardization and innovation through a 
thorough econometric analysis of a rich set of novel and original data. These data allow 
addressing important empirical questions, which have so far found no satisfactory response. 
This thesis provides empirical evidence on the distinctive characteristics of essential patents, 
on how investment in essential patents is affected by patent pools and informal consortia, 
and on the effect of essential patents on the technological progress of standards. 
The Ph.D. thesis is organized along three research axes. The first axis analyzes the specific 
characteristics of essential patents, reflecting their role as original appropriation mechanism. 
The first chapter of the thesis highlights that, among essential patents, the technological 
significance of the underlying invention is uncorrelated with measures of the private value of 
the patent. This finding provides an economic foundation for the analysis of the patent 
inflation – a multiplication of increasingly insignificant essential patents watering down the 
value of the significant inventions. I furthermore show that this effect is confined to the 
sample of essential patents, and cannot be generalized to the so-called complex technology 
classes. The chapter also makes a methodological contribution through an assessment of 
patent quality indicators for research on cumulative innovation. I highlight that while the 
number of forward citations is the most meaningful indicator in the case of discrete 
innovation, the number of claims and the generality index are more relevant in the case of 
cumulative innovation. This finding has guided the methodology of the following analysis. 
The second chapter analyzes the characteristics of essential patents introduced into patent 
pools. Patents added to the pool over time are increasingly narrow, incremental and 
insignificant. The patents introduced by incumbent pool members are narrower and less 
significant than patents introduced by new entrants. Using a novel indicator, I furthermore 
show that patents introduced into the pool over time are increasingly focused upon the 
standard underlying the pool, and that incumbent members introduce patents which are more 
focused upon the standard. I discuss the hypothesis that the royalty sharing rules practiced 
by these pools, which do not account for the significance of the underlying invention, induce 
opportunistic patenting on standard-essential technology. Incumbent members could hereby 
benefit from a better access to the pool, for instance through a learning on the criteria of 
essentiality. I also discus alternative explanations for these findings: founding members of 
pools are coalitions of firms who have developed the technological core of the standard. The 
central position of these firms, independently from the creation of a pool, allows them to 
obtain a large number of standard-essential patents. Another explanation is that the creation 
25 
 
of a patent pool streamlines further technological development of the standard towards the 
technologies which are available from the pool.  
The second axis measures standard-related patenting, and analyzes how the incentives to 
obtain standard-essential patents are affected by patent pools and informal standardization 
consortia. The third chapter of the thesis discusses empirical evidence for the effects of 
prospective patent pool creation on standard-related patenting. So far, there is only empirical 
evidence on the effects of pooling existing patents upon follow-up patenting.  The theoretical 
literature however focuses upon ex ante effects of expected patent pool creation on the 
incentives to file patents that could be included into this pool. We find evidence supporting 
the predictions that prospective patent pool creation induces an increase in related patenting. 
Furthermore, we show that standard-related patenting is anticipated with respect to the usual 
timing when a patent pool is expected. Nevertheless, we argue that the possibility to create 
patent pools is not a significant driver of the increasing number of essential patents.  
The fourth chapter shows that depending upon the IPR policy, collaborative R&D for 
technology standards can be characterized by either under-investment or over-investment. If 
rewards for essential patents are insufficient, the public good nature of the standard induces 
free riding and underinvestment, while excessive rewards induce patent races and over-
investment. Informal standardization consortia streamlining the collaborative R&D effort not 
only increase the R&D efficiency of their members, but can also attenuate either type of 
inefficiency. Using the participation of non-practicing entities to identify standards 
characterized by over-investment, we find that the effect of consortia membership on 
standard-related patenting is always positive in cases of under-investment, whereas it is 
weaker or even negative in cases of over-investment. 
The third research axis analyzes the consequences of the inclusion of patented technology 
on the dynamics of standardization. The fifth chapter of the thesis shows that the inclusion of 
patented technology into a standard increases the expected lifetime before standard 
replacement, but induces more frequent upgrades of existing standards. Essential patents 
thus induce a more continuous technological progress, while reducing the incidence of 
fundamental changes to the incorporated technology. While more frequent standard 
upgrades can partly explain the effect of essential patents on the rate of standard 
replacement, we still find evidence for a significant effect of patents on the expected lifetime 
of standards even when controlling for the frequency of upgrades. This finding indicates that 
essential patents also contribute to slowing down standard replacement through other 
mechanisms, such as rent-seeking strategies and vested interests in standard development. 
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In addition to providing empirical responses to specific research questions, my research 
sheds light on the more general interaction between standardization and technological 
progress. In the analysis of the various novel phenomena at the interface between patents 
and standards, I develop an integrated and original conception of standardization and clarify 
the distinctive economic function of essential patents. In my analysis, standardization is a 
selection mechanism, selecting certain technological elements as the basis for further 
technological progress. Standardization is thus an integral part of the process of cumulative 
innovation. In vast parts of the literature, standardization is analyzed as an adoption decision, 
as a choice among existing technological options. In the chapters of my thesis, I show that 
standardization accompanies and often precedes the relevant R&D effort. I also analyze 
standards as dynamic objects: in contrast to patents, standards evolve, and constantly 
change. A second distinctive feature of my analysis is the conception of essential patents as 
a very specific appropriation mechanism. Indeed, rather than property rights on distinct bits 
of technology, essential patents function as claims on the fruit of joint work. Obtaining an 
essential patent on a standard means obtaining a say on the future of the standard. Essential 
patents are the basic instrument for bargaining and contracting on the levels of future 
investment and shares in the expected revenue. In the same line, including patented 
technology into a standard means more than just acquiring a useful invention. It also means 
gaining a new sponsor for the standard, and to the worse or the best, it means gaining a new 
member of the family of stakeholders.  
My thesis does however not provide a settled theory of the role of essential patents. I like to 
think of this research as a contribution to the ongoing cumulative effort to understand the 
interface between patents and standards. It consists in five research papers, streamlined 
towards the open gaps in the relevant literature by the selection mechanism operating 
through the review process of academic journals, and coordinated through helpful 
discussions with academic colleagues in twelve international conferences. At this place, I 
should acknowledge that I have integrated comments and suggestions from various 
anonymous referees, the discussants at the different conferences, and my colleagues at 
Mines ParisTech, TU Berlin and Hitotsubashi University. Reiko Aoki, Rudi Bekkers, Marc 
Bourreau, Nancy Gallini, Tobias Kretschmer, Anne Layne-Farrar, Aija Leiponen, Sadao 
Nagaoka, Mark Schankerman, Tim Simcoe and many others that I forget have provided 
helpful support and suggestions in discussions and emails. The different papers are co-
authored on equal basis with Knut Blind, Henry Delcamp, Yann Ménière and Tim Pohlmann. 
Overall, this thesis is a genuine part of a process of distributed innovation in the spirit of my 
analysis. 
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Chapter I : The Private and Social Value of 
Patents in Discrete and Cumulative Innovation 
 
 
 
 
La valeur privée et sociale des brevets en innovation discrète et 
cumulative 
 
Cet article analyse le rapport entre valeur privée et sociale des brevets, en comparant 
l’innovation discrète et cumulative. Il est établi que les indicateurs de la valeur sociale des 
brevets sont moins corrélés avec les indicateurs de valeur privée dans des champs 
technologiques caractérisés par un type d’innovation plus cumulatif. Nous analysons si ce 
résultat est du à un lien moins fort entre valeur privée et valeur sociale, ou si les indicateurs 
sont eux-mêmes moins aptes à mesurer les différents concepts de valeur. Par ailleurs, nous 
analysons si cette spécificité de certains champs technologiques est réellement imputable au 
caractère cumulatif de l’innovation. Nous observons l’innovation cumulative grâce à des 
bases de données de brevets déclarés essentiels à des standards technologiques. En 
utilisant l’analyse factorielle et un ensemble d’indicateurs de qualité de brevets, nous 
estimons l’importance de la valeur sociale pour déterminer la valeur privée d’un brevet, 
mesurée à travers des données de renouvellement et de litiges. Alors que nous trouvons une 
corrélation robuste et significative entre valeur privée et valeur sociale dans le cas de 
technologies discrètes, ni les facteurs communs, ni les indicateurs spécifiques de la valeur 
sociale permettent de prédire la valeur privée dans le cas des brevets essentiels, issus d’un 
type d’innovation très cumulatif. Néanmoins, ce résultat ne peut pas être généralisé à des 
classes technologiques entières classifiées comme classes de technologies complexes par 
la littérature. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Patents play an important role in modern economies, especially in the growing sector of 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). At the same time, ICT patents are seen 
with increasing suspicion. One important source of concern is the importance of cumulative 
innovation in ICT. For the purpose of this inquiry, cumulative innovation is defined as a 
process whereby various strongly complementary inventions need to be bundled together for 
any commercial application. In technological fields where cumulative innovation is dominant, 
patents do not provide their owner with a monopoly right over a marketable invention, but 
rather with a blocking power over a jointly controlled technology. This could explain why the 
economic literature has evidenced different patenting strategies in technological fields such 
as ICT or software than in other technologies (Cohen et al., 2000). For instance, recent 
research highlights the importance of strategic patenting in these technological fields 
(Bessen and Hunt, 2003; Noel and Schankerman, 2006). It is a widely shared belief that an 
important share of the numerous patents filed in these fields is of questionable value (Jaffe 
and Lerner, 2004). Furthermore, there is skepticism about the contribution of these 
numerous patents to technological progress (Bessen and Maskin, 2006). Many scholars 
raise concerns that cumulative innovation in ICT might be stifled in a dense “patent thicket” 8 
(Shapiro, 2001) with many low quality patents having a blocking capacity. 
For many economists, the patent thicket problem weakens innovation incentives by reducing 
returns on significant innovations through patent inflation and litigation, while allowing 
litigious firms to earn much on patents of dubious technological significance (Shapiro, 2001; 
Bessen, 2003). The core prediction of this theory is thus that the link between the social 
value and the private value of the patent for its owner erodes. Social value of a patent 
designates the contribution of the underlying invention to social welfare9, including both 
future technological developments and the value of current commercial applications. As 
opposed to social value, the private value only encompasses the value of a patent for its 
owner. 
The link between the private and social value of patents is important for the capacity of the 
patent system to reward innovators for socially desirable innovations. If the link is weakened, 
                                                          
8
 Patent thickets can be defined as: “a dense web of overlapping intellectual property rights that 
a company must hack its way through in order to actually commercialize new technology.” (Shapiro, 
2001) 
9
 The earlier literature often refers to a broader concept of “patent quality”. Nevertheless, the concept 
of patent quality lacks a clear definition. We will therefore stick to the better defined concept of patent 
value, and rely upon the traditional distinction between private and social value of inventions. This 
distinction dates back at least to Arrow (1962). 
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the patent system is at risk to encourage strategic patenting on incremental contributions 
rather than inventive efforts and significant innovations. We will therefore address the crucial 
issue of the link between private and social value of patents with a special focus on 
cumulative technologies. 
Probably one of the most prominent examples of cumulative technologies is ICT 
standardization. Standards are means of ensuring compatibility between complementary 
technological components. Standardization is thus a crucial feature of cumulative innovation. 
Standard setting has evolved to an original form of joint development of common 
technological platforms in highly profitable markets such as mobile telephony, wireless 
communication, digital data processing and consumer electronics. The question whether the 
patent system is able to appropriately reward innovators for their contributions to this 
cumulative technological innovation is a crucial policy issue. This is evidenced by the 
debates around sharing of royalty surplus between the owners of patents included into 
standards (Swanson and Baumol, 2005; Salant, 2009). Therefore, standardization is a 
perfect way to identify patents on cumulative inventions, even though not all cumulative 
sectors are subject to standardization. 
Going beyond the narrowly defined, yet extremely important, technology markets around 
formal standardization, there are attempts in the literature to identify broader technological 
fields in which technology is more cumulative. Many authors have relied upon the 
technological classification of patents by patent examiners, proposing a categorization in 
discrete and complex technology classes. In this definition, the difference between complex 
and discrete technological classes is that a complex class is characterized by stronger 
cumulativeness10. Even though the concrete classification varies from study to study, ICT 
technologies are consistently classified as complex. ICT is indeed characterized by high 
citation rates among patents, indicating strong cumulativeness of research (Nagaoka, 2005), 
and it concentrates the majority of mutually blocking patent rights (Von Graevenitz et al. 
2009).  
In several empirical studies11 on the capacity of indicators of the social value of patents to 
predict private value, electronics and other “complex” technological fields have revealed a 
low link between measures of private and social value. Nevertheless, these studies do not 
reveal whether the capacity of social value indicators to predict measures of private value is 
                                                          
10
 See for instance Cohen et al. (2000), p. 19: “[…], the key difference between a complex and a 
discrete technology is whether a new, commercializable product or process is comprised of numerous 
separately patentable elements versus relatively few” 
11
 E.g. Hall et al. (2005) and Lanjouw and Schankerman (1999), for a more detailed literature review, 
see Part I. 
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weaker because the link between private and social value is weaker, or because the 
indicators are themselves less informative of the underlying concepts of value. Furthermore, 
none of these studies has clearly established whether cumulativeness per se is driving this 
apparently lower link between indicators of the social and private value of patents, or whether 
other specificities of technological classes classified as “complex” could be the reason for 
these results.  
It is an important contribution of the present study to disentangle these issues. First, we 
analyze whether the observed differences in the relationship between measures of private 
and social value are due to differences in the performance of indicators to measure the 
underlying concept, or in the link between the concepts themselves. Therefore, in this study 
we will use a broad range of indicators to measure the social value of patents: forward 
citations, backward citations, number of claims, family size, and originality and generality 
indices. We observe the private value of patents by predicting the likelihood of renewal after 
4, 8 and 12 years of patent terms and check the robustness of our results by using litigation 
data as alternative measure of private value12. We are thus able to disentangle the link 
between private and social value from the performance of indicators. 
Second, we analyze whether these differences between patents in complex and discrete 
technology classes are due to the cumulativeness of research. For this purpose, we compare 
random complex technology patents to patents that are essential to technological standards 
and thus perfect examples of cumulative innovation. We will therefore study three different 
samples of patents. The first sample consists of patents declared as essential to 
technological standards, and allows testing directly the characteristics of cumulative 
innovation. In order to analyze whether these effects can be generalized to the broader 
technological field, we compare our sample of essential patents with a control sample of 
sibling patents from the same technological classes as the essential patents, classified as 
complex by the related literature. Finally, we introduce a third sample of patents with the 
same application years as our two other samples, but randomly drawn from patent classes 
that are consistently classified as discrete by the related literature. We then compare the link 
between the private and social value of patents from sample to sample. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Part I summarizes the literature and 
sketches our main contributions to the state of the art. Part II describes the data and 
discusses the construction of the samples. Part III summarizes the results of the factor 
analysis. In Part IV, we will describe how the quality factor performs in predicting patent 
                                                          
12
 for a discussion of these measures of patent private value, see Lanjouw and Schankerman, 1999 
and Bessen, 2006 
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value as measured through patent renewals. Part V discusses the implications of our results 
for policy and research methodology. 
  
2. Analytical framework 
 
It is the aim of this part to provide an overview over the literature and to sketch our main 
contributions to the state of the art. In the first part, we summarize the economic literature on 
the measurement of the social value of patents, and in particular the use of patent indicators. 
In the second part, we discuss results of previous studies using these indicators to analyze 
the relationship between private and social value. In both parts we focus particularly on the 
distinction between discrete and cumulative innovation. In the third part, we show how the 
present study goes beyond and complements the previous findings. 
 
2.1 Measuring the social value of patents: the literature on patent 
indicators 
There is a longstanding tradition in economic research to measure the output of innovative 
activity with patent data. Nevertheless, patents are very heterogeneous, as some patents are 
very important, while many patents are never used. As this heterogeneity of patents reduces 
the significance of patent counts as measure of innovation output, empirical research seeks 
for ways to weight patent counts by measures of the social value of the patents.  
Various strategies exist to compare the social value of patents: the literature has used e.g. 
expert rankings, case studies, or survey analysis. Nevertheless, these strategies are not 
available for studies of broad technological sectors with a very high number of relevant 
patents. Therefore the economic literature systematically relies upon indicators of patent 
quality. Indicators are quantitative patent characteristics that are easily observable and are 
thought to reflect their social value. 
The most commonly used indicators are the number of citations a patent receives by 
posterior patents (so-called forward citations), the number of claims, and the size of the 
patent family (i.e. the number of international patent files with the same priority patent) 
(Griliches, 1990). Other indicators of social value include the number of backward citations, 
i.e. the number of patents cited as prior art and the patent’s generality index (measuring the 
dispersion of prior art over technology classes) and originality index (measuring the 
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dispersion of citing patents over technology classes). Table 1 summarizes the main 
indicators used in the literature. 
 
Name of the Indicator Description Justification 
Forward citations Number of citations received 
by posterior patents 
Indicates the relevance of the 
patent for further research 
Backward citations Number of citations made to 
previous patents 
Indicates the extent to which 
the patent makes use of the 
existing prior art 
Number of claims The number of priority claims 
made in the patent 
Indicates the breadth of the 
technology claimed by the 
patent holder 
Family size The number of international 
patents filed for the same 
priority patent 
Indicates that a patent is 
important on an international 
scale, and that the validity of 
the patent has been certified 
by various patent offices 
Generality Dispersion of cited patents 
over technology classes 
Indicates that the patent 
draws from various sources, 
increases the likelihood that 
the patent is a fundamental 
rather then incremental 
innovation 
Originality Dispersion of citing patents 
over technology classes 
Indicates that the patent has 
been important for a broad 
field of further research 
Table 1: Patent quality indicators 
 
These indicators are often used indiscriminately in different sectors and to measure a vague 
and little defined social value of patents. However, the indicators capture at best 
heterogeneous phenomena associated with this social value. For example, the number of 
claims could indicate the breadth of a patent whereas forward citations measure 
technological significance for further research. These specific phenomena could be, 
according to the field and the aim of the study, more or less relevant. Thus, these indicators 
may be, according to the sector, considered as more or less suited to a study of a specific 
situation. Consequently, assessing the reliability of social value indicators is crucial.  
For instance, the performance of the forward citations indicator has been repeatedly 
assessed and confirmed. Trajtenberg (1990-1) shows on a sample of computed tomography 
patents that more highly cited patents contribute more to consumer and producer welfare, 
Harhoff and al. (1999) show that patent holders value higher those of their patents that 
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receive more citations, and Giummo (2003) finds that patents more often cited are more 
likely to be licensed. It has furthermore been shown that patents cited more frequently are 
more likely to be litigated (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 1999) or to be included into 
technological standards (Rysman and Simcoe, 2008). In a different approach, Lanjouw and 
Schankerman (2004) carry through a factor analysis on four indicators of social value and 
identify a strong common variability with one single common factor capturing an important 
part of the variance in the data. They argue that patent “quality” is the only underlying factor 
that could be thought of to jointly affect the number of claims, forward and backward citations 
and the size of the families. They furthermore argue that using a common underlying factor 
of various indicators rather than a single indicator allows reducing the noise and improves 
the capacities of indicators to approximate patent “quality”. 
Probably, the most important challenge to the general use of patent indicators is the 
heterogeneity of the patent population. The functions and the mechanisms of patents can 
vary very much according to external factors, such as the type of assignee, the grant year 
and especially the field of technology. It is important in our context to make sure that for 
instance cumulativeness does not affect the capacity of indicators to measure the social 
value adequately. 
For several reasons the cumulativeness of a technological field could have an impact on the 
measures used as indicators of social value of patents. For instance, the cumulativeness of 
innovation mechanically affects the average number of forward citations (Nagaoka, 2005). 
Indeed, a patent has a higher chance of being cited in a technological field where 
technological inventions strongly build upon each other. For the same reason, a patent in 
such a dense web will have to cite more previous art than a comparable patent in another 
technological field.  
Also patenting strategies are different from discrete to cumulative innovation, which could 
have an impact on specific indicators. For instance, in cumulative innovation, not all 
complementary parts of a technology need to be patented in every single office in order to 
exclude potential imitation. Therefore patent families are larger in discrete than in cumulative 
innovation. Furthermore, the existence of overlapping patents in cumulative innovation could 
provide incentives to raise the number of claims, as increasing the number of claims 
increases the chances of the patent to be relevant to future developments of a jointly held 
technology (Berger and al., 2012).  
The fact that the indicators are driven upwards or downwards by the cumulativeness of 
innovation in a particular technological field does not impede that variance inside a sample of 
patents from this technological field indicates differences in the social value of patents. For 
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instance, Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) in their factor analysis of four indicators over 
samples of patents from different technological fields identify a “quality” factor that is roughly 
consistent over technological differences. Nevertheless, the common variability of the 
indicators captured by this factor is lower in electronics, and the relative weights of the 
different indicators included in the factor are different. These results could indicate that even 
though the indicators still evidence a common “quality” factor in complex technology classes, 
they yield less consistent results in these sectors where innovation is more cumulative. 
The reviewed literature provides several arguments why patent indicators perform differently 
well in measuring the social value of patents in discrete and cumulative innovation. It is 
therefore important to test the consistency of patent indicators across different technological 
fields before analyzing differences in the link between the social and private value of patents.  
 
2.2 The link between private and social value of patents: cumulative 
vs. discrete innovation 
Economic research draws a clear distinction between private and social value of inventions 
(Arrow, 1962; Trajtenberg 1990-2). As mentioned before, the social value represents the total 
net value created by the patent for social welfare. The concept of private value takes into 
account only the value added of the patent for its owner: it can thus be defined as the 
depreciated sum of expected cash flows or the contribution of the patent to the market value 
of the owning firm. The private value can also be expressed as the social value minus all 
positive13 and negative externalities14 (Bloom et al., 2010). The social value is thus a causal 
determinant of the private value of the patent. Private value is furthermore determined by the 
ability of the owner to appropriate the value generated by the patent and to exclude the 
generation of positive externalities (Trajtenberg et al., 1997). On the other hand the private 
value can also exceed the social value of patents, if additionally to reaping the added value 
of the protected technology they allow leveraging on related innovations, for instance in the 
case of patent thickets.  
In a very complete review of the literature, Van Zeebroeck and Van Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie (2011) highlight the conceptual difference between determinants and indicators of 
patent value. Indeed, the empirical literature relies upon statistical patent indicators as 
measures of private patent value. As discussed, the same patent characteristics are as well 
used to measure the social value of patents. As such, they are often determinants rather 
                                                          
13
 such as for consumers, intermediaries, and follow-up inventors 
14
 such as the effect on the profits of a competitor 
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than indicators of private patent value. The use of a specific variable as indicator of private or 
social value of patents depends upon the research setting. Recent research (Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 2004; Bessen, 2006) focuses upon patent renewal and litigation decisions as 
measures of private value, as costly renewal and litigation decisions reveal a minimal 
threshold value of the patent to its owner. Thus, the private value of patents is measured 
indirectly, through the observation of the behaviour of the agents, which reveals the value 
that they attribute to their patent. The remaining observable characteristics, such as 
technological significance as measured by citations, the breadth of the patent as measured 
by the number of claims, and application strategies such as family size, are used to 
represent the social value of patents. Assuming a correlation between social and private 
value, these indicators can thus be analyzed as causal determinants of private value. 
An increasing strand of empirical literature has studied the link between private and social 
value of patents. Hall et al. (2005) and Nagaoka (2005) analyze the correlation between 
patent indicators reflecting the social value of patents and the market value of the patent 
owner, and Lanjouw and Schankerman (1999) and Thomas (1999) analyze the impact of 
patent “quality” indicators on the probability that a patent is renewed. Consistently, all studies 
evidence a strong link between private and social value, but there is also evidence for strong 
differences across technological fields.  
Many arguments pointing to a divergence between the private and social value of patents 
relate to the cumulativeness of research. Different strands of research have established that 
firm strategies with respect to patents differ from cumulative to discrete technologies. In 
cumulative technologies, many firms use patents for other reasons than excluding their rivals 
from the use of their technology (Cohen et al., 2000). Most notably, many firms active in 
cumulative technologies rely heavily on cross-licensing agreements to cut their way through 
patent thickets (Shapiro, 2001) and engage into patent portfolio races (Hall and Ziedonis, 
2001). Hereby patent portfolios play an important role as “mass of negotiation”.  
Thus, the way how patents create value could be different from discrete to cumulative 
technological fields. According to this argument, the value is not only derived from the use of 
the technology, but from the possibility to use the patent as a threat of exclusion and mass of 
negotiation.  The possibility to use patents as bargaining chips has two implications on the 
private value of patents: first, there is an incremental value to holding a patent in cumulative 
innovation which is independent of the social value of the underlying invention. In line with 
this hypothesis, Liu et al. (2008) find that patents relating to sequential innovation held by the 
same owner are more valuable. Second, in cases of cumulative innovation, the private value 
of the patent for its holder is less determined by the intrinsic significance of the underlying 
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invention. For instance, Noel and Schankerman (2006) find evidence that the contribution of 
software patents to firm value depends upon fragmentation of patents in patent thickets and 
upon strategic patenting by competitors. In very cumulative innovation, and most notably in 
the realm of telecommunication standards, the perceived disconnection between the social 
value of patents and the royalty revenue that they generate for their owner has spurred a 
long series of litigation and regulatory efforts15.  
Consistently with these arguments, several empirical findings highlight weaker links between 
indicators of private and social value of patents in “complex” technological classes, where 
cumulative innovation is assumed to be more important. These contributions build upon the 
idea that technologies can be categorized into complex and discrete technologies, whereby 
complex technologies are characterized by a dominance of cumulative innovation and a 
strong incidence of patent thickets16. This distinction originates in a paper of Levin et al. from 
1987 and has by now been studied by an extensive body of research17.  
Lanjouw and Schankerman (1999) use a compound factor of “quality” indicators (claims, 
forward citations, family size and backward citations) to predict patent litigation and renewal 
as measure of private value. They emphasize a strong link between patents’ private value 
and indicators of “quality”; but this link is less obvious for the electronics sector. Hall et al. 
(2005) underline that the impact of citations on the contribution of patents to the firms’ market 
value differs according to the type of technology. They especially highlight that the impact of 
patent citations on market value is over 50% higher for drugs than the average effect. This 
effect is lower for computers than that for the other sectors. They explain this difference by 
the cumulativeness of innovation:  “Computers and Communications is a group of complex 
product industries where any particular product may rely on various technologies embodied 
in several patents held by different firms. In this industry patents are largely valued for 
negotiating cross-licensing agreements, so their individual quality is not as important, 
although having them is”. On the other hand, Nagaoka (2005) finds that forward citations are 
more correlated with firm market value in ICT and other industries where innovation is 
cumulative.  
 
                                                          
15
 There is an increasingly precise regulatory framework for licensing patents in these very cumulative 
technologies, as it is not clear that market mechanisms will yield prices that are in adequate proportion 
to the technological contribution of the patent. A recent example is the drastically extended chapter on 
standardization in the draft guidelines on the applicability of European Competition Law to Horizontal 
Cooperation Agreements, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2010_horizontals/guidelines_en.pdf 
16 Harhoff  et al. (2008) 
17 Levin et al. (1987), Merges and Nelson (1990), Cohen et al. (2000) 
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2.3 Our contribution to the state of the art 
The empirical literature has repeatedly found differences in the link between indicators of 
private and social value of patents between technological classes. These differences have 
been widely attributed to implications of more or less cumulative innovation, as theoretical 
arguments predict a weaker link between private and social value of patents when innovation 
is cumulative. However, the empirical validation of this hypothesis faces two methodological 
challenges. First, it is necessary to make sure that the measurement of private and social 
value is consistent throughout the samples to be compared. In previous studies, differences 
between discrete and cumulative innovation have been either attributed to measurement 
issues, regarding the performance of indicators (e.g. Lanjouw and Schankerman, 1999), or to 
economic differences in the link between private and social value (e.g. Hall et al. 2005). 
Second, it is not straightforward to identify cumulativeness of innovation. Previous studies 
have relied upon patent classification into complex and discrete patent classes, but it is 
unclear to what extent technological classes can capture higher or lower degrees of 
cumulativeness18. It is the main contribution of our paper to jointly resolve these two 
methodological challenges. 
We address the first point running a factor analysis to identify the common variance of patent 
indicators. We can thus test in a first stage the consistency of patent indicators in the 
different samples, and use the underlying factors rather than single indicators as measures 
of social value. With respect to previous studies, we enlarge the set of indicators, by adding 
generality and originality indices to the traditional indicators. In the factor analysis, we will 
allow for two rather than one common factor, in order to capture a broad concept of social 
value.  
We have defined social value as the contribution of a patent or the underlying invention to 
social welfare. The first aspect of the social value of a patent is thus the impact of the 
underlying invention on current welfare and future technological progress. Nevertheless, we 
argue that when inventions are cumulative, it is unclear whether it is possible to assess their 
individual social value in terms of impact. Indeed, the idea of cumulativeness implies that 
each single invention is necessary to allow the bundle of inventions to have an impact. In 
                                                          
18
 Indeed, the notion of complex technology fields seems problematic in light of e.g. recent evolutions 
in the field of biotechnology. Biotechnology comprises a set of technological advancements in the field 
of medical drugs, plant breeding and crops. These technological fields are traditionally classified as 
discrete. Biotechnology itself however is characterized by an important degree of cumulativeness, with 
strong incidence of patent thickets and cross-licensing. This example shows that processes of strongly 
cumulative innovation can occur also in “discrete” technological fields. On the other hand, also in 
complex technology fields there are inventions that can individually be commercialized. For this 
reason, it is important to directly identify cumulative technologies, and to assess to what respect 
technological classification is able to capture the effects of cumulativeness. 
39 
 
order to capture differences in the significance and social value of single inventions relating 
to a cumulative research effort, we thus believe that it is necessary to allow for aspects of 
social value other than direct measures of impact.  
Second, in order to identify cumulativeness, we introduce a sample of patents that are 
declared essential for technological standards. This sample reveals the effects of 
cumulativeness, as standardization is a pure case of cumulative innovation. We will compare 
a sample of (complex) patents declared as essential to technological standards with a control 
sample of patents from exactly the same (complex) technology classes, and another control 
sample of patents classified as discrete. This methodology allows us to establish whether 
particularities of patents classified in “complex” technology classes are really due to 
cumulativeness, and to disentangle the effects of cumulativeness from the technological 
class a patent belongs to.  
We now turn to a description of the construction of the database and provide descriptive 
statistics for the various samples. 
 
3. Data and Descriptive statistics 
 
3.1 Construction of the samples and variables 
Our objective is to analyze the way cumulativeness impacts the link between private and 
social value of patents. As discussed, we make use of two different strategies in order to 
identify cumulative innovation: first, we use data on patents essential for technological 
standards as a pure case of cumulative innovation. Second, we will use a sample of random 
patents classified in the same technological classes as the essential patents. These 
technological classes are consistently classified as “complex” classes in the relevant 
literature. 
As data are most constrained for standard-essential patents, we first constituted a database 
of US patents that are essential to technological standards (Sample 1). This database is 
derived from patent disclosures at 8 standard setting organizations (SSOs) collected by 
Rysman and Simcoe19 and from the websites of seven different patent pools (lists of SSOs 
                                                          
19
 Data available online at http://www.ssopatents.org/  
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and patent pools can be found in the appendix 3). It comprises overall 3343 essential 
patents20. 
By merging these patent lists with the NBER patent database, we inform the technology 
classes of 3128 patents and verify that the patents in our database cover technology classes 
that are classified as “complex” according to previous literature21. The concrete classification 
of technological classes into complex or discrete is still subject to debate. In our analysis, we 
will concentrate on clear cut cases of classes classified as complex or discrete according to 
several methodologies22. Details on our selection of classes can be found in appendix 4. 
Based on the remaining patents, we construct a sample of siblings. These are US patents 
with the same application year and the same technology class randomly chosen from the 
NBER patent database. This second sample is what we will call in the following the group of 
complex, non-essential patents (Sample 2). 
Finally, we build up a third sample of discrete patents (Sample 3). These are patents with the 
same application years as the patents in the other two samples, randomly chosen from a 
large range of discrete technology classes in the NBER patent database. The detailed, three-
digit technology classes of both the complex and the discrete patent samples can be 
consulted in appendix. 
Overall, we have 9255 patent observations. The NBER patent database yields information on 
citation flows and other important variables. We inform the number of forward citations 
(including and excluding self-citations), backward citations as well as the generality and 
originality indices, both building upon citation data. We furthermore retrieve the number of 
claims, the application year and the grant year. We complete this information on patents 
using the website of the European Patent Office www.espacenet.com, where we retrieve the 
size of the patent families and indications on renewals. 
Finally, using the Stanford IP litigation database (www.lexmachina.org), we generate a 
dummy variable - litigated - which gives 1 if the patent has been cited in at least one law suit 
in the database. 
 
                                                          
20
 993 of these patents are part of a patent pool 
21
 See von Harhoff et al. (2008) or Cohen et al. (2000) 
22
 For instance, we rely upon the classifications used by von Graevenitz et al. (2009) and Cohen et al. 
(2000) 
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3.2 Descriptive statistics 
In this section, we will use the comprehensive database to provide first descriptive statistics. 
In a first step, we will provide statistics on the average scores of indicators in the different 
samples (Table 2). While these statistics do not inform about the linkages between 
indicators, they corroborate several arguments on factors affecting the performance of single 
indicators in the comparison between discrete and cumulative innovation. For instance, we 
confirm earlier findings that citation rates are higher in complex technology classes and that 
patent families are larger in discrete technology classes: both backward and forward cite 
rates are significantly higher in Samples 1 and 2 than in Sample 3 whereas the scores for 
claims are not significantly different, and family size is much bigger in Sample 3 than in 
Sample 2. These differences of indicator levels in the different samples provide a further 
justification for our use of composite indicators to measure social value. 
Regarding measures of private value, we confirm previous findings that the litigation rate is 
indeed higher in complex than in discrete industries (1.4 compared to 1 %)23. Furthermore, 
higher renewal rates in Samples 1 and 2 provide further evidence that less patents are of low 
value to their owners in complex technologies. Essential patents in Sample 1 are clearly 
found to be of a higher value to their owners, as indicated by much higher renewal and 
litigation rates. 
Patents in Sample 1 score high on all the quality indicators and on renewal and litigation rate. 
This provides evidence that we are confronted with a selection effect: essential patents are 
not only more strongly cumulative, but also more valuable than average patents from their 
technological field. This bias can result from the fact that standard setting organizations often 
choose between different technological options and select the best technologies for inclusion 
into the standard. In the remainder of the analysis, we will have to control for this selection 
effect. We want to make sure that our findings on the link between private and social value in 
the sample of essential patents can be attributed to the strongly cumulative nature of these 
patents, and not to their high private and social value. 
  
                                                          
23
 This could hint to the fact that patents are indeed used in a slightly more “litigious” way in complex 
industries, and corroborates the argument that patents generate value in a different way from complex 
to discrete technological fields. 
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Complete 
sample 
 
 
Sample 1 : Essential, 
very cumulative 
patents 
Sample 2 : 
Complex 
technology classes 
Sample 3 : 
Discrete 
technology classes 
 
Mean 
  
Standard 
deviation 
Mean  
 
Standard 
deviation 
Mean  
 
Standard 
deviation 
Mean  
 
Standard 
deviation 
Allnscites 23,35 42,76 40,15 57,86 20,93 36,66 8,58 15,42 
Backward 
citations 9,30 14,12 11,72 16,18 8,87 15,38 7,28 9,67 
Claims 16,85 15,09 19,66 17,54 15,77 12,92 15,19 14,07 
Family size 15,66 46,33 24,75 62,67 6,51 17,88 13,64 40,15 
Generality 0,35 0,37 0,43 0,35 0,39 0,37 0,22 0,34 
Originality 0,23 0,24 0,25 0,22 0,26 0,25 0,14 0,22 
Renewal at 8 0,73 0,44 0,95 0,21 0,73 0,44 0,59 0,49 
Renewal at 12 0,57 0,50 0,92 0,27 0,55 0,50 0,37 0,48 
Litigated  0,03 0,17 0,07 0,25 0,01 0,12 0,01 0,10 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of indicators 
 
4. The quality indicators relevant for different 
types of technologies: the principal factor 
analysis 
 
The aim of this part is to compare the consistency of indicators among the three different 
samples of patents using factor analysis. Factor analysis is a way to relate common 
variability among observed variables to a smaller number of underlying variables, called 
factors. Factor analysis estimates how much of the variability of the observed variables is 
due to common underlying factors. Thus, the factor analysis uses a large number of 
observations and reveals common patterns underlying the variables24. In this part we will use 
the factor analysis for our three samples: Sample 1 (essential, very cumulative patents), 
Sample 2 (complex technology classes) and Sample 3 (discrete technology classes). The 
objective is to study the consistency of the different indicators and to analyze if a common 
pattern exists among the samples.  
We first want to make sure that our samples are comparable to those used in earlier 
analyses, and especially Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004). We therefore reproduce the 
earlier methodology and run a factor analysis on the four indicators most frequently used to 
assess the social value of a patent, namely the number of forward citations, the number of 
claims, the number of backward citations and the family size of the patent. We only make the 
                                                          
24
  In economics, factor analysis is used when capturing a common phenomenon is more interesting 
than analyzing individual variables. Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004) first used the principal factor 
analysis to identify an overall patent “quality” factor through four indicators. 
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comparison for Samples 2 and 3. Our results on this first factor analysis (presented in annex 
1) are very close to the previous results using the same methodology.  We highlight that the 
impact of forward citations on the common factor 1 is more important in Sample 3 than in 
Sample 2. Inversely, the impact of the number of claims is more important in Sample 2. We 
can also highlight that the common variability explained by factor 1 is less important in 
Sample 2.  
We then implement our methodological innovations discussed above. First, we introduce our 
Sample 1 of essential patents, and second we include two additional indicators: the 
originality and the generality of the patent. The generality and originality, measured by the 
number of forward or backward citations between the patent and patents from other 
technological classes, indicate the patents’ interest for broader technological applications 
(Hall et al., 2001). We do not restrict the number of common factors in order to allow for 
various aspects of the social value of patents.  The notion of the social value of a patent 
indeed incorporates various complementary aspects, such as the contribution of an invention 
to social welfare, or the inventive step of a patented invention with respect to the state of the 
art. The following table summarizes the factor loadings for each sample.  
 
 Sample 1 : Essential, very 
cumulative patents 
Sample 2 : Complex 
technology classes 
Sample 3 : Discrete 
technology classes 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 1 Factor 2 
Variance 0.47470 0.28419 0.26113 0.24636 0.48807 0.24936 
Forward 
citations 
0.2139 0.3903 0.3029 0.1377 0.4532 0.0021 
Backward 
citations 
-0.0722 0.0685 0.4036 -0.0143 0.3549 0.0762 
Claims 0.0563 0.3745 0.4197 0.0469 0.2383 -0.0049 
Originality  0.4441 0.0759 -0.0286 0.3467 -0.0794 0.3629 
Generality 0.3828 0.1426 0.1113 0.3276 0.0370 0.3662 
Family size -0.0677 0.1463 0.2102 0.0289 0.4174 -0.0950 
Number of 
observations 
 
3191 
 
3004 
 
3139 
 
Table 3: Loadings factor analysis six indicators 
 
Table 3 highlights that there are two main factors underlying these indicators. A first factor is 
mainly correlated to the number of forward citations, claims and to some extent backward 
citations and family size. This first factor has already been discussed in the literature 
(Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004) and named “quality”. In order to reflect the idea that 
these indicators measure the social impact of the underlying invention, we will call this factor 
“social value – impact”. Table 3 also stresses the existence of a second factor, having an 
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important impact on the indicators’ common variability in all the samples. This second factor 
is mainly linked to the generality and the originality of the patent. In samples 1 and 2, this 
second factor also has significant loadings on the citation indicators. A plausible 
interpretation would be that this factor discriminates between fundamental and incremental 
innovations; which could be the reason why it is particularly linked to the generality and 
originality of the patent but also with the number of citations in the case of complex 
technologies. Trajtenberg et al. (1997) have examined the generality and originality indices 
and argue that these indicators measure the ”basicness” of a patent. In order to refer to this 
concept, we will speak of “social value – basicness”. For the sample of essential patents, the 
common variability of social value indicators is mainly driven by the social value – basicness 
factor.  
This result implies that especially in the case of very cumulative innovation, it is important to 
take various aspects of social value into account. As we have argued above, when 
innovation is cumulative, it is unclear whether it is possible to assess the social value of 
patents in terms of impact. The idea of cumulativeness implies that not each single invention, 
but only all cumulative inventions taken together have an impact. The result on the social 
value -- basicness factor confirms that there exist other aspects to rank the social value of 
cumulative patents. The aspect highlighted by our basicness factor is the place of an 
invention in the innovation chain discriminating between some inventions being fundamental, 
and others being narrow and incremental contributions. 
In spite of the presence of a second factor that is especially important in samples of 
cumulative patents, we identify a social value - impact factor that is roughly consistent across 
the samples. In all three samples, this factor is driven by a positive correlation between 
forward citations, claims and family size. Nevertheless, the loadings of indicators are slightly 
different between complex and discrete technologies. The number of claims seems to have 
more impact than the number of forward citations on the social value - impact factor for 
Sample 2. It is exactly the opposite in Sample 3, where the most important indicator is the 
number of forward citations. Backward citations are important and stable components of the 
social value – impact factor for both Samples 2 and 3, but do not have any importance for 
Sample 1 of essential, highly cumulative patents.  
Another important difference is the variance explained by the social value - impact factor 
between the complex and discrete sample. Indeed, we can underline that this factor explains 
almost fifty percent of the common variability of the indicators for Sample 3. However, in the 
Sample 1 and 2, this factor only explains one fourth of the common variability of the 
indicators.  
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For the social value - basicness factor, we argue that it captures the fundamentality of the 
patent, i.e. its place in a chain of cumulative innovation. This factor is orthogonal to the 
impact factor of the individual patent, and takes into account the relationship between this 
patent and complementary patents. This factor is thus useful for discriminating between 
fundamental, early-stage patents, and incremental patents in a later stage of a cumulative 
innovation effort. Consistently with this interpretation, this factor is more important in the 
samples of complex technology patents, and especially in the sample of strongly cumulative 
essential patents. Indeed, the social value - basicness factor captures almost 50 % of the 
common variability of patent indicators in this particular sample of very cumulative patents. 
We use data on the timing of declaration or introduction of patents into standard setting 
organizations and patent pools to corroborate our interpretation. The results are presented in 
table 4 (appendix 4). They show that both factors are related to being a founding patent. The 
results stress that being a founding patent of a pool or being declared early in a 
standardization project is significantly linked to a high score on the social value - basicness 
factor25. The social value - impact factor is also significantly associated with the likelihood of 
being a founding patent.  
To sum up our main conclusions, we can say that the factor analysis underlines the 
existence of two factors driving the common variability of the indicators. The first one, mainly 
linked to the traditional indicators of “quality”, has already been studied in the literature. The 
second one is mainly driven by the generality and originality of the patent. We call it the 
social value - basicness factor and give some evidence corroborating our interpretation. For 
Sample 1, this basicness factor explains almost half of the common variability of the 
indicators. This is the first time that these different aspects of the social value of patents are 
discussed and empirically related to the private value of patents. While in the case of discrete 
technology patents (Sample 3), one single factor seems sufficient to capture a large part of 
the common variability of indicators of social value, in the case of cumulative innovation, 
allowing for our second factor strongly increases the part of the variability of the indicators 
captured by the underlying factors. 
The traditional “quality” factor, which we call social value – impact factor, seems to remain 
stable (with some minor changes on claims and forward citations) across our three different 
samples except for the importance of the backward citations. Indeed, there is a stable 
covariance of forward citations, claims and family size across the samples. Nevertheless, this 
                                                          
25
 This confirms our interpretation that this factor discriminates between fundamental and incremental 
innovations. 
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factor captures a lower part of the common variability of indicators in Samples 1 and 2. This 
factor is however not less important in Sample 1 than in Sample 2. If there is thus a 
difference in the capacity of patent indicators to measure the social value of patents, this 
difference affects only the comparison of complex and discrete technology patents. The 
patent indicators do not seem to perform worse in capturing the social value in the case of 
the very cumulative essential patents. 
In the next section, we will look at the ability of these factors to predict the private value of 
the patents. In order to assess the private value of a patent, we will use data on renewals 
and litigations. To take into account the instability of backward citations in the social value - 
impact factor, we will use a common factor compound of forward citations, claims and family 
size. Results for the single indicators can be consulted in the appendix. 
 
5. The link between private and social value of 
patents in discrete and cumulative innovation 
As discussed in part I, we expect that the link between indicators of private and social value 
of patents is weakened when innovation is cumulative. We will analyze whether this link is 
weaker for random patents in complex technology classes than for patents in discrete 
technology classes, and whether this link is weaker for essential, very cumulative patents 
than for patents randomly drawn from the same (complex) technology classes. 
Specifically, we will estimate the private value of patents in an ordered logistic regression 
estimation of patent renewals 4, 8 and 12 years after grant. First proposed by Lanjouw et al. 
(1998), patent renewals are by now a well-established indicator of the private value of a 
patent (Bessen, 2006). As every renewal is costly and the cost of patent renewal is 
increasing over time, patent renewal decisions reveal the willingness to pay of the patent 
holder for patent protection. Comparing samples of complex and discrete technology patents, 
we will test whether the common social value factors are less explanatory of patent value in 
complex technologies. We also analyze whether the mere fact of holding a patent is more 
valuable in cumulative innovation, i.e. whether patents in cumulative innovation have a 
higher private value than patents in discrete technologies of the same social value26. 
 
                                                          
26
 See for instance Liu et al. (2008) 
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We have two means to test for the effects of cumulativeness. First, we test for the effect of a 
patent being classified in a “complex” rather than a “discrete” technology class. Complex 
technologies are thought of in the literature as being characterized by a more cumulative 
type of innovation. Second, we use a sample of patents declared essential for standards. As 
explained above, standardization is a procedure to ensure compatibility between 
complementary technologies and therefore a perfect example of cumulative innovation. We 
have thus argued that if cumulative innovation weakens the link between patent quality and 
patent value, this should clearly be seen in the case of essential patents.  
We thus estimate the following baseline equation:  
                   (1) 
where V represents private value, measured through an ordered logistic regression of the 
probability of patent renewal. Q represents social value, measured by the two different social 
value factors established in part III.1. X is a vector of control variables, including application 
year and assignee dummies. These control variables have been chosen in agreement with 
the literature on the subject27. C is a constant and ε is a stochastic error term.  
 
We introduce dummies for complex technologies and essential patents. Both dummies are 
interacted with the social value of patents. 
                                                       (2) 
Hypothesis 1: 
   >  0 and    > 0, there is a premium for patents in cumulative innovation, therefore 
patents in complex technologies (respectively essential patents) are more valuable to 
their owners than patents of the same social value in discrete innovation. This 
hypothesis predicts that cumulativeness has an impact on the level of private value of 
patents. 
 Hypothesis 2: 
   < 0 and    < 0, social value has a lower impact on private value in cumulative 
innovation. This hypothesis predicts that cumulativeness has an impact on the link 
between private and social value. 
 
                                                          
27
 see for instance Hall et al. (2001) on the variables that have an impact on the number of citations 
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Ordered logistic  
Regression renewals 
Ordered logistic  
Regression renewals 
 
Coef. 
 
 
Odds ratios 
 
Coef. 
 
 
Odds ratios 
 
Impact factor 
 
1.07511*** 
(0.267) 
 
2.930*** 
(0.781) 
1.09445*** 
(0.273) 
2.988*** 
(0.814) 
Basicness factor 
  
 
-0.01812  
(0.157) 
0.982 
(0.154) 
Dummy essential 
 
1.7190671*** 
(0.287) 
 
5.579*** 
(1.604) 
1.74413***  
(0.342)  
5.721*** 
(1.956) 
Dummy complex 
 
0.47798*** 
(0.133) 
 
1.613*** 
(0.214) 
0.55548***   
(0.144) 
1.743*** 
(0.251) 
Interaction Impact_essential 
-1.46111** 
(0.563)   
 
0.232** 
(0.131) 
-1.45623* 
(0.615)   
0.233** 
(0.143) 
 
Interaction Impact_complex 
 
0.57896 
(0.363)    
 
1.784 
(0.649) 
0.69004    
(0.376)  
1.994 
(0.749) 
Interaction  
Basicness_essential  
 
-0.31799 
(0.743) 
0.727 
(0.540) 
Interaction  
Basicness_complex  
 
-0.27421 
(0.238) 
0.760 
(0.181) 
 
Grant year 
 
-0.05839 
(0.060) 
 
0.943 
(0.057) 
-0.06079 
(0.060) 
0.941 
(0.057) 
Control appyear dummy Y Y 
Control assignee dummy Y Y 
Number of obs 1637 
 
1637 
 
Log pseudolikelihood -1753.59  
 
-1751.81 
  
Wald chi2 290.41 
 
288.62 
 
Prob > chi2 0.0000 
 
0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0988 
 
0.0998 
Table 4: The link between quality and value for cumulative and discrete innovation 
 
Table 4 allows underlining a couple of results. First of all, only the social value – impact 
factor is significant for the definition of the private value of a patent. The coefficient for the 
social value - impact factor is positive and significant for our two models. The link between 
private value and a compound factor of traditional “quality” indicators is verified in our case. 
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On the other hand, even though important for establishing the social value of a patent, the 
social value – basicness factor does not have any significant effect on the private value of 
patents in any of the samples. Fundamental patents are no more valuable to their owners 
than incremental patents of the same social value – impact. 
Hypothesis 1 is verified, there is a premium for patents in cumulative innovations. Thus, a 
patent in cumulative innovation is more valuable to its owner than a patent of the same social 
value in discrete technologies. This result is confirmed for both patents classified in complex 
technology classes, and for very cumulative essential patents. This finding relates to earlier 
research finding that patents that are part of sequential innovation are more valuable to their 
holders (Liu et al., 2008). Furthermore, we can infer from this result that a patent in 
cumulative innovation generates value for its owner even when it has a very low social value. 
This is in line with the theoretical argument that holding a patent in cumulative innovation is 
valuable per se, as patents can be used e.g. as mass of negotiation.  
Hypothesis 2 is verified only for very cumulative patents. The coefficient on the interaction 
term interaction_impact_essential is negative and significant. Therefore, the social value - 
impact is significantly less important for the definition of private patent value for cumulative 
innovation (i.e. the link between private and social value is less obvious for this type of very 
cumulative innovation). But hypothesis 2 is not verified for Sample 2 of random “complex” 
technology class patents. Therefore, the social value of a patent is not less important for 
determining the private value of patents in complex than in discrete technology classes. This 
result casts doubts on the hypothesis that the link between private and social value of 
patents is weaker in whole “complex” technology classes than for patents classified in 
discrete technology classes.  
The social value - impact factor predicts renewal in Samples 2 and 3, but not in our Sample 1 
of essential, very cumulative patents. We verify that this is not due to a selection effect. 
Indeed, one could argue that patent indicators are less informative of patent value in a 
sample of essential patents, as all these patents are selected and their private and social 
value is above average28. There is no evidence for non-linear effects of social on private 
patent value in any sample, and our results hold under all the different control strategies29. As 
we can rule out that our results are driven by a selection effect, we argue that it is clearly 
cumulativeness that alters the way how patents generate value. Nevertheless, this 
                                                          
28
 We control for selection effects by excluding all patents from the analysis that have never been 
renewed, by restricting the samples to patents that have been litigated, by dropping all patents from 
the sample that have a social value – impact factor score below average, and by introducing the 
square of the social value factors to control for non-linear effects. 
29
 The results are available upon request from the authors. 
50 
 
cumulativeness is rather unrelated to technological classes, as Sample 2 does not exhibit 
any weakened link between private and social value of patents. 
Table 7 (appendix 5) allows refining the previous results. We run the same regression as in 
Table 4 for each patent indicator individually. For model 1, we use in the same regression all 
the indicators together as explanatory variables. The coefficients therefore allow assessing 
the indicators’ impact holding other patent characteristics constant. Model 2 reports the 
coefficients for each indicator used individually as explanatory variable. In order to check the 
sensitivity of our results to our indicator of private patent value, we also introduce patent 
litigation as an alternative indicator (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 1999). 
Table 7 confirms that indicators of social value, especially forward citations, claims and 
family size are good predictors of the private value of patents (measured by litigation or 
renewal) for discrete and complex non-essential technologies. The main result is that no 
indicator of social value predicts the private value of essential, very cumulative, patents. This 
is in line with our hypothesis that cumulativeness disrupts the link between private and social 
value due to the different use of patents in the two types of innovation.  
However, the traditional indicators of “patent quality” are significant predictors of patent value 
for other patents in the same technology classes. While cumulativeness therefore has an 
impact on the link between patent quality and value, the real difference is not between 
complex and discrete technological classes, but between the narrow sample of very 
cumulative essential patents and the remainder of the patent population.  
 
6. Conclusion: Implications for policy and 
research methodology 
We have highlighted two aspects of social value of patents that can be related to two 
common factors driving the common variability of measurable patent characteristics. Besides 
a social value – impact factor, mainly related to traditional indicators of patent “quality”, we 
evidence a social value – basicness factor, which is particularly predominant in the case of 
very cumulative innovation. This is the first analysis to discuss and evidence the importance 
of this second aspect of social value of patents. 
We have demonstrated a very significant and robust relationship between the social value – 
impact factor and the private value of patents classified in discrete and complex technology 
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classes. Traditional “quality” indicators work well in predicting the private value of patents. 
Nevertheless, this robust relationship completely disappears in highly cumulative innovation, 
as demonstrated using a sample of patents declared essential to technological standards. 
While these patents have both a higher social and private value than control patents, none of 
the two aspects of social value plays any role for explaining differences in private value 
inside the sample of essential, highly cumulative patents. Nevertheless, these results cannot 
be generalized to whole “complex” technological classes. This finding casts doubts on the 
hypothesis that theses classes are generally dominated by cumulative innovation.  
On the one hand, we have found that in the case of highly cumulative innovation, the private 
value of each patent is generally high, but independent of measures of social value. This has 
strong implications for patent filing incentives and innovation strategies. If there is no link 
between the private value of a patent and the social value of the underlying invention, 
innovators have incentives not to pursue social value, as long as they can achieve 
patentability. This finding helps to revisit the patent portfolio theory (Parchomovsky and 
Wagner, 2005), according to which holding patents is valuable as such, independently of the 
value of the underlying inventions. We thus provide support to those who see the surge in 
patenting in highly cumulative technological sectors with some worries.  
In order for the patent system to provide socially efficient innovation incentives, there must 
be some link between the private and social value of patents. We have discussed and shown 
in the data that the notion of social value is a concept which incorporates different aspects. In 
the case of very cumulative innovation, the traditional aspect regarding the impact of a single 
invention seems to be less relevant than another aspect, reflecting the basicness of the 
invention in the cumulative research effort. We have shown that there are indicators that can 
be used to measure this basicness, but that they do not display any significant link to 
measures of private value. This absence of link between private and social value could 
explain the importance of strategic patenting and litigation surrounding cumulative 
innovation, such as ICT standardization. This is especially worrying, as many of the most 
important current technological evolutions are characterized by strong cumulativeness.  
On the other hand, our results suggest that the link between private and social value is 
robust in the remainder of the patent population and stable across technology classes. 
Indeed, our Sample 2 of complex technology patents drawn from exactly the same classes 
as the essential patents in Sample 1 does not exhibit a weakened link between private and 
social value. This latter finding is important for appreciating the implications for research 
methodology. Indeed, we find no evidence that indicators of social value of patents are less 
informative in complex than in discrete technological classes. In spite of the lower common 
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variability of indicators, the social value factors predict renewal decisions and litigation even 
more accurately for (randomly chosen) “complex” technology patents in Sample 2 than for 
“discrete” technology patents in Sample 3. This suggests that the link between private and 
social value is affected only in narrow, yet highly relevant technological fields. Technological 
classification of patents seems unable to capture this phenomenon. 
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Chapter II : The Strategies of Patent 
Introduction into Patent Pools 
 
 
 
 
 
Les stratégies d’introduction de brevets dans les pools de brevets 
 
Cet article analyse les différentes stratégies des firmes d’introduire des brevets dans des 
pools de brevets. Nous conduisons une analyse empirique de 1.337 brevets américains 
introduits dans 7 pools différents. L’analyse montre que parmi les brevets inclus dans les 
pools, les brevets qui appartiennent aux membres fondateurs du pool sont plus étroits, plus 
incrémentaux et moins cités. A tout âge du pool, les anciens membres introduisent des 
brevets plus étroits et moins significatifs que les  nouveaux entrants. Ces résultats indiquent 
qu’il y a un avantage d’insider pour les membres du pool, qui peut être expliqué à la fois par 
un pouvoir accru de négociation et par l’asymétrie d’information. Nous apportons des 
éléments empiriques qui corroborent notamment l’hypothèse d’un effet d’apprentissage. En 
utilisant un nouvel indicateur, nous trouvons que des membres expérimentés du pool 
introduisent des brevets mieux ciblés sur le standard sous-jacent au pool. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Patent pools are agreements between different patent holders to offer joint licenses for a 
bundle of patents. Since the successful launch of the MPEG230 and DVD patent pools in 
1997 and 1999, pools have evolved with impressive speed. Today, patent pools are a 
phenomenon of increasing and undeniable importance in Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT). Modern mobile phones, DVD or mp3 players, receivers for digital TV—
all these high tech consumer goods use technology licensed out through patent pools. The 
value of products produced under pool licenses and sold on the US market exceeded US 
$100 billion annually in 2003 (Clarkson, 2004)31. 
Most contemporary patent pools are related to technological standards. The importance of 
patent pools in ICT results from the fact that technological standards incorporate an 
increasing number of technologies protected by patents (Shapiro, 2001, Bekkers and West, 
2009). Patents that are essential to the same standard are strictly complementary, but can 
be held by many different firms. This is the constellation in which patent pools are most likely 
to be efficiency-enhancing (Lerner and Tirole, 2004). On the one hand, patent pools indeed 
play a beneficial role in standardized technologies. First, by bundling patents, they reduce 
the transaction costs by cutting down the number of licenses needed to comply with the 
standard. Second, pools reduce the multiple marginalization problem32. This problem arises 
when different firms have market power over complementary inputs (such as different 
patents necessary for complying with the same standard), and the firms fix prices 
independently of each other. On the other hand, patent pools have an effect on the returns 
on essential patents, and can potentially exacerbate opportunistic patenting strategies 
regarding standard-essential technology (Bekkers and West, 2009; Berger et al., 2012).  
Even though practitioners report that opportunistic strategies of patent introduction are 
among the major threats to current patent pools (Peters, 2011), there is to date little empirical 
analysis of the patenting strategies around patent pools. The purpose of this paper is to fill 
this gap and to analyze the patterns of patent introduction into major contemporary pools. 
We analyze the link between pool membership and the technological characteristics of the 
                                                          
30
 MPEG2 is a data compression technology of moving pictures used in digital television, Internet streaming, 
DVDs among other uses. 
31
 More recent estimations made by the Fuji Chimera Research Institute indicate that the importance of pools 
keeps increasing, the amount of royalties collected by the MPEG2 and DVD patent pools being multiplied by 4 
between 2003 and 2008, reaching an amount of 7.8 billion US dollar per year (Wajima et al., 2010). 
32
 This problem was first analyzed by Cournot (1838) as “the exercise of market power at successive vertical 
layers in a supply chain”.   
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patents that are introduced. For instance, we compare patents introduced by incumbent 
members and entrants regarding their breadth and generality, as well as their significance 
and match with the standard. We have produced a unique dataset on the timing of patent 
introduction into several of the most important pools that currently exist. Furthermore, we 
make use of technical documents to construct a novel indicator for the technological focus of 
a patent on the technology underlying the pool. 
We find that patents introduced are increasingly narrow, incremental and insignificant over 
time. Especially incumbent members introduce patents that are narrower and less significant 
than patents introduced at the same time by entrant companies. As a result, the founding 
members of a pool hold a broad majority of the patents currently included in the pools in our 
sample, but their patents are narrower, more incremental and less significant on average 
than the patents held by companies that joined the pool at some time after pool creation. We 
also introduce a novel indicator for the match of a patent with the standard underlying the 
patent pool, and show that insiders introduce patents that are essential to broader parts of 
the standard. The pool founding members are those companies that have developed the 
earliest essential patents and are hence more central in the development of the standard. 
But the stronger focus of their patents could also result from better access to information on 
the criteria of essentiality, or from the fact that the development of incremental standard 
relevant technology is streamlined towards the technological inputs available from the pool. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the 
economic literature on pools and discusses main institutional features of contemporary ICT 
pools. Section 3 presents the methodology and provides a quick overview of the data and 
indicators used in this analysis. Section 4 presents our main empirical results, and discusses 
their implications. Section 5 concludes and sketches further research opportunities. 
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2.  Analytical framework 
 
2.1 Economic literature on patent pools 
There is now an increasing body of research on the effect of patent pools on innovation 
incentives33. This effect strongly depends upon how patent pools affect the return that patents 
generate for their owners. As patent pools are voluntary agreements between patent holders, 
it can be assumed that patent pool creation increases expected revenue of at least some 
patent holders (Lerner and Tirole, 2004).  
One important and widely recognized benefit of patent pools is that they mitigate the costs of 
multiple marginalization. The creation of a patent pool is beneficial for patent holders, as it 
efficiently reduces the overall licensing cost to the monopoly price (Shapiro 2001). Patent 
holders however benefit most from patent pool creation if they stay out of the pool. Indeed, the 
collective effort of pool members to reduce licensing costs results in a higher demand for all 
complementary patents, including the patents held by the outsiders. By contrast to pool 
members, outsiders can react to this increase in demand by raising the prices for their own 
patents (Aoki and Nagaoka, 2004). From this point of view, it is hard to understand why many 
companies join existing patent pools. 
In other models of the effect of patent pools on innovation, it is assumed that the value of a 
patent is higher if it is included into a pool than if it stays out (Dequiedt and Versaevel, 2012). 
Empirical evidence indeed suggests that the value of a patent increases with its introduction 
into a patent pool (Delcamp, 2011-1). This effect could for instance be explained by lower 
transaction costs for licensing, by a signal strengthening the presumption of essentiality, or by 
facilitated patent enforcement (Delcamp, 2011-2, Choi 2011). We would then expect that 
outsiders are willing to integrate existing pools. Dequiedt and Versaevel (2012) assume that in 
order to do so, outsiders must negotiate their entry with incumbent members, who dispose of 
bargaining power and can extract the additional benefit of pool membership from new joiners. 
The positive effect of patent pools on patent value thus only benefits the founding members of 
a pool. This reward for founding members in turn spurs patent races, and leads companies to 
anticipate their R&D investments. 
In practice, the incentives to join patent pools depend upon the characteristics of the 
respective pool, firms and patents. For instance, Layne-Farrar and Lerner (2011) find that 
                                                          
33
 Cf. Lerner and Tirole (2004), Dequiedt and Versaevel (2007), Llanes and Trento (2010), Lampe and Moser 
(2010), Lampe and Moser (2011), Joshi and Nerkal (2011a) 
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holders of relatively more valuable patents refrain from joining patent pools practicing royalty 
sharing rules based solely upon the number of patents. Accordingly, Layne-Farrar (2011) finds 
that pool patents are generally less significant than other patents that are essential to 
standards. This finding conflicts with other investigations revealing that pools tend to include 
better patents than appropriate control patents (Lerner et al., 2007; Delcamp, 2011-1; Joshi 
and Nerkar, 2011-2).  
While Layne-Farrar and Lerner (2011) investigate the binary decision of firms whether to join 
a pool or not, Nagaoka et al. (2009) document a continuous growth of the number of patents 
included in patent pools over time. They find strong evidence for the hypothesis of a strategic 
increase of patent portfolios, as around 40% of the essential US patents in the pools for 
MPEG2 and DVD standards have been obtained through continuations. The authors also 
focus on whether a founding member of a pool can obtain more essential patents by using 
these practices. They find that to the contrary firms with pioneering patents tend to have a 
smaller number of essential patents obtained through continuations.  
 
2.2 Stylized facts  
In order to analyze the incentives and capacities of pool members and outsiders to file and 
introduce patents, it is important to present two main features of the institutional setting of 
contemporary patent pools. These features are the rules on revenue sharing between patent 
pool members and rules governing the inclusion of patents into pools. 
 
2.2.1 Revenue-sharing rules 
All pools that collect royalties have rules on how these royalties are shared between 
members. Pool members are free to agree on their preferred sharing rule. Layne-Farrar and 
Lerner (2011) identify two main types of sharing rules: numeric proportional rules and value 
added rules. Both rules provide important incentives to firms for increasing their share of 
patents in the pool. 
The numeric proportional rule consists of dividing earnings proportional to the number of 
essential patents in the pool. All the pools administered by MPEG LA34 use this revenue 
                                                          
34
 MPEG Licensing Association is one of the currently most important pool administrators (together with Via 
Licensing and Sisvel). There are currently 8 patent pools administered by MPEG LA, including very important 
pools such as MPEG2.  
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sharing rule (Layne-Farrar & Lerner, 2011). The numeric proportional rule has a direct 
incidence on the incentives to introduce a high number of patents.  
The value added rule exists in several variants. The variant practiced by the DVD6C patent 
pool is a royalty sharing rule based on the number of patents weighted by determinants such 
as the age of the patents, the number of claims, the number of times the patents are 
infringed, and the part of the standard these patents are essential for (Layne-Farrar & Lerner, 
2011). Even though the value added rule weights the number of patents by some indicators 
of patent quality, it still provides incentives to firms to increase their share of patents in the 
pool, even if the additions are of lower quality35.  
 
2.2.2 The rules governing inclusion of patents into patent pools  
In order to qualify for introduction into a pool, a patent has to be essential to the underlying 
standard. The claim of essentiality of the patents is usually assessed by a third party 
evaluator. There are several points to highlight on this essentiality criteria. 
First, the criteria of essentiality are not always exactly the same and pools have some 
discretion in defining their criteria36. Furthermore, not all pools force members to consult the 
expert37. Finally, it is difficult to ascertain to what degree pool members can influence the 
outcome of the patent evaluation. Patent evaluators are appointed by the pool administrator 
and paid by the patent holders. In several cases of litigation, licensees have accused patent 
evaluators of being overly lax in their evaluation of allegedly essential patents.38  
Most importantly, the criteria of the essentiality evaluation do not restrict the patent 
propensity on essential technology. Essential patents can still be of low technological or 
economic value. For instance, owners of an essential technology can often choose to protect 
it by one large or several narrow patents. Furthermore, holders of essential technology can 
                                                          
35
 The business review letter of the DVD6C pool states: “although the formula weights the patent count with 
other factors, each Licensor will benefit monetarily from the exclusion of other Licensors’ non-‘essential’ 
patents and accordingly has a strong incentive to encourage the expert to review other Licensors' patents 
critically’ ”. 
36
 For instance, the MPEG 2 pool uses the technical essentiality criteria (no alternative available) whereas the 
DVD 6C pool uses the economic feasibility criteria (no economically feasible alternative) 
37
 For instance, the MPEG 2 pool stipulates: “The licensors are bound by the expert’s opinion. However, they 
need not consult the expert if they agree unanimously in good faith that a submitted patent is an essential 
patent or that a portfolio patent is not essential” 
38 This claim is raised as patent misuse defence in many patent infringement cases, e.g. by disc replicator ODS 
in its litigation MPEGLA over the MPEG2 patent pool; Landgericht Düsseldorf Urteil vom 30. November 2006, 
Az. 4b O 346/05; V. b) cc) 
60 
 
patent even incremental inventions relating to a standard, which they would normally not 
have patented. 
We have seen that the royalty sharing rules induce incentives for firms to increase their 
number of essential patents included in the pool. We have also discussed that essentiality 
evaluation by patent pool experts does not rule out the possibility of opportunistic patent 
introductions into pools. For instance, companies can file more and narrower patents, and 
they can patent even very incremental inventions relating to the technology covered by the 
pool. We will therefore analyze in the remainder of this article the width, generality and 
significance of the patents introduced into patent pools by the various companies. 
 
3. Methodology 
We analyze the characteristics of pool patents with respect to the owners of the patent and 
the timing of their introduction. In particular, we compare the characteristics of introduced 
patents according to whether the patent holder was already a pool member before inclusion 
of this patent.  
 
3.1 Data 
We have produced a unique database of 7 important patent pools: DVD6C, MPEG2, MPEG4 
Systems, MPEG4 Visuals, AVC H/264, IEEE 1394 and DVB-T39. The institutional setting of 
the pools is very similar. In order to avoid allegations of anti-competitive conduct, all these 
pools adopted an institutional framework similar to the arrangements that had already been 
cleared as non-infringing. The seven patent pools provide us with 8,046 patent observations. 
A few patents are included in several pools; for our purpose the same patent in different 
pools is treated as a separate patent observation each time it appears. Furthermore patents 
sometimes change the designation by which they are identified on patent lists, expire or are 
retrieved. The 8,046 observations thus stand for around 5,000 patents that were included in 
the pool at the time of observation. 
                                                          
39
 DVD6C is one of the two patent pools licensing out patents essential for DVD specifications, MPEG2, MPEG4 
Systems, MPEG4 Visuals and AVC H/264are patent pools including essential patents for coding standards issued 
by the Moving Pictures Expert Group, the IEEE 1394 patent pool covers wireless communication technology, 
and DVB-T is a patent pool for patents on Digital Video Broadcasting technology. 
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We retrieved the patent numbers and the name of patent holders from the lists available on 
the websites of the pools40. Using Internet Archives,41 we checked when the patent first 
appeared on the list of pool patents. We call this the date of input. As the sites may be 
updated or the update be retrieved from the Archives after some delay, the date we identify 
as date of input may differ from the actual date of introduction by as much as a couple of 
months. Nevertheless, our method reliably identifies the order in which patents and thus 
firms are introduced into pools.  
The patents in our sample are issued by all the major patent offices in the World. The highest 
number of observations are Japanese patents (1.878 observations), followed by the US 
patents (1.337 observations). In order to compare only what is comparable; we restrict our 
analysis to the 1.337 U.S. patent observations in our sample (we have 1.259 unique patents, 
as 44 patents are included in two, 13 patents in three and 3 patents in four patent pools). The 
majority of US patents in our sample have a Japanese priority application. Nevertheless, out 
of out 615 distinct patent families including US patents, 380 have a US priority. When a 
patent family includes patents from several countries, the US patent is in general the first 
patent of the family to be introduced into the pool. In only 29 cases, the Japanese patent has 
been introduced before the US patent (Appendix 1). This pattern is probably due to the fact 
that the essentiality evaluation is carried through by US experts and based upon the US 
patent. As our research focuses on the strategies of patent introduction into patent pools, US 
patents are thus the appropriate level of analysis. 
 Table 1 shows how these patents are distributed over the pools, and the shares of US 
patents introduced at the time when the pool was created (US founding patents), of patents 
introduced by founding members of the pool, and of patents introduced by companies that 
eventually joined. By matching the patent numbers with the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) database, we obtain a full range of information on the patents, and 
especially the number of claims, forward citations (forward cites count the number of times a 
patent is cited by ulterior patents), patent generality, technological class, and grant and 
application year. In order to deal with truncation problems and missing observations, we 
completed the dataset using the web service of the European Patent Office42.  
 
 
                                                          
40
 www.mpegla.com (MPEG2, MPEG4 Systems, AVC, IEEE 1394), www.dvd6cla.com (DVD6C), www.sisvel.com 
(dvb-t) 
41
 www.archive.org  
42
 www.espacenet.com  
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 Founding members Entrant companies 
# of 
firms 
# of US 
patents 
# of US 
founding 
patents 
Firms # of 
firms 
# of US 
patents 
Firms 
IEEE 
1394 
9 62 34 Apple, Canon, Compaq, 
Hitachi, Panasonic, Philips, 
STMicroelectronics, Sony, 
Toshiba 
1 1 LG 
DVD 6C 
 
7 771 124 Hitachi, IBM, JVC, 
Mitsubishi, Panasonic, 
Toshiba, Warner 
3 101 Samsung, Sanyo, 
Sharp 
MPEG 2 
 
7 65 39 Mitsubishi, Next Level 
System, Panasonic, 
Philips, Samsung, Scientific 
Atlanta, Sony 
10 47 Alcatel, British 
Telecom, CIF 
Licensing, Canon, 
France Télécom, 
General Electric, 
General Instrument, 
JVC, Thomson, 
Toshiba 
MPEG4 
Systems 
6 9 6 Apple, ETRI, France 
Télécom, Philips, 
Samsung, Sun 
Microsystems 
0 0  
MPEG4 
Visual 
16 140 33 Canon, France Télécom, 
Fujitsu, General Electric, 
General Instrument, 
Hitachi, Microsoft, 
Mitsubishi, Panasonic, 
Pantech Curitel, Philips, 
Samsung, Sharp, Sony, 
Telenor, Toshiba 
6 9 British Telecom, CIF 
Licensing, Competitive 
Technologies, LG, 
Sedna, Siemens 
AVC 
H.264 
9 75 28 France Télécom, Fujitsu, 
Microsoft, Mitsubishi, 
Panasonic, Philips, Sharp, 
Sony, Toshiba 
11 53 Apple, Dolby, ETRI, 
Fraunhofer, LG, LSI, 
NTT, Samsung, 
Scientific Atlanta, 
Sedna, Siemens 
DVB-T 4 5 5 France Télécom, JVC, 
Panasonic, Philips 
0 0  
Table 1. Founding members and entrant companies by pool 
 
We collect four important dates for each patent: application date, grant date, date of pool 
creation and date of introduction into the pool. From these dates are drawn our age 
variables. Patent age is the difference between today and the grant date, and Input age is 
the age of the pool at the time a patent was introduced, defined as the difference between 
date of input and pool creation date.  
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3.2 Indicators 
The main purpose of our paper is to analyze strategies of patent introduction into patent 
pools.. We will focus upon the timing of introduction, and compare the characteristics of 
patents compared at different moments into the pool by incumbent pool members and new 
firms joining the pool. We characterize the patents through objective indicators commonly 
used in economic research. First, we use the number of claims. The number of claims is 
often used as an indicator of the patent breadth43. This view has been questioned by Allison 
et al. (2004), who relate the number of claims rather to the willingness to pay of the applicant. 
In any case, the number of claims exhibits a strong positive correlation with other indicators 
of patent significance, and is a valuable indicator of patent significance especially in the case 
of cumulative technologies (Chapter 1). 
The second indicator we use is the generality index. Patent generality is defined as the 
dispersion of prior art over technology classes. If a patent cites prior art that is technologically 
very heterogeneous, it is more likely to protect a fundamental invention. (Trajtenberg et al, 
1997)44. We furthermore use the number of forward cites, which is the most frequently used 
indicator of technological significance (Harhoff et al. 1997, Hall et al. 2001, Giummo 2003).45. 
We also compare patent strategies by providing statistics on the family size. Family size is a 
common indicator of the private value of a patent (Putnam, 1996), as the costs of filing 
increase with the number of countries in which the innovation is protected.  
Finally, we construct a novel indicator for the focus of a patent on a standard. This indicator 
is based upon the breadth of the essentiality claim. As discussed earlier, the patent 
essentiality reports indicate the standard sections for which each patent is essential. We 
count the standard sections and correct by the median of patents in the same pool 
(respectively in the same licensing program for pools with several distinct licensing 
programs). Estimating the effects of patent pools on the breadth of the essentiality claim and 
controlling for the breadth of the patent itself should give a good indication of the patent’s 
focus on the standard underlying the pool. 
A list of all the variables used in this paper with some descriptive statistics can be found in 
Appendix 2. In the following table, we can see the correlations of the different indicators in 
our sample, as well as correlations of each indicator with the time of patent introduction into 
                                                          
43
 (e.g. Merges & Nelson 1990, Klemperer 1990, Reitzig 2004).  
44
 In Chapter 1, we show that the generality index is an especially meaningful indicator in the context of 
essential patents. 
45
 To exclude any bias and in line with most empirical research on patent quality, we exclude citations received 
by patents owned by the same firm; see also Hall et al. (2001) 
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the pool. Forward citations, the number of claims and the generality index display a 
significant positive correlation. These three indicators are significantly negatively correlated 
with the time of introduction: pools include increasingly narrow, incremental and insignificant 
patents. These patent indicators are however not significantly correlated with family size or 
with the scope of the essentiality claim. There is however a significant correlation between 
these two values, providing weak evidence that the private value of an essential patent is 
correlated with the breadth of the covered parts of the standard. 
 
 Age_input Allnscites Claims Genindex Family 
Allnscites -0.312 
(0.000) 
    
Number_claims -0.059 
(0.033) 
0.108 
(0.000) 
   
Genindex -0.347 
(0.000) 
0.329 
(0.000) 
0.167 
(0.000) 
  
Family_size -0.017 
(0.651) 
-0.026 
(0.501) 
-0.035 
(0.365) 
-0.094 
(0.021) 
 
Standard 
sections 
0.050 
(0.083) 
-0.063 
(0.031) 
0.009 
(0.752) 
-0.014 
(0.720) 
0.296 
(0.000) 
Table 2. Correlation table, indicators 
 
 
4. Empirical results 
 
4.1 Descriptive analysis 
In a first step, we compare patents introduced by founding members of a pool with patents 
introduced by companies. Table 3 shows that there is no significant difference in the age of 
pool patents of founding members and late joiners. The patents of founding members have 
on average not been granted before the patents of late joiners. On average, the pool patents 
have been granted more than 4 years before the official creation of the pool. But only 243 out 
of the 1059 pool patents held by founding members have been included in the pools since 
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their creation, 816 patents have been added eventually. Among the 170 pool patents held by 
late joiners, 138 patents have been included when the company joined the pool, and 32 have 
been added eventually. Comparing the age of patents which the companies first introduced 
into the pool, we can see that the founding patents of the pool have been granted on average 
almost 8 years before the official launch of the pool, significantly earlier than the first patents 
that late joiners introduce into the pool. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that 
the founding members of a pool are a coalition of the first companies to own patents 
qualifying for the pool46. These companies also account for the majority of patents eventually 
added. 
 
  Age of patents Age of first inputs 
Late joiners 
 
Mean 
Obs. 
4.466 
170 
4.206 
138 
Founding members Mean 
Obs. 
4.421 
1059 
7.891 
243 
t-statistics t 
Pr(T < t) 
Pr(T > t) 
0.144 
0.557 
0.443 
-9.487 
0.0000 
1.0000 
Table 3. T-test patent age late joiners vs. founding members 
 
When comparing the technical characteristics of the pool patents held by founding members 
and late joiners, we notice significant differences regarding almost all the indicators. The pool 
patents of late joiners are significantly more cited, have more claims, and are more general. 
These results confirm that founding members have pool patents of lower average47.  
  
                                                          
46
 This pattern is consistent with the pool creation model of Dequiedt and Versaevel (2007), and is opposed to 
the model of Aoki and Nagaoka (2004).  
47
 For an analysis of these differences inside the different pools, see Appendix 3 
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  Citations Claims Generality Standard 
sections 
Late joiners 
(0) 
Mean 
Obs. 
26.069 
170 
20.095 
211 
0.470 
84 
1.191 
174 
Founding 
members (1) 
Mean 
Obs. 
16.591 
1059 
14.913 
1101 
0.312 
623 
1.448 
1037 
t-statistics t 
Pr(T < t) 
Pr(T > t) 
3.925 
1.0000 
0.0000 
4.327 
1.0000 
0.0000 
3.759 
0.9999 
0.0001 
-3.330 
0.0004 
0.9996 
Table 4. T-test patent indicators late joiners vs. founding members 
 
4.2 Estimation 
We next compare the patent characteristics between patents introduced by incumbent 
members and by new entrants. We distinguish between three different constellations: a 
patent is a founding patent of a pool, a patent is introduced into an existing patent pool by an 
incumbent member, and a patent is introduced into an existing pool by a new entrant. We 
thus regress the patent characteristics on a dummy for founding patents, and a dummy for 
new entrants. We control for the age of the patent, the time of patent introduction and the 
fixed characteristics of the pool.  
We test the effect of pool membership on patent characteristics in two different ways. First, 
we test the effect on all the individual characteristics independently. This approach is justified 
if the variables are used to indicate the same characteristic, for instance the technological 
significance of the underlying invention. But we also want to investigate the effect of pool 
membership on specific patent characteristics, such as breadth, generality, significance, and 
the scope of the essentiality claim. In order to compare these specific patent characteristics 
between patents introduced by different companies, we also run all our regressions 
controlling for the number of claims.  
We measure the effect at the patent level, but our main explanatory variables vary among 
firm-pool-period observations (a firm has the same situation with respect to the pool 
regarding all the patents it introduces at the same time). We therefore cluster standard errors 
at the firm-pool-period level. For each left hand side variable, we chose the best estimator 
(negative binomial for all variables except the number of standard sections) using likelihood 
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ratio tests and report the results for the best estimator48  in Table 5. We run the following 
baseline regression: 
pyppp patentAgeinputAgepatentFoundingOutsiderIndicator   ___ 43210 [1] 
with: 
pIndicator = Tested patent characteristics: the number of claims, generality index, number 
of forward cites and number of standard sections to which the patent is essential  
Outsider = Dummy that equals 1 for a patent held by an entrant company (not already 
member of the pool) 
patentFounding _  = Dummy that equals 1 for a patent introduced at the creation of the 
pool 
pinputAge _  = Linear age effect of the input (Input date - date of pool creation) 
ppatentAge _ = Set of dummies for patent age 
py = Error term i.i.d. among firm-pool-period clusters 
We chose to control for the age of the patent49, age of the input and potential fixed effects for 
the pools. We also run alternative regressions controlling for the technological classes of the 
patents. The results, presented Appendix 4, are similar to those presented in the body of this 
paper. However, as controlling for technological classes potentially capture at least partly the 
effect that we would like to underline (an evolution of the filing behaviours of the 
participants50), we chose to present in this paper the results without controlling for the 
technological classes.  
 
4.3  Results 
Table 5 presents the marginal effects of our regressions51. Column 1 reports the results for 
our baseline model on the number of claims. In column 2 and 3, we present the same results 
on the generality index of the patent. Column 4 and 5 presents the results on the number of 
forward cites. Column 6 and 7 introduce the findings on the number of standard sections for 
which the patent is essential to. 
                                                          
48
 We also test that our findings are robust to other specifications (OLS). The results are similar to the results 
presented in the body of this paper and are presented in Table 10 (appendix 5). 
49
 Using alternatively linear and non-linear (dummies) age effects. The results are presented with a non-linear 
age effect. 
50
 On this effect, see Nagaoka et al. (2009) 
51
 The coefficients are presented in Table 9, a robustness check with OLS is presented in Table 10 (appendix 5). 
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We successively, for each indicator, (except the number of claims) run the regressions with 
and without controlling for the number of claims of the patent. Indeed, one of the main 
potential effects that we discuss in this paper is that patent holders may have incentives to 
divide their patent filings in order to increase their royalty share.  Thus, it is necessary to 
present our results on the different indicators controlling for the breath of the patent. As the 
number of forward citations is sensitive to patent age52, we also present in Appendix 6 the 
regression results with a full set of application year dummies, technological class dummies 
and a linear age effect. The results are similar to those presented in Table 5 below. 
 
 
(1) 
NBREG 
(2) 
NBREG 
(3) 
NBREG 
(4) 
NBREG 
(5) 
NBREG 
(6) 
Poisson 
(7) 
Poisson 
 
DV=Number 
of claims 
 
DV=Generality 
index 
 
DV=Number of 
citations 
 
DV=Number of 
standard sections 
 
Outsiders* 
 
 
6.697*** 0.032 0.031 1.853***  1.657*** -0.248** -0.251** 
(2.595) 
 
(0.023) (0.022) (0.554) (0.575) (0.120) (0.118) 
Founding Patent* 
 
 
 
1.944 0.091*** 0.090*** 0.345 0.246 0.013 0.008 
(2.118) 
 
(0.034) (0.033) (0.331) (0.339) (0.171) (0.172) 
Age input 
 
 
-0.041 0.0006* 0.0006* -0.006 -0.006 0.0006 0.0007 
(0.036) 
 
(0.0003) (0.0004) 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) 
Number of claims 
 
 
  0.0006*  0.018***  0.002 
 
 (0.0003)  (0.006  (0.002) 
Patent age effect Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Pool dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1208 707 707 1229 1208 1164 1143 
Nb. of clusters 190 141 141 190 190 162 162 
Legend: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Robust standard error clustered in parentheses. 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1  
 
Table 5. Regression Results, Marginal effects 
 
As we can see, there are significant differences in the characteristics of patents introduced 
by insiders and by outsiders. On this opposition, with a positive and significant marginal 
effect of 6.69, we can affirm that patents introduced by outsiders are significantly wider than 
patents introduced by insiders. The effect seems to be huge and robust53.  
                                                          
52
 For a discussion of patent citations as indicators, see Hall et al. (2001); for a discussion of  how to control for 
patent age and application year effects in patent citation analysis, see Mehta et al. (2009) 
53
 Depending on the model tested (Poisson, OLS and NBreg, the marginal effects for the variable outsiders vary 
from 4.45 to 6.69 and are all significant at 5% or 10%. The most conservative approach is a Poisson estimation 
with dummy variables to control for the technological classes of the patents. In this case, the marginal effect 
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It means that insiders introduce patents that are almost 7 times narrower than patents 
included by outsiders. At the same time, these patents are more cited than patents 
introduced by insiders and this difference is also statistically significant at 1%. There is 
however no significant difference in generality scores: incumbent members introduce patents 
that are not significantly more general than the patents introduced by incumbent members.  
Furthermore, we can see in Table 5 that patents introduced by incumbent members are 
essential to significantly more standard sections than patents introduced by outsiders. 
Between two patents54 introduced by an outsider and an incumbent member, the number of 
standard sections to which the patent is essential is 25% lower for the patent held by an 
outsider.  
On the difference between founding and non founding patents, we can underline a positive 
and significant difference in the generality index. The generality index is 9% higher for the 
founding patent and this difference is statistically significant at 1%. Thus, patents entered at 
the creation of the pool are more general than patents introduced later on. This result is quite 
intuitive, as we expect that the more fundamental and general patents are the first to be 
introduced. Nevertheless, the difference in the generality index is the only dissimilarity in 
terms of intrinsic characteristics between founding and non founding patents.  
To summarize, we can say that patents entered at the time of the pools’ creation are 
significantly more general than patents introduced later on. This difference is the only one in 
terms of characteristics between founding and non founding patents. Patents introduced by 
outsiders are wider than patents introduced by insiders. At the same time, patents held by 
outsiders are also significantly more cited and less focused on the standard (number of 
standard sections to which the patent is essential) than patents introduced by incumbent 
members. These results remain robust if we control for the different breadths of the patent 
held by insiders and outsiders (using the number of claims). The number of forward citations 
per claim is significantly higher for patents held by outsiders and the number of standard 
sections per claim is significantly lower for patents introduced by incumbent members.  
As shown in Appendix 7, our results are robust for three pools out of four on which we can 
effectively estimate the different effects (DVD 6C, AVC and MPEG 4 Visual). For the MPEG 
4 Visual pool, we highlight the same difference between patents introduced by incumbents 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
equals 4.45 and is statistically significant at 10%. We also control for the values taken by our variable 
number_claims using the logarithm of the variable instead. The most conservative marginal effect is in this case 
0.428 and is statistically significant at 5%. Nevertheless, the ME can not be interpreted, reason why we chose 
to present the ME on the number_claims variable in Table 5. However, all these findings confirm that there is a 
significant huge positive impact of the variable outsiders on the number of claims of the patent. 
54
 with average values on the other explanatory variables 
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and new entrants in terms of the number of claims, the generality index and the number of 
citations, but there is no significant difference in the number of standard sections. On the 
other hand, the MPEG 4 Visual pool is the only pool for which the patents introduced by 
entrant companies are significantly more general than patents introduced by insiders. There 
is only one pool out of four (MPEG 2 pool) for which there are no significant differences 
between the patents introduced by incumbent members and outsiders.  
 
4.4 Discussion 
We have shown in this article that patent pools grow over time, as they attract a considerable 
number of patents after pool launch. The patents introduced after launch are on average filed 
four years after the founding patents, and they are more incremental. We distinguish 
between patents introduced by incumbent members and patents introduced by new entrants. 
We find that a large majority of the patents introduced late are introduced by incumbent 
members. 
When comparing patents introduced at the same time by incumbent members and late 
entrants, we find that these patents have a similar age and generality score. The first patents 
introduced by companies joining late are thus younger and more incremental than the 
founding patents, i.e. the patents which the founding members have first introduced into the 
pool. This finding indicates that late entries into patent pools are not predominantly an 
indicator of slow coalition building among a group of companies holding comparable patents. 
It rather seems that the founding members are those companies that obtained the first 
essential patents for a standard, while the late entrants obtained their first patents on a later, 
more incremental stage of the development of the standard.  
The pool founding members also account for the majority of the more incremental patents 
introduced into the pool after its launch. When comparing patents introduced at the same 
time in the same pool, we find patents introduced by late joiners to be wider and more 
significant, but less focused on the standard. As a result, the share of the founding members 
in the pools is very large, and the average significance and width of their patents is below the 
average significance and width of the patents of late entrants. In spite of the high generality 
score on founding patents, patents of late entrants are even more fundamental than patents 
held by founding members. Because of the royalty sharing rules of the patent pools, the 
respective revenue of the different companies is directly linked to their share in the number of 
patents. Patent pool founding members can thus capture a great part of the value of the pool 
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with many relatively narrow, incremental and insignificant patents, whereas new entrants 
capture only very small shares with few relatively wide and significant patents. 
We can then discuss various explanations for the correlation between pool membership and 
the characteristics of patents filed and presented to the pool. One possible explanation is that 
incumbent members and pool outsiders have a different capacity to inflate their share in the 
pool through opportunistic patent introduction (see Nagaoka et al., 2009): as pool members 
partly control the process through which patents are accepted for patent pools, they arguably 
face a lower entry barrier for introducing their patents. Due to this advantage, they can 
profitably file narrower and less significant patents than outsiders facing a higher barrier for 
including their patents into the pool.  
Another explanation is that founding members file patents that are more relevant to the 
standard. This interpretation is corroborated by the higher number of standard sections 
covered by their patents. There are various possible reasons for this difference. For instance, 
we have shown that founding members are those firms holding the earliest and most 
fundamental patents that are essential for a particular standard. This central position could 
allow them to eventually obtain more easily further essential patents, because they hold 
technology which is at the very core of the standard. Another potential reason is that pool 
membership induces a learning effect of the criteria of essentiality practised by the pool, 
which could make it easier for companies to match their patent files with standard 
specifications (see Berger et al., 2012). Yet another reason could be that inclusion of a 
patent into a pool streamlines incremental R&D towards the technology underlying this 
patent. Delcamp (2012) shows that patents are cited more often after inclusion into a patent 
pool. The further technological development of a standard is thus more likely to build upon 
patents included into a patent pool, which implies that the standard will rely relatively more 
upon the technological assets controlled by the holder of these patents. 
Our results allow revisiting several findings of the economic literature on patent pools. Layne-
Farrar and Lerner (2011) analyze the determinants of the decision to join patent pools. We 
show that beyond this coalition building process among holders of existing essential patents, 
pools grow through a continuous process through which new, increasingly incremental 
patents with blocking power over the standard are added into existing pools. In this process, 
incumbent pool members are in a relatively stronger position to defend their share of the 
standard, while new entrants have to come up with more significant inventions in order to 
reap equivalent royalty shares. In opposition with the findings of Nagaoka et al. (2009), we 
thus find that founding members of a pool find it easier than late entrants to inflate their 
patent share in a pool. Our finding thus provides empirical support for the assumption of 
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Dequiedt and Versaevel (2012), who argue that companies would rather be founding 
members of a pool than having to negotiate their entry into an existing pool. From this 
assumption, Dequiedt and Versaevel derive important implications for the innovation 
incentives induced by prospective pool creation. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this article, we describe how patents are introduced into patent pools over time. All the 
pools in our sample grew after their creation by including further patents, and most of them 
included further member companies. Most additional patents were however introduced by 
incumbent members. Patents introduced late are increasingly narrow, incremental and 
insignificant. Especially incumbent members introduce patents that are narrower and less 
significant than patents introduced at the same time by entrant companies. As a result, the 
founding members of a pool hold a broad majority of the patents currently included in the 
pools in our sample, but their patents are narrower, more incremental and less significant on 
average than the patents held by companies that joined the pool at some time after pool 
creation. We introduce a novel indicator for the match of patent with the standard underlying 
the patent pool, and show that insiders introduce patents that are essential to broader parts 
of the standard. With this indicator, we also make a significant methodological contribution to 
an emerging literature on firm strategies aiming at matching patent claims with ICT 
standards. 
Due to the royalty sharing rules, the income of the members is linked to their shares of 
patents included in the pool. The high number of relatively insignificant and narrow patents 
introduced by founding members could in this context indicate that these companies find it 
easier to obtain inclusion of their patents. This advantage for the first companies joining a 
pool could be explained by the fact that these companies have a better bargaining position 
with respect to the pool, or by the fact that they file patents which are more focused on the 
underlying standard.  
Our findings have important policy implications. On the one hand, a first mover advantage for 
pool founding members is a powerful tool to overcome free riding in coalition building for 
creating a pool. On the other hand, the possibility to increase the share in royalty revenue 
through adding relatively incremental, narrow and insignificant patents after joining a pool 
might trigger wasteful excess patenting. We thus recommend that patent pool design should 
take the incentives for opportunistic patenting into account. A particular importance should be 
attributed to royalty sharing rules and to the criteria for acceptation of patents. Variance in 
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the institutional settings inside our sample is however not informative about how efficient the 
different rules are. Future research should investigate differences between pools in order to 
assess the different potential solutions for the problems highlighted in this paper. 
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Chapter III : Patent Pools and Patenting for 
Technological Standards  
An empirical analysis of the ex-ante effects of contemporary patent pools 
 
 
 
Pools de brevets et dépôt de brevets autour des standards 
technologiques – une analyse empirique des effets ex ante de pools 
contemporains 
Il y a un nombre croissant de pools de brevets mis en place pour les brevets qui sont 
essentiels à des standards technologiques. L’effet de ces pools sur les incitations à déposer 
et déclarer des brevets essentiels est pourtant peu étudié. Nous analysons comment le 
nombre de brevets déposés et déclarés essentiels est affecté par le nombre croissant de 
pools depuis 1999. En nous appuyant sur un large échantillon de standards NTIC 
développés entre 1992 et 2009, nous comparons les standards liés à au moins un pool de 
brevets et les autres standards.  Nous montrons que les périodes autour de la création de 
pools sont caractérisées par un niveau exceptionnellement élevé de dépôts et de 
déclarations de brevets. Ensuite, nous distinguons les standards développés avant 1999, 
quand les pools de brevets étaient pratiquement interdits par le droit de la concurrence, et 
depuis 1999, quand les autorités de la concurrence ont adopté une approche plus 
permissive. Dans le cas des standards développés plus tôt, les dépôts de brevets culminent 
suite à la création d’un pool, reflétant une réaction face à un changement exogène inattendu. 
Dans le cas des standards plus récents, les dépôts de brevets culminent avant la création de 
pools, et ont lieu généralement plus tôt que pour des standards comparables qui ne sont pas 
liés à des pools. Ces résultats sont conformes aux prédictions de l’analyse théorique sur les 
effets d’une création de pool attendue sur les incitations à déposer des brevets. Alors que 
nos résultats mettent en évidence un effet positif des pools de brevets sur le nombre de 
brevets déposés et déclarés, le rôle des pools dans le nombre croissant de brevets déclarés 
essentiels semble toutefois être limité.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Over the last ten years, the increasing number of patents declared essential to technological 
standards has attracted wide attention in the academic literature and among policy makers. 
A patent is called essential for a standard when it is necessarily infringed by any 
implementation of the standard. Obtaining such a blocking power over a standard may 
increase the commercial value of a patent for its holder (Rysman and Simcoe, 2009, Bekkers 
et al., 2002). Standardization thus generates additional incentives for firms to file more 
patents (Layne-Farrar, 2008, Bekkers et al., 2012), or to adjust their patent files to ongoing 
standardization (Berger et al., 2012). The increasing number of patents around 
standardization thereby evolves to become a challenge for standard development and 
implementation (Shapiro, 2001).  
 In order to deal with these challenges, standardizing firms have come up with 
mechanisms to coordinate their strategies with respect to Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). 
Patent pools are the most important of these mechanisms (Shapiro, 2001). Pools combine 
IPR of different firms to be licensed out under a single contract. This increases transparency, 
reduces coordination costs and avoids costly infringement litigation. Pools including only 
patents which are complementary and necessary for implementing a standard furthermore 
reduce overall royalty rates by eliminating wasteful multiple marginalization (Lerner & Tirole, 
2004). Based upon these arguments, patent pools are generally believed to increase ex post 
economic efficiency, and recent antitrust guidelines have adopted a permissive policy stance 
towards patent pools including only complementary patents.  
 The effect of patent pools on the incentives to innovate is however subject to 
debate. Simcoe (2007) argues that the spreading practice to create patent pools for 
technological standards is one of the driving factors of the increasing number of essential 
patents. This claim is supported both by the theoretical literature, predicting a positive effect 
of pools on innovation incentives, as well as by practitioner reports (Peters, 2011) and case 
studies evidencing the importance of opportunistic patenting in view of patent pools 
(Nagaoka et al., 2009, see also Chapter 2).  Recent empirical research (Lampe and Moser, 
2012; Joshi and Nerkar, 2011-1) nevertheless suggests that patent pool creation was 
followed by a decline in related patenting. These findings however only describe a decline in 
follow-on innovation once a number of existing patents were bundled into a pool (the ex post 
innovation effects). The effect of patent pools on the incentives to file patents to be included 
into this pool (the ex ante innovation effects) have so far not been subject to a thorough 
empirical analysis. 
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 In this paper, we investigate ex ante effects of patent pools on patenting and 
evaluate whether pools increase incentives to file standard-essential patents. Using data on 
60,000 declarations of essential patents to more than 700 ICT standards, we first describe 
the growth in the number of patent declarations over the past twenty years, and discuss to 
what extent the increasing number of patent pools is likely to have contributed to this 
evolution. 
 We then analyze on the standard and firm level whether the creation of the 
individual patent pools can be related to unusual peaks in the levels of patent declaration and 
patent files. We build up a comprehensive database of 7 million patents that are 
technologically close to declared essential patents, filed by over 150 companies contributing 
proprietary technology to the specific standard. We relate patenting and patent declarations 
to 700 standards and technical specification and 28 patent pools. We describe the baseline 
timing of patenting and declaration with respect to the development of technology standards. 
We then analyze whether there is an unusual change in the extent of patenting before or 
after the launch of patent pools.  
We distinguish between expected and unexpected patent pools, using the favorable 
business review of patent pools from 1997 to 1999 as an exogenous policy change. While 
there have been many patent pools in very different technological areas until World War II 
(Lampe and Moser, 2012), stricter enforcement of competition law impeded any pool creation 
from the end of World War II until the 1990s (Gilbert, 2004). In 1997 and 1999, the European 
and American antitrust authorities however authorized a new model of patent pooling for two 
important standards55, including several important safeguards against anti-competitive 
abuses. After this precedent, many other important pools including the same safeguards 
have been created and authorized. This policy change significantly altered the expectations 
of standardizing firms regarding the likelihood of successful patent pool creation.  
We thus compare two groups of standards related to patent pools: on the one hand, 
standards released before 1999 were developed in a policy environment hostile to patent 
pools. The possibility to create a patent pool for these standards only appeared after 
standard release, once the technological basis for the standard was settled, and companies 
could only adapt their later patenting decisions to the new situation. On the other hand, firms 
investing in the development of standards released after this policy change were able to 
integrate the new policy environment in their investment decisions before the technology for 
the standard was settled. We will analyze how the timing of patenting around pools differs for 
                                                          
55
 MPEG2 and DVD, see the business review letters: 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/2485.pdf, 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/215742.pdf. 
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standards released before and after the policy change. Furthermore, we describe how the 
timing of patenting differs from standards related to a (foreseeable) patent pool with respect 
to other standards which are otherwise comparable, but not related to patent pools. 
 We find evidence for a positive effect of patent pools on patenting and the number of 
patent declarations. The effect of patent pools depends upon whether the pool creation was 
expected or came as a surprise to innovating firms. For instance, the periods before pool 
creation are characterized by high numbers of patent files in the subsample of standards 
released later than 1999. There is no such relationship in the sample of standards released 
earlier then 2000. For these standards, the creation of a patent pool is however followed by 
an immediate increase in the number of patent files. Furthermore, we find that companies 
entering such a pool increase their level of patenting with respect to companies contributing 
to the same standard, but staying outside the pool. The overall effect of patent pools on the 
number of essential patents seems however to be limited. The recent surge in the number of 
essential patents was mainly driven by standards for which pools were not an option.  
 
2. Review of the Literature 
 
The theoretical literature on patent pools generally predicts a positive effect on the incentives 
to invest in related R&D. Llanes and Trento (2010) finds that patent pools reduce the royalty 
stacking problem, thus reducing the negative effect of patent protection on follow-up 
innovation. The majority of the theoretical work however considers the effects of prospective 
patent pools on ex ante incentives to invest in patents that could be included into the pool. 
Lerner and Tirole (2004) argue that prospective pools increase the expected return on 
patents, and thus increase patenting incentives. Lerner and Tirole (2004) find that in the case 
of pools restricted to complements, this increase is necessarily efficient. Aoki and Schiff 
(2007) nevertheless find that in some situations prospective patent pools can induce wasteful 
overinvestment. Dequiedt and Versaevel (2012) analyze the dynamic incentives for R&D in 
view of a patent pool. In their model, patent pools increase innovation incentives, and 
especially induce patent races preceding the launch of the pool. Choi (2012) analyzes the 
effect of prospective patent pools on patenting when the patentability of inventions is subject 
to uncertainty. He finds that patent pools can be detrimental for innovation because they 
induce an increase in the number of weak patents. 
 In contrast to theoretical research, recent empirical advances rather point to a 
negative effect of patent pools on innovation and patenting. In a study of the sewing machine 
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patent pool in the 19th century, Lampe and Moser (2010) find that this pool had a positive 
effect on the number of subsequent patent files by insiders and outsiders. Nevertheless, the 
authors show that the effect on innovation is negative, as measured by indicators of real 
technical progress. There is thus apparently evidence of an increased patent propensity 
which does not translate into an increased innovation effort. In a more recent study of patent 
pools in the 1930s, Lampe and Moser (2012) find that most of these pools had a negative 
effect on subsequent patenting in the field. In the only existing study of the effects of 
contemporary ICT patent pools, Joshi and Nerkar (2011-1) find that the creation of the DVD 
patent pools was followed by a decline in patenting in related technical fields by pool 
licensors and licensees. All these papers however measure the effects of pooling existing 
patents on ex post incentives to file subsequent patents.  
 
The existing empirical literature does not address the question whether the known possibility 
to create patent pools makes it more attractive to develop patentable technologies for new 
standards. Simcoe (2007) argues that the recent possibility to create patent pools without 
facing antitrust concerns has contributed to the surge in the number of declarations of 
essential patents. There is so far however no empirical evidence that would allow to confirm 
this hypothesis. This paper fills this gap and analyzes the effect of patent pools on the 
incentives to file and declare essential patents. 
 
3. Descriptive analysis 
 
3.1 Patent declarations and standards 
The aim of our analysis is to assess whether patent pools have contributed to the increasing 
number of essential patents for technological standards. In a first step, we identify the totality 
of declarations56 of essential patents made from 1992 to 2010 to the main formal standard 
setting organizations (SSO) which operate on an international level:  ISO, IEC, JTC1 – a joint 
committee of ISO and IEC – CEN/CENELEC, ITU-T, ITU-R, ETSI, and IEEE57. We identify 
64,000 declarations of essential patents made by 150 companies. Our measure is based 
upon a count of declarations, and not a count of essential patents. The number of 
                                                          
56
 A patent declaration is a public statement by a patent holder declaring that his patent is essential to 
a specific standard. These declarations are made publicly available on the website of the SSO. 
57
 These SSOs account for a large part of the essential patents identified by Bekkers et al. (2011). The 
sample is however restricted to formal SSOs operating with comparable rules on Intellectual Property 
Rights, thus excluding important SSOs and consortia, such as the IETF.  
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declarations is higher than the number of patents, because we also include so-called blanket 
declarations (a generic declaration that a company owns essential patents without specifying 
the patent number), and we count patents declared essential to various standards as multiple 
declarations.  
 These declarations are related to more than 700 standards and technical 
specifications. The PERINORM58 database provides detailed bibliographic information on 
formal standards such as standard version updates, standard amendments, the number of 
pages, the technical classification and the year of release. In a next step we identify 28 
patent pools (including failed attempts to create a patent pool) and match these pools to the 
standards in our sample59. Matching pools with standards is straightforward, as pool 
administrators clearly display the technological standards that are covered by the patent pool 
license. For each pool, we inform the date of launch, defined as the date at which a patent 
pool administrator publishes a call for patents to gather holders of patents that are essential 
to a technological standard (compare Chapter 2). 
 
3.2 Patent pools and declarations of essential patents 1992 to 2010 
We will first use our comprehensive database to describe the historical evolution of patent 
pools and the rate of patent declarations over the past 18 years. The most immediate effect 
of the policy change with respect to patent pools can be seen from figure 1: the rate at which 
new successful pool projects are created is steadily increasing. The increasing experience of 
companies with pools, the emergence of companies specializing in the administration of 
patent pools, initiatives by SSOs and standards consortia encouraging pool creation as well 
as the further clarification of the legal environment contributed to an increasing ease of pool 
creation. New pools are created both for standards developed prior to the policy change (this 
is the case for instance for MPEG Audio, MPEG2 and G.729) as well as for new standards. 
Furthermore, we can compare the number of companies having joined the patent pool during 
the first four years after launch. We can see an increasing number of pools attracting a 
relatively large number of members. Nowadays, companies deciding upon the level of R&D 
investment for a future standard can integrate a non-negligible probability of successful pool 
creation into their calculations of the expected return on essential patents. 
                                                          
58 
PERINORM is the world’s biggest database with bibliographic information on formal standards and 
is regularly updated by the SDOs DIN, BSI and AFNOR. 
59
 The list of pools, the date of pool launch and the match of relevant standards is provided in 
Appendix 1. 
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Figure 1 Pool creation and number of members after 4 years 
 
 In the following, we can use our declaration database, matched to individual 
standards, in order to analyze whether the increasingly widespread practice of pooling 
patents has affected the number of essential patents on new standards. First, our own data 
confirms a remarkable increase in the number of patent declarations beginning at the end of 
the 1990s (figure 2). These figures are however to a very large extent driven by declarations 
made to ETSI, and in particular related to 3G mobile communication standards (indeed, 
UMTS alone accounts for 11,000 declarations, 3GPP receives 15,000 declarations and 
AMR-WB 1,500 declarations). It can only be speculated to what extent the various attempts 
to create a large patent pool on 3G technology have fuelled this unprecedented level of 
patent declaration. It seems that the role of the (eventually failed) attempts to create 
important 3G patent pools have not been decisive for the huge number of essential patents 
on 3G standards60. Several of the most important holders of 3G patents have never aimed at 
joining a patent pool. Furthermore, patenting in this industry seems to be strongly driven by 
portfolio races between litigious rivals and by the presence of innovation specialists patenting 
aggressively, notably Qualcomm and InterDigital. 
  
                                                          
60
 As to practitioners and experts in the telecommunication industry only 8-9% of the GSM standard 
essential patents are pooled. Attempts by Sisvel and Via Licensing to form pools for LTE have yet not 
been successful even though there have been meetings to pool LTE patents since more than 2 years. 
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Figure 2 Declarations per year (whole sample left graph) Declarations per year and per year 
of release (excluding ETSI right graph) 
 
Setting aside ETSI and the 3G mobile phone standards, we focus the analysis on ISO, IEC, 
ISO/IEC (JTC1), CENELEC, ITU and IEEE. These are standard bodies that, even though 
they account only for limited numbers of essential patents (compared to ETSI and IETF), are 
related to 24 out of the 48 pools in our database, including many of the most important ones.  
Concentrating on these standards, we can still see an increase in the number of declarations 
at the end of the 1990s (dark grey line in the right graph of Figure 2). The graph also exhibits 
a spike in the number of patent declarations in 1998. Possibly, this spike includes several 
declarations of essential patents made as an immediate reaction to the contemporaneous 
policy change. In order to analyze whether there was a lasting change in the levels of 
patenting related to new standards after this year, it is important to relate the number of 
declarations to the year of standard release. By comparing how many patent declarations 
standards receive in the first four years after release, we can see that standards issued after 
1997 indeed include a higher number of essential patents, even though there is no obvious 
trend, and the numbers are in decline since 2003 (light grey line in the right graph of Figure 
2). 
 We can go further in the analysis of these trends by comparing different types of 
standards in our sample. For instance, patent pools are a solution tailored to single large 
standards including many patents held by many different owners. In the following figure 3, we 
can however see that the increasing number of patent declarations on new standards is 
mainly driven by an increasing number of standards including patents.  
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Figure 3 Number of declaring firms per standard and standards including essential patents 
released per year (excluding ETSI), and the percentage of ICT standards including essential 
IPR (right graph) 
 
The right graph reveals that an increasing share of the standards released by the SSOs in 
our sample receive at least one declaration of essential patents. At the same time, the 
average number of declaring firms per standard has decreased over this period. 
 This finding could indicate that the increasing number of patent declarations is 
driven by many small standards, for which pools are not really an option. We thus 
concentrate our analysis on standards including declarations by more than 4 firms. Analyzing 
this restricted sample, we find important numbers of patent declarations on standards 
released from 1997 to 2003, but no steady increase neither in the overall number of 
declarations on such standards, nor in the average number of declarations by standard 
(figure 4). 
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Figure 4 Number of patent declarations to standards receiving declarations from more than 4 
firms, and average number of declarations for each of these standards (excluding ETSI) 
The analysis of the trends in the number of patent declarations over the past twenty years 
indicates that the increasing number of patent declarations is on the one hand accountable to 
3G mobile communication standards and on the other hand to a high number of standards 
including few essential patents. While this analysis suggests that patent pools have not been 
a main driver of the recent increase in the number of essential patents on standards, the 
analysis of the time trends does not allow concluding on the effect of patent pools on the 
incentives to file and declare essential patents. Indeed, the aggregate figures are affected 
not only by the policy change with respect to patent pools, but also by a strong variability in 
the rate of technological progress, by other policy changes with respect to disclosure 
obligations and reasonable royalty rates, and by a strong heterogeneity between standards 
released in different periods. In order to analyze the effect of patent pools on declarations 
and patenting, we will therefore proceed to an analysis on standard level, analyzing how 
patent pools affect the level and timing of patenting and declarations for each company and 
standard.  
 
4. Patent pools and the dynamics of patenting 
 
4.1 Methodological Approach 
We will next analyze how the rate of patenting and declaring patents relevant for specific 
standards is affected by patent pools. The patents that are declared essential only constitute 
a share of the patents filed in view of technological standards. Indeed, very often rivaling 
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firms develop competing technological solutions for the same problem of a standard. If only 
one of the proposed solutions is chosen for inclusion into the standard, the patents protecting 
the competing technologies are not essential patents, even though they have been filed as 
part of the technological development of the standard.  In order to identify standard related 
patent files, we use the 7-digit IPC classification of the declared essential patents, and count 
the number of patents filed per year in the respective IPC classes. We use all ICT patents 
filed at the three major patent offices (USPTO, JPO and EPO) from 1992 to 2009 by the 
firms declaring at least one essential patent for the respective standard, using the PatStat 
database and the merging methods of Thoma et al. (2010). This merging yields 7 million 
patents filed by over 150 firms. To create our explained variable, we computed for each 
company-standard pair and year the number of priority patents filed in the relevant IPC 
classes for the standard of observation.61  
 We thus have two measures of standard-related patents: declared essential patents, 
and related patents filed by the same companies. We relate the timing of patenting and 
declarations to the timing of pool creation. We define the pool creation as the initial call for 
patents, often made upon the initiative of a group of patent holders wishing to create a pool 
who seek to identify and federate the remaining patent holders. The call for patents thus 
indicates the time where the prospective pool creation becomes common knowledge. In the 
period preceding the call for patents, several companies can already negotiate on eventual 
pool creation, but at this stage there is still uncertainty on whether a patent pool will be 
launched. In addition to the launch of the pool, we identify the dates at which the companies 
joined the pools using internet archives and the history of news releases of the pool 
administrators (cf. Chapter 2). 
 We further create control variables such as a yearly count of all patent declarations 
on formal standards62 and a patent count of all patents per year in the IPC classes “G” and 
“H”63. The latter two variables should account for technology shocks in the technical field and 
organizational changes in the SSOs. We also control for informal industry alliances arising 
around standardization. Consortia are matched to formal standards using liaison 
                                                          
61
 We further conduct tests of the technological position of standards as well as size measures to 
prove that our matching method reliably identifies standard-related patents. The method and the 
various tests have been presented at the Patent Statistics for Decision Makers Conference 2011 at the 
USPTO. 
62
 We labeled each patent declared essential to each standard as one declaration. For example a 
patent declaration for two patents declared essential to two different standards is counted as four 
declarations. Empty or so-called blanket patent statements - i.e. statements of ownership of essential 
IPR that do not provide patent numbers - were also counted as one declaration. 
63
 “G” and “H” IPCs are technologies that can be connected to information and communication 
technologies. In our database of standard essential patents 95% of all patents are classified in in both 
or at least one of these IPC. 
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statements64. If an official liaison statement was not given, we conducted a more detailed 
analysis in order to identify the related standard. In total 21 different informal consortia could 
be related to 63 formal standards including essential patents.  
 All information is given in longitudinal data over 18 years. This broad database 
allows testing the impact of patent pools on the number and timing of patenting controlling for 
fixed effects of company-standard pairs, activities in standardization and exogenous 
technological shocks.  
 
4.2 The counterfactual 
In order to analyze the effects of patent pools, we need to compare the empirically observed 
patenting and declaration rate with the counterfactual rate that would have been observed for 
the same standard, the same company and the same year in the absence of a pool. The 
existing empirical literature on patent pools compares the levels observed after pool creation 
with the levels before pool creation, or with the hypothetical values which would be observed 
if these rates had continued to follow a general trend pre-existing to pool creation (Lampe 
and Moser, 2012), or if the patenting of pool members had evolved in a manner similar to the 
patenting of other firms (Lampe and Moser, 2012; Joshi and Nerkar, 2011-1).  
 We opt for a similar approach, especially tailored to the analysis of patent pools 
related to technological standards. The development of the essential technology for a 
standard does not follow a steady linear increase or decrease, nor do patent files and patent 
declarations for different standards increase or decrease at the same time.  Rather, we will 
show that the patenting and declaration rates follow an inverted U-shape over the 
development of the specific standard: the number of patent files related to technological 
standards increases up to the year of standard release and eventually declines, while the 
number of declarations culminates three years later. We will control for this baseline timing of 
patenting and declaration with respect to standardization by including a full set of standard 
age dummies. We furthermore control for different levels of investment in different standards 
with company-standard pair fixed effects. 
In order to increase the robustness of our results, we estimate the baseline timing for 
different samples of standards. We present results based upon the sample of standards 
related to patent pools, the full sample of standards including at least one essential patent, 
and a sample of standards which are similar to the standards related to a pool based upon 
observable characteristics. Patent pools are more likely to be created for standards including 
                                                          
64
 A liaison implies an accreditation and a cooperative standardization development between the 
formal and informal standards bodies. 
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many essential patents from many different firms (see Appendix 3). These standards are at 
the same time likely to involve more important commercial stakes and higher technological 
complexity. The number of contributing firms, the commercial stakes and the technological 
complexity of the standard could have an impact upon the timing of patenting. We therefore 
build up a sample of comparable control standards. To account for technological complexity, 
we restrict the sample to standards related to R&D consortia (for an extensive discussion, 
see the following Chapter 4). We furthermore restrict the sample to standards including 
patents from at least four different firms, out of which at least one non-practicing entity. This 
restriction makes sure that we include only commercially important standards, for which 
patent licensing is a profitable source of income. We then carry out a propensity score 
matching based upon the observable characteristics of the standards (see appendix 4). 
 
4.3 The policy change 
As mentioned before, the favorable business review by European and American competition 
authorities of two large pool licensing schemes between 1997 and 1999 constitute a major 
policy change. While no patent pool has been authorized between 1945 and 1997, after 1999 
many other patent pools followed the examples of MPEG2 and DVD. Including very similar 
safeguards as the pools previously authorized, none of these pool creations has met any 
resistance from antitrust authorities. “The DOJ business review letters provide a template for 
patent pooling arrangements that should not run afoul of the antitrust laws. The letters 
embody a new thinking in economics and law and contrast sharply with early judicial 
opinions about the legality of patent pooling arrangements.” (Gilbert, 2004).  
In the following, we will use this policy change to identify the effects of expected pool creation 
on patenting incentives. It is reasonable to assume that companies developing technology for 
a new standard after the issuance of the business review letters had different expectations of 
the likelihood of pool creation than companies working on a standard before this policy 
change. We will analyze how these expectations in turn affect their patenting behavior. We 
therefore compare three samples of standards: standards that have never been related to a 
patent pool, standards developed before the policy change, but eventually related to a pool 
created after 1999, and standards developed after the policy and related to a patent pool. 
Using the policy change as exogenous source of variation, we are able to distinguish 
between the effects of patent pools and the characteristics of standards for which standards 
are more likely to be created. 
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4.4 Patent pools and the timing of patent declarations 
We wish to analyze how the pooling of patents affects the rates at which companies file and 
declare essential patents. Therefore we compare the level and timing of patenting and patent 
declarations between standards related to a patent pool and standards licensed out 
individually. We furthermore distinguish between standards released before and after the 
policy change with respect to patent pools. 
 As discussed, we have constructed two counts of standard-related patents: patent 
declarations and patent files in standard relevant IPC classes. We first analyze the timing of 
patenting and declaration with respect to standard development. Figure 5 compares the 
timing of our two measures around a standard release. In standardization, the release of the 
first standard version represents an important event. The first standard version specifies the 
core technological components that determine imminent standardization. Even though 
standards are regularly updated and may consequently progress in their technological scope 
beyond release, the first version often specifies a technical trajectory for ongoing 
development phases.  
 
Figure 5 Patent files and Patent Declaration as to pool timing 
 
The figure reveals the typical timing of patenting and patent declarations along the 
development of a technological standard. Most patents are filed during the four years 
preceding the first standard release, when the technological basis of the standard is under 
development. Most declarations are made after the first standard release. Furthermore the 
count of patent declarations is rather volatile and has a steeper peak around standard 
release compared to patent files. The graphical analysis shows that the patent count variable 
also measures some early R&D activities prior to standardization. 
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 We next compare if firms’ patent declaration timing differs when patents are pooled or 
not. In figure 6 we plot the mean patent declaration per firm over standard age. Both graphs 
show a peak of declaration around the year of standard release. This underlines our 
argument that the first version contains a major part of the standard’s technology 
components. However, the figure also illustrates that standards related to pools exhibit an 
unusually high level of declarations in later periods. In comparison, standards without pools 
experience an almost steady decrease of patent declarations after release. 
 
Standards with Pools            Standards without Pools 
 
Figure 6 Patent declaration as to standardization timing if patents are pooled or not 
In order to analyze whether the unusual peak in declarations well after standardization is 
related to pool creation, we turn to a panel data analysis. The unit of observation is a one 
year time span for each standard. We control for standard fixed effects, the baseline timing of 
declaration along standard development, for exogenous technology shocks and for 
standardization events (such as modifications or releases of new versions). We can then test 
whether the creation of a patent pool is related to an otherwise unexplained high level of 
patent declarations by introducing dummies for two-year periods around pool creation. We 
thus estimate the following poisson regression: 
                                                                         
       
Where     is the number of declarations per standard per year,         to          are 
dummy variables for the timing with respect to pool creation,    and    are time-invariant 
standard and technology characteristics,      and      are time variant standard and 
technology characteristics, and ε is an idiosyncratic error term. In the fixed effect 
specification,    and   are replaced by a standard fixed effect. 
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The full regression results can be consulted in appendix 2. The following figure 7 plots the 
estimated coefficients for the periods around pool creation. We can see that these periods 
exhibit significantly positive coefficients. The estimated coefficients are at the highest for the 
periods immediately preceding pool creation; and significantly decrease thereafter. This 
finding could indicate that preparations for pool creation trigger unusually high levels of the 
declaration rate well after standard release (indeed patent pools are usually launched several 
years after standard release). Alternatively, it could also indicate that patent pool creation is a 
reaction to periods of an unusual intensity of patent declarations. 
 
Figure 7 Coefficients on timing with respect to pool launch65 
 
4.5 Patent pools and the timing of standard-related patenting 
In a next step, we plot the evolution of our count of standard related patent files per firm 
standard pair over standard age. Again the two graphs in figure 8 illustrate that the timing of 
patenting differs when patent pools exist. Compared to the bell shaped distribution of patent 
files around the release of standards without pools, we observe an increase of patenting 
several years after the first release when the standard is related to a pool. Indeed most 
patent pools are formed several years after standard release. However, we have to be 
cautious in interpreting these shifts of patenting or patent declaration. On the one hand, we 
could argue that patent pool formation increases incentives to invest in R&D, leading to a 
peak in patent files that deviates from the normal timing of patenting around standard 
development. On the other hand, we could argue that patent pools are particularly formed for 
standards that are subject to ongoing technology development beyond standard release. 
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 ∗∗∗, ∗∗,and ∗ imply significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels of confidence, respectively 
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Standards with Pools     Standards without Pools 
  
Figure 8 Patent files as to standardization timing if patents are pooled or not 
Once again, we analyze whether the unusually high level of late patenting on standards 
related to patent pools can be connected to the timing of pool creation. We therefore graph 
patent files per company over time with respect to pool creation. We distinguish between 
pools for standards released before and after 1999.  
 
     Pools for standards released before 1999     Pools for standards released after 1999 
  
Figure 9 Patent files as to pool timing, standards released before and after 1999 
Figure 9 illustrates patent files per firm as to pool timing for standards released before and 
after 1999. The graph for standards released after 1999 does not show clear evidence for a 
specific timing of patenting as to the creation of patent pools. We have discussed earlier that 
the business review of antitrust authorities ensured a legal certainty in periods after 1999. 
We have argued that for standards released after this date, the possibility of an eventual pool 
creation can be taken into account by the companies while investing in standard related R&D 
during the standard development phase. In comparison, for standards released before 1999, 
there is a strong peak in patent files well after the initial launch of a patent pool. These 
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differences support our approach to distinguish between pools created for standards 
released before and after policy change. However, difference in the timing of patenting 
around pool creation between earlier and later standards could also be due to changes in the 
general dynamics of standardization, rather than the effects of a policy change on the 
expectations of pool creation. We therefore carry through a further analysis where we include 
a group of comparable control standards to account for generic changes in standard 
dynamics. 
 
4.6 Patent pools and time shifts   
We apply an additional analysis in order to examine the effects of expected pool creation. As 
we want to analyze the effect of a prospective pool launch on the overall timing of standard-
related patenting, we need a counterfactual group of standards that are closely comparable 
with the standards related to patent pools. We therefore compare standards related to patent 
pools with our sample of comparable control standards (see Appendix 4). 
 We then compare the timing of patenting around standard development between the 
different groups of standards. We estimate the number of standard-related patent files by 
firm standard pair and year, controlling for fixed effects, persistent effects of transitory 
shocks, standard age dummies, and events affecting the standard and exogenous factors in 
the field. We test for the time-shifting effect of patent pools by including a linear standard age 
variable, which we interact with the dummy variable indicating that the standard is related to 
a pool. As in the previous analysis, we estimate this effect separately for standards issued 
before and after the policy shock66 (results can be consulted in the appendix 5).  
 We estimate coefficients on the whole sample from 1992 to 2009. In order to avoid 
truncation of the observation period, we include for all standards only observations for the 
four years preceding and the four years following to standard release and restrict the sample 
to standards issued from 1995 to 2005 (results are robust to estimating the model over the 
full sample and the full observation period). We find that patent pools for standards released 
after the policy change are connected with patenting taking place earlier in the standard life-
time. We further conduct test of statistical differences for periods before and after the policy 
                                                          
66
 As we are now interested in effects of patent pools on R&D investment made early in the standard 
life time, we decided to divide the sample at a later date. For instance, we cannot expect that the 
policy change from 1997 to 1999 led to an earlier start of R&D investment for standards released in 
2000. We somehow arbitrarily chose the release date of 2002 as a separating line, but within 
reasonable bounds the results are not sensitive to the precise date separating the samples. 
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shock. The results reveal significant differences, ensuring that the time shift of patenting is 
specific to later standards.  
 
4.7 Anticipation and reaction to pool creation 
In order to confirm these descriptive findings, we apply econometric analysis to control for 
heterogeneity and isolate the pool timing effect. We use our panel of firm standard pairs over 
the timespan of 1992-2009. Thus we are able to make use of the baseline timing of 
standardization while testing for specific effects around the time when a pool is launched. All 
firms are observed over the whole period of time. Following our discussion of the importance 
of expectations, we distinguish between standards released before and after the policy 
change. We interact the pool dummies with a variable indicating whether the standard was 
released before or after 1999. We test the following specification: 
             =  exp (                     +                                 * 
                   +                                *                    
+                                 *                    +  
                                *                    + 
                               *                      + 
                               *                      + 
                                *                      + 
                                *                      +    
                +                          +    +   ) 
 
Where we count st            filed by firm i that are relevant to standard j per year t, 
                             equals one 3 to 4 years before the pool launch PL for 
standard j in year t,                             equals one 1 to 2 years before the pool 
launch PL for standard j in year t,                            equals one 1 to 2 years after 
the pool launch PL for standard j in year t,                            equals one 3 to 4 
years after the pool launch PL for standard j in year t,                    is a dummy 
variable that equals one if a standard j is released later than 1999,                      
is a dummy variable that equals one if a standard j is released earlier then 2000, 
                 denotes all worldwide ICT patent files for each year t, 
                       denotes version releases and amendments to standard j in year 
t-1,     are year dummies and   is an idiosyncratic error term.  
 
We restrict our standard firm pair panel to standards for which a pool has been created at 
some time, and further control for unobserved heterogeneity using fixed effects. Thus we rely 
on a sample of standards that is subject to a comparable pattern.  Rather than accounting for 
pre-existing trends or supposing linear evolutions, we include a full set of standard age 
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dummies to control for the bell shaped baseline pattern of patenting around standardization 
observed in the descriptive analysis. We furthermore control for particular events affecting 
the standard in question (including variables for standard upgrades) and for technological 
shocks in the wider technological field (including the overall number of ICT patents files in the 
categories G and H per year). We furthermore control for persistent effects including the 
lagged dependent variable as control variable. We use a poisson estimator with robust 
standard errors, and furthermore cluster standard errors by firms (clustering standard errors 
by standards instead does not alter the results). In models M1a-M1c we sequentially include 
our control variables of standard updates and lagged patent files to ensure independency 
from our main explanatory variables. In M2 we only use observations of member companies 
and thus reduce our sample from 242 to 93 group observations. In M3 we also include 
variables accounting for the timing of pool member entrance. This is due to the possibility 
that firms which are prospective pool members might react on both, the time when the pool is 
created and the time when they actually join the pool. All models show robust results for our 
main explanatory variables. 
 The results corroborate our methodology to distinguish between standards released 
before and after the policy change with respect to patent pools. Indeed, the link between 
patent pools and patenting is very different in the two different samples. For standards 
released earlier than 2000, we can observe that the creation of a patent pool is immediately 
followed by an unusually high level of patenting. This group of standards has been released 
at a time when the prospect of pool creation was still very uncertain. Pool creation became 
common practice after 1999, when these standards were already released. In comparison, 
we do not evidence any significant reaction to the creation of patent pools in the sample of 
standards issued later than 1999. However, our results indicate an anticipatory effect. 
Periods up to 4 years before pool launch have a significant positive effect for observations of 
pools related to standards released after 1999. 
 Firms that declare patents to standards where a pool will be created may react to 
two events: first, the launch of the patent pool and second, the timing of joining the pool as a 
full member. In the last model we therefore also include the timing of joining a patent pool. In 
comparison to M1-M3 our last model differentiates the timing of two effects. The effects of 
the pool creation remain unchanged. In the case of standards released after 1999, firms 
show no reaction in periods before or after joining a pool. In comparison, firms active in pools 
for standards released before 1999 show an incremental positive reaction immediately after 
joining the pool. This effect last for up to 4 years. However, for the latter sample of firm-
standard pairs, the positive effect of pool creation is still slightly stronger compared to the 
effect of actually joining the pool.  
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DV= patent_files M1a M1b M1c M2 M3 
Variable 
Coef. 
(S.E.) 
Coef. 
(S.E.) 
Coef. 
(S.E.) Coef. (S.E.) 
Coef. 
(S.E.) 
3-4 y. before pool 
launch (later 1999) 
0.122*** 
(0.027) 
0.151*** 
(0.028) 
0.149*** 
(0.027) 
0.162*** 
(0.028) 
0.145*** 
(0.033) 
1-2 y. before pool 
launch (later 1999) 
0.122*** 
(0.035) 
0.136*** 
(0.029) 
0.127*** 
(0.031) 
0.114** 
(0.045) 
0.152*** 
(0.037) 
1-2 y. after pool 
launch (later 1999) 
-0.006 
(0.045) 
0.043 
(0.036) 
0.027  
(0.04) 
0.122* 
(0.066) 
0.050  
(0.035) 
3-4 y. after pool 
launch (later 1999) 
-0.074* 
(0.044) 
-0.076* 
(0.04) 
-0.071* 
(0.041) 
0.039 
(0.064) 
-0.056 
(0.04) 
3-4 y. before pool 
launch (earlier 2000) 
0.071 
(0.066) 
0.078 
(0.062) 
0.090  
(0.064) 
0.024 
(0.064) 
0.188*** 
(0.056) 
1-2 y. before pool 
launch (earlier 2000) 
0.032 
(0.083) 
0.075 
(0.062) 
0.091 
(0.063) 
0.04  
(0.068) 
0.129*   
(0.068) 
1-2 y. after pool 
launch (earlier 2000) 
0.350*** 
(0.128) 
0.330*** 
(0.12) 
0.340*** 
(0.116) 
0.468*** 
(0.109) 
0.268*** 
(0.085) 
3-4 y. after pool 
launch (earlier 2000) 
0.159 
(0.108) 
-0.023 
(0.056) 
-0.019 
(0.056) 
0.055 
(0.085) 
-0.065*   
(0.037) 
patent files in  
G and H 
1
 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
0.010*** 
(0.002) 
Lag1 patent 
files 
 0.076*** 
(0.011) 
0.075*** 
(0.011) 
0.071*** 
(0.012) 
0.077*** 
(0.008) 
Lag 1 standard  
upgrade 
  -0.022* 
(0.013) 
-0.048*** 
(0.016) 
-0.018 
(0.013) 
1-4 y. before pool 
entry (earlier 2000)     
0.067 
(0.047) 
1-4 y. before pool 
entry (later 1999)     
-0.065 
(0.06) 
1-2 y. after pool entry 
(earlier 2000)     
0.175**  
(0.071) 
3-4 y. after pool entry 
(earlier 2000)  
 
  
0.232**  
(0.113) 
1-2 y. after pool entry 
(later 1999)  
 
  
-0.102*   
(0.059) 
3-4 y. after pool entry 
(later 1999)  
 
  
-0.028 
(0.057) 
Standard Year 
Dummies 
 
Included 
 
Included Included Included Included 
Observation 3,928 3,928 3,928 1,473 3,928 
Groups 247 247 247 93 247 
Log likelihood  -476,922 -446,830 -445,701 -190,429 -438,846 
Note: All models are estimated using the conditional fixed-effects poisson estimator with 
robust clustered standard errors (reported in parentheses). Standard errors are robust to 
arbitrary heteroskedacity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firm. ∗∗∗, 
∗∗,and ∗ imply significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels of confidence, respectively. 
1
Coefficient multiplied by 1,000 to make effects visible.  
 
Table 1: Patent files around pool creation and entry into a pool 
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4.8 Robustness 
In our first models (M1-M3), we compared the observed rate of patenting with the baseline 
evolution of patenting over standard age estimated exclusively for standards which are 
licensed through patent pools. This makes sure that we work with a sample of comparable 
standards and reduces heterogeneity. Even though patent pools affect different standards at 
a different time, the estimated baseline timing of patenting with respect to standard 
development is nevertheless not unaffected by patent pools. In a first robustness check, we 
thus compare the timing of patenting for standards related to pools with the timing around 
standards where pools do not exists. We therefore make use of our whole sample of 
standards where at least one patent has been declared essential, consisting in 1,704 firm 
standard pairs. We estimate our third model (M1c) over the expanded sample (M4-1).  
Standards where patent pools exist however differ significantly from other standards in 
technological characteristics and in the characteristics of the contributing firms (see Appendix 
3). We gradually reduce our sample to better account for these differences. To account for 
differences in contributing firms, we identify firms which are technological outsiders with 
respect to other firms also contributing to the same standard. Indeed, firms may have a 
different patenting timing when they specialize on different technologies relevant for the 
standard. In order to limit this firm specific heterogeneity, we measure the technological 
difference between the essential patents declared by different firms using the overlap of IPC 
classes. In model M4-2, firms are dropped if their technological focus differs strongly from the 
average focus of other firms67. 
Another source of heterogeneity between firms is that different firms can be differently 
affected by specific technology or business cycles. Our sample covers 18 years during which 
markets and technology have changed in a volatile manner, with many technology-intensive 
firms disappearing during the internet crisis and new actors appearing. In order to obtain a 
sample of firms with a comparable overall evolution, we identify positive or negative shocks 
to the number of employees of firms (M4-3). We observe differences in one year periods, 
indicating mergers, acquisitions, restructuring etc. If this shock takes place after 2000, all 
observations after the shock are dropped for this firm, if the shock takes place earlier, we 
drop all previous observations. Firms with more than one shock are dropped altogether. 
  
                                                          
67
 We drop the 5% of firm-standard pairs with the highest technological distance to the other firms 
investing in the same standard 
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DV= patent_files M4-1 M4-2 M4-3 M4-4 M4-5 
Variable 
Coef. 
(S.E.) 
Coef. 
(S.E.) 
Coef. 
(S.E.) 
Coef. 
(S.E.) 
Coef. 
(S.E.) 
3-4 y. before pool 
launch (later 1999) 
0.177*** 
(0.064) 
0.177** 
(0.084) 
0.159* 
(0.096) 
0.057 
(0.05) 
0.166*** 
(0.045) 
1-2 y. before pool 
launch (later 1999) 
0.220*** 
(0.061) 
0.209*** 
(0.076) 
0.197** 
(0.092) 
0.116* 
(0.065) 
0.095**  
(0.046) 
1-2 y. after pool 
launch (later 1999) 
0.071 
(0.052) 
0.037 
(0.061) 
0.043 
(0.078) 
0.069 
(0.074) 
0.027 
(0.041) 
3-4 y. after pool 
launch (later 1999) 
-0.186 
(0.127) 
-0.244** 
(0.119) 
-0.233* 
(0.123) 
-0.006 
(0.087) 
-0.061 
(0.041) 
3-4 y. before pool 
launch (earlier 2000) 
-0.115** 
(0.055) 
-0.084 
(0.079) 
-0.043 
(0.067) 
0.035 
(0.077) 
0.199*** 
(0.069) 
1-2 y. before pool 
launch (earlier 2000) 
-0.112* 
(0.067) 
-0.047 
(0.089) 
-0.009 
(0.085) 
0.026  
(0.1) 
0.133 
(0.081) 
1-2 y. after pool 
launch (earlier 2000) 
0.347* 
(0.184) 
0.428** 
(0.185) 
0.446*** 
(0.172) 
0.452*** 
(0.148) 
0.413*** 
(0.103) 
3-4 y. after pool 
launch (earlier 2000) 
-0.014 
(0.055) 
0.025 
(0.074) 
0.103 
(0.102) 
0.106* 
(0.063) 
0.098 
(0.104) 
patent files  
in G and H 
1
 
0.009*** 
(0.001) 
0.009*** 
(0.001) 
0.008*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.008*** 
(0.001) 
Lag 1 standard 
upgrade  
-0.020 
(0.013) 
-0.031** 
(0.015) 
-0.028** 
(0.011) 
-0.042*** 
(0.01) 
-0.033**  
(0.013) 
Lag1 patent  
Files 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
Standard Age 
Dummy earlier 2000 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.002* 
(0.001) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.003*   
(0.001) 
Sample  
Restrictions 
None Tech 
outsider 
Employee 
shock 
PSM 
 
Pool 
Exists 
Standard Year 
Dummies 
 
Included 
 
Included Included Included Included 
Observation 27,147 19,560 13,197 6,675 2,521 
Groups 1,704 1,227 972 482 171 
Log likelihood
2
 - 25,596 - 13,682 - 7,310 - 2,185 -288 
Note: All models are estimated using the conditional fixed-effects poisson estimator 
with robust clustered standard errors (reported in parentheses). Standard errors are 
robust to arbitrary heteroskedacity and allow for serial correlation through clustering 
by firm. ∗∗∗, ∗∗,and ∗ imply significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels of 
confidence, respectively. 
1
Coefficient multiplied by 1,000 to make effects visible. 
2
 
values in thousand.  
Table 2: Robustness analysis 
Another concern is heterogeneity among standards. We thus exclude firm-standard pairs for 
standards that were not matched in our sampling analysis (Appendix 4), and estimate model 
M4-4. In our last model we again restrict our sample to standards where pools exist, retaining 
the restrictions with respect to technical outsiders and employee shocks. All models show 
robust results for both the anticipation effect before pool launch for standards released later 
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than 1999, and the prompt reaction in periods after pool launch for standards released before 
2000. 
 
4.9 Discussion 
We have highlighted unusually high levels of patent declaration and patenting around the 
time when a patent pool is launched. For instance, we have shown that standards related to 
a patent pool exhibit a peak in patent declarations well after standard release. The rate of 
patent declaration is especially high in the two years preceding pool launch. When changing 
our level of analysis to the firm standard level, we have furthermore shown that there is an 
unusually high level of standard related patenting in the periods around pool creation. In the 
case of standards released after the policy change with respect to patent pools, patenting 
takes place before pool creation, whereas in the case of standards released before the policy 
change, the unusually high level of patenting takes place in the periods immediately after the 
creation of a pool. Furthermore, companies increase their level of standard-related patenting 
after joining the pool. As compared with other standards, early standards related to a patent 
pool are characterized by a peak in patenting occurring several years after standard release. 
Later standards related to patent pools do not exhibit unusual peaks of late patenting and 
overall patenting takes place in earlier periods than for standards not related to a pool or for 
standards related to a pool, but released before the policy change.  
In principle, finding a correlation between pool creation and periods of strong patenting and 
high rates of patent declaration is not necessarily evidence for a causal effect of patent 
pools. As patent pools are conceived a solution to the problems of large numbers of 
complementary patents, it is plausible that periods of unusually strong patenting or high 
declaration rates lead to launches of patent pools. This argumentation does however not 
explain why the creation of patent pools for standards released before the policy change is 
followed by an increase in patenting. In the case of these standards, pool creation can be 
considered as an unexpected response to an exogenous policy change. While several 
companies initiated the project to create a pool before 1997, the favorable business review 
revealed new information on a more permissive policy stance. The direct increase in 
patenting as a reaction to pool creation, especially but not only by pool members, can 
therefore be interpreted as an immediate reaction to newly revealed information. The 
distinction between standards released before and after the policy change is indeed a crucial 
condition for interpreting our findings as evidence of causal effects of patent pools. 
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We have argued that the favorable business review of patent pools in 1997 and 1999 created 
a template for viable pool licensing schemes. Companies investing in R&D related to 
standards released after this policy change could take the creation of a possible patent pool 
into account. Due to the benefits of patent pools for holders of essential patents, the 
prospective creation of a patent pool is expected to induce companies to increase their 
efforts to obtain essential patents (Lerner and Tirole, 2004, Aoki and Schiff, 2008). Dequiedt 
and Versaevel (2012) expect that this induced effect takes place before the pool is actually 
created, and culminates in the periods immediately preceding the launch of the pool. This 
expectation is based upon the assumption that patent holders would prefer being among the 
founding members of a pool, rather than having to negotiate entry with incumbent members. 
We have provided empirical support for this assumption in Chapter 2. Based upon this 
hypothesis, Dequiedt and Versaevel (2012) also predict that expected patent pool creation 
induces companies to overall anticipate their investment in related R&D. Our empirical 
findings are thus fully consistent with the predictions of the theoretical literature on the effects 
of prospective pool creation on ex-ante incentives to invest in related R&D and patenting. 
It should however be stressed that our findings are limited by the fact that we do not directly 
observe firms’ expectations with respect to future pool creation. We only observe actual pool 
creation on some standards, and assume that at least some firms expected pool creation for 
these standards with a higher likelihood than for other standards released at the same time. 
In future work, it should be analyzed whether our findings are robust if we explicitly model 
expectations as a function of observable standard characteristics in conjunction with learning 
about the conditions for successful pool creation. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this article, we have analyzed how standard-related patenting and declarations of essential 
patents are affected by the known possibility to create a patent pool. We show that the 
change in competition policy has strongly altered the chances for the successful creation of a 
patent pool. We provide evidence that patent declaration as well as firm individual patenting 
show unusually high levels around the launch of a standard-related pool. There is an 
important difference between standards released before and after the policy change. While 
patenting is especially high before the pool is launched for the most recent standards, we 
find a direct effect right after pool creation for standards released before 1999. These 
findings indicate that companies were less able to anticipate pool formation before 1999, 
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when patent pools were still subject to legal uncertainty. Today, patent pools are commonly 
accepted by antitrust authorities and several successful pools set an example for well-
functioning mechanisms for pooling patents. Firms are thus able to include the possibility of a 
pool formation in their expectations of future returns on patents. 
 Our findings overall support the argument that patent pools have a positive effect on 
patenting. However, our analysis of the increasing number of patent declarations points out 
that patent pools have contributed very little to this increase. Most patent declarations are 
declared to standards that do not qualify for pooling patents. Still, policy makers should take 
into account that firms’ incentives to patent may change due to a pool creation.  
 However, our analytical framework does not allow us to conclude whether this 
incremental patenting reflects an increase in substantial innovation or opportunistic 
patenting. The theoretical proposition that an increase in the expected value of patents leads 
to more R&D investment rests upon the assumption that firms cannot easily adapt their 
patent propensity. Given the importance of strategic patenting in the field of ICT standards, 
we would not be confident to interpret increases in the number of patents as evidence of an 
increase in substantial innovation. Further empirical research using outside measures of 
technological progress is required to analyze this question.  
 To guide this future research, our findings have pointed out that innovation 
measures need to take into account the role of expectations. We have made the case that in 
order to analyze substantial effects on innovation, researchers should focus upon the R&D 
investment incurred preceding expected or at least foreseeable patent pool creation. Our 
information on expectations concerning pool creation is however limited to the policy change. 
A challenge for future research is to better measure firms’ expectations concerning pool 
creation, which may also depend upon prior experience with pools, market constellations, 
licensing strategies and implicit or explicit agreements between firms.   
  
102 
 
103 
 
Chapter IV : Joint innovation in ICT standards : 
How consortia drive the volume of patent 
filings 
  
 
 
 
 
L’innovation commune dans les standards des NTIC: comment les 
consortia influencent le nombre de brevets déposés 
 
Le développement de standards technologiques dans les nouvelles technologies 
d’information et de communication (NTIC) est une forme légère d’innovation collaborative : 
les firmes développent dans un premier temps des technologies rivales, parmi lesquelles 
certaines technologies seront par la suite sélectionnées pour faire partie d’un standard. Dans 
ce contexte, des firmes utilisent souvent des consortia informels qui prennent les devants et 
précisent une feuille de route pour la suite du processus de standardisation. Cet article 
évalue comment de tels consortia influencent le nombre de brevets déposés autour des 
standards technologiques, et analyse si cet effet est socialement efficace. Nous montrons 
que l’effet des consortia dépend du rapport de forces entre les différentes incitations des 
firmes à développer le standard. Le fait d’être membre d’un consortium induit une 
augmentation du nombre de brevets déposés si la rémunération des brevets essentiels est 
insuffisante et les firmes sous-investissent dans le développement du standard. Cet effet est 
toujours socialement efficace. Dans des situations où la rémunération des brevets 
essentielles est excessive et incite à des courses aux brevets, le fait d’être membre d’un 
consortium n’induit qu’une faible augmentation ou même une baisse du nombre de brevets 
déposés. Au moins dans le cas d’une baisse, l’effet du consortium sur l’efficacité est 
également positif. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past twenty years, the number of essential patents  claimed on ICT standards has 
strongly increased (Simcoe, 2007). This evolution firstly denotes the importance of these 
patents for firms: they can generate substantial licensing revenues, and be used as 
bargaining chips to obtain freedom to operate on rivals’ patent portfolios (Rysman & Simcoe, 
2008). Another explanation lies in the growing complexity of ICT standards. As compared 
with other sectors, standardization in ICT has indeed evolved from the definition of mere 
specifications enabling interoperability to the joint development of large technology platforms 
including critical technologies . Consequently, they tend to embody a growing number of 
patented components. 
 While the conditions for licensing essential patents have been widely discussed (see 
e.g., Shapiro, 2001; Lerner & Tirole, 2004; Layne-Farrar & Lerner, 2011), the peculiar type of 
collaborative innovation they proceed from has received less attention so far. Formal ICT 
standards are developed in standard setting organizations (SSOs)–such as ETSI 
(telecommunications) or IEEE (electronics)–that are open to a broad range of stakeholders. 
Besides the large number of participants, the originality of this process is that it does not 
involve any ex ante contracting between the firms preparing to develop a standard 
(Ganglmair & Tarentino, 2011). The choice of standard specifications rather takes place ex 
post in ad hoc working groups, based on the merit of rival technologies available to solve a 
given technical problem. Firms thus compete in R&D ahead of the working group meetings, 
thereby generating a large volume of patented innovations of which only a fraction will 
eventually become essential. 
 This formal process generates costly R&D cost duplications and delays due to vested 
interests (Farrell & Simcoe, 2012; Simcoe, 2012). Firms therefore increasingly rely on 
informal consortia to take the lead in the standard setting process (Cargill, 2001; Lerner & 
Tirole, 2006). Such consortia are fora wherein a group of firms seek to agree on a common 
design that they will jointly push as a standard. While some of them substitute for the lack of 
formal SDOs and issue their own standards (e.g., Blu-Ray alliance or W3C for web 
protocols), most consortia actually accompany formal standardization . They are then a 
means for members to better focus their R&D investments on a common roadmap (Delcamp 
& Leiponen, 2012), thereby saving useless development costs while enhancing their chances 
to obtain essential patents (Pohlmann and Blind, 2012). Leiponen (2008) furthermore shows 
that participation in a consortium improves the capacity of firms to influence the technological 
decisions taken at the formal SSO. 
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 This paper aims to assess how such consortia influence the volume of patents filed 
around formal standards, and whether this is efficient. We show that their effect actually 
depends on the strength of firms’ incentives to develop the standard. Consortium 
membership induces a higher number of patent files in situations where insufficient rewards 
for essential patents induce underinvestment in the standard. This effect is necessarily pro-
efficient. In situations where excessive rewards induce patent races, consortium membership 
only moderately increases or even reduces their volume of patents. At least in the latter 
case, the effect of consortia membership is also pro-efficient. 
 The implications of these results are twofold. They first highlight the cost entailed by 
the loose coordination of R&D investments in formal SSOs. In this context, they also suggest 
that the creation of informal consortia can be an efficient way to supplement formal SSOs. 
Consortia are indeed an effective means to unlock the development of standards when firms 
have insufficient incentives to contribute technology, while they do not significantly amplify 
the race for essential patents when these incentives are strong. 
 The paper proceeds in two steps. We first develop a theoretical model to analyze the 
efficiency of distributed innovation into a standard. We then assess empirically the actual 
impact of consortia over a large panel of ICT standards. 
 Our model allows for some degree of rivalry between the firms’ innovations, so that 
only a fraction of their patents eventually become essential. We firstly establish that the level 
and efficiency of firms’ investments depend on the share of the standard’s value that accrues 
to owners of essential patents. A public good pattern involving sub-optimal investment 
prevails in equilibrium when the licensing revenue of essential patents holders is not 
sufficient to cover their R&D costs. Conversely, firms engage in a wasteful patent race when 
licensing profits exceed total R&D costs. 
 Against this background, we introduce consortia as a means to mitigate technology 
rivalry between member firms. By joining a consortium, a firm may thus deflate its volume of 
patents by cutting irrelevant R&D investments, or inflate it by seeking to develop more 
relevant innovations. We show that consortium membership is always pro-efficient if the first 
effect dominates. A patent-inflating consortium is also pro-efficient in a public good 
equilibrium, but it may actually harm efficiency in a patent race equilibrium if it induces an 
excessive inflation of patents around the standard. 
 Drawing on this framework, we use a large panel of ICT standards to assess the 
actual effect of consortia empirically, respectively for standards entailing over- and 
underinvestment. For this purpose, we have developed an original dataset of standard-
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related patent applications at firm level, which we use as a proxy for firms’ R&D investments. 
We also use information on the participation of pure R&D firms in the standard development 
process in order to identify over-investment patterns. We find that firms entering a 
consortium strongly increase their patent files in most of the cases. This is however not true 
for standards featuring an over-investment pattern: in these cases, consortia membership 
has a smaller, and in some cases negative effect on firms’ patent applications. These results 
thus suggest that consortia tend to enhance the efficiency of innovation in the development 
of standards.  
 The remainder of this article is organized as follows. We present the theoretical model 
and its implications in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the empirical strategy, the database 
and econometric results. We conclude in Section 4. 
 
2. Theoretical framework 
 
2.1 Value of the standard 
We consider a set N of n firms that take part in the development of a standard. The standard 
embodies essential patents contributed by the firms, and its implementation is 
expected to generate aggregate profits v ( )x  in the industry. These profits increase with the 
amount of embarked technology, but with decreasing returns: v' ( )x >0 and v'' ( )x <068. 
There are two ways in which firms can derive revenues from the standard. Patent holders 
firstly appropriate a share  of the standard’s value through the royalties they 
charge to implementers of the standards. Parameter r can thus be thought of as reflecting 
the IP licensing policy of the standard setting organization (r=0 denoting a royalty free policy). 
In line with common practices regarding ICT standard, we assume that the share of the 
licensing revenues that accrues to firm i N is proportional to its share of the essential 
patents . 
 The remaining part of the revenues, ( )1-r v ( )x , accrue to the firms that implement 
the standard in their products. Let si denote firm i’s share of these revenues, which can be 
                                                          
68
These assumptions account for various possible specifications. The standard’s value v ( ).  can in 
particular reflect a dynamic innovation process, if we define it as the expected outcome lxp/ ( )d+lx  of a 
x  
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thought of as its share of the market for standard-compliant products. We assume that all 
firms with si>0 are involved in the standard setting process (so that  ). Other firms 
(sj=0) may also contribute patented inventions provided they have appropriate R&D 
capabilities, but they will get a return only through royalty revenues. Taking into account both 
sources of profits, the expected benefit of firm i N is thus: 
 
2.2 R&D investments 
The definition of a standard is the outcome of an open innovation process wherein firms 
submit innovations, some of which only will be included in the standard specifications. 
Assuming constant and symmetric per unit R&D costs c, the R&D cost function of firm i N 
is proportional to yi, the number of patents it develops for the standard: 
 
Equation (1) in turn posits that only a fraction of these patents eventually become essential.  
                                                                (1) 
Firm i’s selection rate denotes the chance that one of its patented inventions be eventually 
included in the standard specifications. Conversely, measures the number of patents 
that firm i must develop in order to obtain one essential patent. We define technology rivalry 
between the firms as follows: 
                                                            (2) 
This parameter can be interpreted as a measure of the degree of complementarity or 
substitutability between the firms’ innovations. Setting m=n implies in particular that the firms’ 
innovations are perfect complements: each of them can be adopted without evicting another 
one. More generally, the ratio m/n provides us with a measure of the degree of rivalry 
between the different technology alternatives promoted by the firms. For instance, a ratio 
m/n=10 means that only one out of ten innovations developed for the standard will become 
essential. At the firm level, observe finally that firm i has a relatively weak position vis-à-vis 
other firms if gi<n/m. 
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2.3 Public good or patent race 
We first highlight two types of coordination failure that may prevail in this context. Each firm i 
N defined by  makes its investment decision so as to maximize Bi-cyi. Solving 
this problem over xi yields the first order condition below: 
                               (3) 
The term in brackets captures the public good nature of the standard. It implies that firm i’s 
direct incentive to develop the standard is proportional to the share of the value it can 
appropriate. The second term captures a patent race effect: To appropriate part of the 
expected profit, firm i needs to invest more the higher the number of essential patents held 
by its R&D competitors. It is easy to check that the LHS of equation (3) is decreasing in x, so 
that the firms’ decisions are strategic substitutes. Summing the FOC of all firms i=1, n, we 
derive the joint R&D investment x* in equilibrium. 
                                               (4) 
The aggregate marginal profits (LHS) again combine the properties of a public good 
investment (marginal benefits are diluted when the number of firm increases) and a patent 
race (when r>0, extra incentives are stronger the larger the number of competitors). On the 
RHS, the aggregate marginal cost of essential patents is higher when technology rivalry is 
strong (large m/n). 
 Observe also that the aggregate marginal cost does depend on the distribution of 
the gi between the firms, but only on the degree of technology rivalry at the aggregate level 
(m/n). We use this property to study how the structure of the incentives affects the efficiency 
of firms’ investments. Let us consider a social program wherein a unique representative firm 
with selection rate  maximizes aggregate profits: 
 
Comparing the outcome of this program with the equilibrium outcome, we can establish the 
following result. 
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Proposition 1 Aggregate investment in equilibrium is efficient if the licensing revenues 
rv ( )x*  equals the total R&D cost . Firms invest in excess if licensing revenues 
exceed total cost and they underinvest in the reverse case.  
Firms’ incentives to innovate can induce either too much (patent race pattern) or too little 
(public good pattern) investment. Which one prevails in equilibrium depends on the balance 
between total licensing profit and the total R&D cost at equilibrium. Firms engage a patent 
race if 
                                                                  (5) 
Intuitively, a patent race takes place when licensing is profitable per se, so that firms will 
compete in R&D in order to preempt the essential patents. Conversely, the public good 
equilibrium emerges when firms’ incentives are primarily driven by the possibility to use the 
standard. Observe that condition (5) also implies that the participation of a pure R&D firm i 
(si=0) with average success rate  is profitable only in a patent race equilibrium: 
                                                 (6) 
Corollary 2 The participation of pure R&D firms signals a patent race pattern in equilibrium.  
We will use this result in the empirical section to infer the existence of a patent race 
equilibrium from the participation of pure R&D firms. We can finally observe that the number 
of firms does not determine the type of equilibrium that prevails, but its magnitude. Hence 
Proposition 1 and its corollary are robust to allowing free entry of firms in the standardization 
game. 
Corollary 3 The inefficiency pattern prevailing in equilibrium does not depend on the number 
of firms, and is thus robust to free entry.  
2.4 Efficiency of consortium membership 
Recall that the consortia we are interested in do not involve any formal contracting or joint 
R&D decisions. They rather function as fora wherein participating firms seek to agree on a 
mutually acceptable roadmap for specifications that they will jointly push in the SDO. 
Accordingly, we posit that consortium members can better focus their R&D effort, thereby 
saving useless investments and enhancing their chances of obtaining essential patents. 
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Assuming that a subset of firms K N have created a consortium to support the standard 
setting process, members thus benefit from a higher selection rate69:  
where  . 
 We focus on the consequences of firm k’s decision to join the consortium70. 
Formally, this firstly translates into a positive shock on the new member’s selection rate 
(dgk>0). Since firm k can better screen irrelevant innovation opportunities, this in turn 
induces a fall in the degree technology rivalry at the aggregate level: . It 
thus follows directly from (4) that the number of essential patents embodied in the standard 
increases in equilibrium. Since the firm’s decisions are strategic substitutes, it is moreover 
clear from (3) that firm k develops more essential patents while the other firms react by 
developing less of them. Lemma 4 summarizes these results. 
Lemma 4 Joining the consortium enables the new member to develop more essential 
patents in equilibrium, while the other firms develop less essential patents. The net effect is 
positive, and thus induces an increase of the equilibrium value of the standard v ( )x* .  
This result does not necessarily imply that an enlarged consortium coalition is efficient, since 
it does not take into account the induced variation of firms’ R&D costs. Indeed, deriving firms’ 
aggregate profits  with gk and rearranging makes it possible to 
highlight the following three effects: 
             (7) 
The first effect corresponds to R&D costs savings induced by firm k’s ability to reduce the 
volume of non-essential patents (A). It is clearly positive. The second one is the net 
(cost/benefit) value of adding new essential patents to the standard (B). It is clear from the 
                                                          
69
We implicitely assume here that the size of the consortium coalition does not change the success 
rate of former members or consortium outsiders. In other words, the only effect of consortium 
membership is a better access to information of future specifications. The entry of a new member in 
the coalition nevertheless indirectly affects former members and outsiders through the new member’s 
stronger ability to preempt essential patents in the standard. 
70
In practice, firms have to pay significant membership fees to join consortia, and therefore decide to 
do so only if they have significant stakes in the standard. The benefits in terms of information and 
influence strongly depend on idiosyncratic factors such as the degree of compatibility between the 
firms’ technology profiles and strategic agenda. 
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term in brackets that it is positive in a public good equilibrium. Indeed new patents can then 
mitigate firms’ lack of investment in the standard. By contrast, developing more essential 
patents reduces joint profits in a patent race equilibrium. Finally, the third effect captures the 
cost or benefit of reallocating the development of essential patents between the firms (C). Its 
sign may be positive of negative, depending on the selection rate of firm k as compared with 
the other firms. Lemma 5 summarizes these findings. 
Lemma 5 A firm’s entry in the consortium deflates the volume of non-essential patents, 
which is clearly efficient. By contrast, the inflated volume of essential patents may be 
inefficient if i) a patent race pattern prevails in equilibrium and/or ii) it entails a reallocation of 
R&D effort from efficient to inefficient firms.  
In order to carry further the analysis, we now focus on the direct effects of firm k’s patenting 
strategy on joint profits, aside from the other firms’ reactions71. We are especially interested 
in relating joint profits with the (empirically observable) total volume of patents filed by firm k. 
Assuming that firm k has average selection rate , we can establish that 
            (8) 
is the variation of the total number of patents filed by firm k (that is, the difference between 
the volumes of spared patents and new essential patents) and . Since 
k’s patents is deflated. This is 
quite intuitive, since firm k then develops more essential patents and saves at the same time 
the R&D cost of an even larger volume of useless patents. 
 The effect of firm k’s move is more ambiguous if joining the standard has a patent 
inflating effect. Indeed the benefit of enhancing the standard’s value must then be balanced 
with the cost of a larger volume of patents. As stated in Proposition 6, the new member still 
invests more efficiently provided the public good pattern prevails in equilibrium. Indeed, it 
thereby provides more of the missing essential patents, and it does so at a lower cost thanks 
to consortium membership. By contrast, and inflated volume of patents filed by the new 
member may harm efficiency in a patent race pattern, unless the volume of extra non-
                                                          
71
This can also be interpreted as an approximation of the full effects when the reactions of the other 
firms are negligible. We will see in the next section that this interpretation is actually supported by 
empirical evidence. 
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essential patents remains sufficiently small to be compensated by the benefit of new 
essential patents. 
Proposition 6 Assume that a firm with average success rate joins the consortium: 
• A deflated volume of patents filed by the new member is efficient whatever the 
inefficiency pattern prevailing in equilibrium. 
• A inflated volume of patents filed by the new member is efficient in a public good 
equilibrium. It becomes inefficient in a patent race equilibrium when it exceeds a 
positive threshold .  
Proof. Observe also that , which is the condition for the 
public good pattern to prevail in equilibrium. Since  , it directly follows that 
condition (8) is also verified in a public good equilibrium when firm k inflates its volume of 
patents. By contrast, the patent race 
increase only if the inflation of firm k’s patents remains moderate, that is if 
. Otherwise, a strong inflating effect induces a fall of joint profits.   
 
3. Empirical analysis 
 
This section in turn presents an empirical analysis of patent filings around a large panel of 
ICT standards. Our purpose is to assess whether joining a consortium changes the volume 
of patents filed by firms involved in standard development, and what is the direction of this 
change. Drawing on the results of our theoretical analysis, we assess this effect separately 
for standards corresponding respectively to a public good or patent race pattern. 
3.1 Data and indicators 
Our empirical analysis draws on a comprehensive dataset of technological standards 
including essential patents72. Our sample includes all ICT standards issued between 1992 
and 2009 by one of the major formal SSOs which operate on an international level73. Since 
we aim to focus on the interaction between formal standardization and companion consortia, 
                                                          
72
A summary of all relevant variables with description and sample statistics can be consulted in 
Appendix 1 
73
ISO, IEC, JTC1 - a joint committee of ISO and IEC -, CEN/CENELEC, ITU-T, ITU-R, ETSI, and 
IEEE. 
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we exclude standards that are exclusively developed by informal standards consortia (e.g. 
BluRay). 
 We furthermore restrict the analysis to standards including essential patents of at 
least two different companies, thereby limiting the sample to 578 standards. Companies that 
own IPRs which are essential to a standard provide this information to the respective SSO. 
We downloaded these patent declarations at the websites of the above-mentioned SSOs in 
March 2010. From the PERINORM74 database we retrieve information on the date of first 
release, releases of further versions and amendments, number of pages from the standard 
document such as the technical classification of the standard. 
 Our sample includes 242 different companies declaring essential patents, observed 
over the whole period. For each firm, we collect yearly information on the amount of sales, 
R&D expenditure, employees and market to book ratio (Tobin’s Q75). In addition we 
distinguish between pure R&D firms, manufacturer and net provider76 and classify our 
sample by main active industry using SIC codes. 
 We connect the firm level data to the specific standard information and built up a 
panel of 1,720 company-standard pairs observed over a time span of 18 years (1992-2009). 
For each company-standard pair, we observe the amount of patents filed by the respective 
company in the technological field for the respective standard, and include a dummy variable 
indicating whether the company takes part in a consortium supporting the development of 
this standard. Other time-variant control variables are either company- or standard-specific. 
Time-invariant factors affecting the firm, the standard or the relationship between both are 
captured by company-standard pair fixed effects. 
3.1.1 Matching between informal consortia and formal standards 
To identify informal consortia accompanying the formal standardization process, we use data 
from 15 editions of the CEN survey of ICT consortia and a list of consortia provided by 
Andrew Updegrove. We identify approximately 250 active ICT consortia77. We categorize 
these consortia as to industry, function (spec producer, promoter) and years of activity (see 
Appendix 1). The connection to a standard in our sample is analyzed by using liaison 
agreements and information from consortia and SSO web pages. For instance, a connection 
                                                          
74
PERINORM is the world’s biggest standard database with bibliographic information on formal 
standards and is regularly updated by the SDOs DIN, BSI and AFNOR. 
75
We used the Thomson one Banker database to match the respective firm level data. 
76
We used the extended business model description in the Thomson One Banker database and 
compared our classification to the list of companies identified by Layne-Farrar and Lerner (2010). 
77
This is coherent with the identification of the CEN survey which reports approximately 250 standards 
consortia in ICT. 
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was identified, when a consortium explicitly references a formal standard, or when a 
standard has been submitted to the formal SSO by an informal consortium. We are 
conservative in establishing the connections, resulting in a narrow list of 54 consortia. We 
use supplementary information for the selected consortia and further restrict the list to 21 
consortia that technologically (spec producer) and significantly contribute to this specific 
standard (excluding pure promoting consortia)78. Using information on the websites of the 
consortia as well as internet archives (www.archive.org) and internet databases 
(www.consortiuminfo.org), we inform consortium membership over time and connect this 
information with the company standard pairs of our sample.  
 
3.1.2 Standard specific patents 
The most intuitive approach to track firms’ R&D investments in standards is to count the 
patent declarations they state for these standards. However, former empirical analyses have 
shown that the timing of declaration is not connected to the dynamics of standardization (see 
Chapter 3). Moreover essential patents only represent a very small amount of patenting 
around standards (Bekkers et al., 2012). To avoid these shortcomings, we thus build up a 
new measure of firms’ standard-specific R&D investment. In a first step we count patents 
filed from 1992 to 2009 by the companies in our sample at the three major patent offices 
(USPTO, JPO and EPO), using the PatStat database and the company assignee merging 
methods of Thoma et al. (2010). We restrict the count of patent files to IPC classes in the 
relevant technological field of each standard, identified by using the IPC classification of 
declared essential patents79. We measure the dynamics of patenting over the standard 
lifecycle (details can be consulted in Appendix 3). Our mean value analysis shows a 
patenting increase before standard release and a decrease thereafter. This finding reassures 
us that our variable captures the innovation for a specific standard, which indeed is expected 
to culminate in the period immediately preceding standard release.  
 
                                                          
78
Assisting this rather broad distinction we conduct a word count analysis on the consortia self-
description abstracts, kindly provided by Andrew Updegrove. We use keywords such as “developing”, 
“creates”, “set standard” or “standardizes”. Appendix 1 provides a list of those consortia and standards 
for which a link could be established, as well as the narrower list of consortia contributing 
technologically. 
79
This method is a novel way of measuring standard-specific R&D investment. We apply tests of 
timing, estimate technological positions of standards as well several test of size measures to prove our 
proposed variable to be a sufficient indicator of standard-related R&D investment. The methodology 
and the various tests have been presented at the Patent Statistics for Decision Makers Conference 
2011 at the USPTO and can be reviewed in Appendix 3. 
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3.1.3 Public goods and patent race patterns 
One contribution of our analysis is the comparison of over- and under investment in 
standardization. As shown in the theoretical model, the patent race pattern can be identified 
when pure R&D firms take part in the standard development. We use this prediction as our 
identification strategy for the empirical sampling of standards. By labeling over- and 
underinvestment as to the classification above, we compare the residual results of a 
regression of standard related patent files against technical characteristics of the standards 
(details can be consulted in Appendix 4). A t-test analysis suggests that our classification of 
overinvestment is an appropriate measure. Results show that residual values of the 
regression are in average positive for standards where pure R&D firms participate to a 
standard and in average negative for those where pure R&D firms are not involved.  
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
3.2.1 Pairwise correlations 
In the following Table 1, we provide pairwise correlations of firm-specific, standard-specific 
and firm-standard-specific variables at the company-standard-pair level. The volume of 
patents around standards is negatively correlated with both consortium membership and the 
existence of a consortium on the standard. This could indicate that consortia attract 
companies with smaller standard-related patent portfolios. On the other hand, consortium 
membership is positively correlated with the value of sales and the number of employees. 
The existence of consortia is positively correlated with the number of firms per standard and 
with standard age. As to the correlation analysis effects are yet not strong enough to derive 
conclusive interpretations. 
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Table 1: Pairwise correlations on the company-standard level 
3.2.2 Difference in means 
In the following Table 2, we present differences in the volume of patents, the number of 
employees, the value of sales and the book-to-market ratio between consortia member 
observations and the rest. Membership observation is associated with a lower volume of 
standard-specific patents, but a higher number of employees and a higher value of sales. 
t =   4.1256 Standard Specific Patent Files 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
consortium members 261 2,238.6 190.8 3,081.9 1,862.9 2,614.2 
not consortium members 1,571 12,092.8 972.8 38,559.2 10,184.6 14,001.0 
t =  -2.4585 Employees 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
consortium members 272 125,635.0 6,929.8 114,289.8 111,991.9 139,278.2 
not consortium members 1,645 106,528.7 2,945.1 119,448.5 100,752.2 112,305.2 
t =  -2.6035 Sales 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
consortium members 
272 40,119.1 1,774.0 29,257.4 36,626.5 43,611.6 
not consortium members 1,644 35,211.2 708.4 28,721.6 33,821.8 36,600.6 
t =  -0.2502 Book-To-Market Ratio 
Group 
Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
consortium members 243 1.7 0.1 1.5 1.5 1.9 
not consortium members 1,240 1.7 0.0 1.4 1.6 1.8 
 
Table 2: Differences in variable means between consortia members and others 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 
 
St. R&D 
Invest. 
1 
 
        
2 
 
Member 
 
-0.10 
 
1 
 
       
3 
 
Consortia 
Exists 
-0.14 
 
0.67 
 
1 
 
      
4 
 
Standard 
Event 
-0.07 
 
0.39 
 
0.58 
 
1 
 
     
5 
 
Tobin's Q 
 
0.02 
 
0.01 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.05 
 
1 
 
    
6 
 
Sales 
 
0.11 
 
0.06 
 
0.01 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.25 
 
1 
 
   
7 
 
Employees 0.10 
 
0.06 
 
0.01 
 
0.02 
 
-0.33 
 
0.87 
 
1 
 
  
8 
 
Number of 
Firms 
0.05 
 
0.34 
 
0.60 
 
0.62 
 
-0.09 
 
-0.02 
 
0.00 
 
1 
 
 
9 
 
Standard 
Age 
-0.07 
 
0.17 
 
0.29 
 
0.32 
 
-0.20 
 
0.00 
 
0.05 
 
0.25 
 
1 
N= 1,046, All correlation coefficients above |0.2| are significant at p < 0.05. 
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3.3 Multivariate analysis 
3.3.1 Estimation methodology 
We use our panel dataset to estimate how consortium membership affects the volume of 
patents filed around the related standard. Our dependent variable is the number of patent 
priority filings by firm i for standard j in year t. Our first key explanatory variable, memberijt, is 
a dummy equal to one for years where the firm i participates in a consortium supporting 
standard j. Following the theoretical model, we expect its effect to depend upon whether the 
standard is initially characterized by over- or underinvestment. We therefore interact the 
consortium membership dummy with the over_investmentj variable, denoting the share of 
pure R&D firms involved in the development of standard j. 
 To account for unobserved heterogeneity of standards and companies, we 
systematically include fixed effects for company-standard pairs. As our dependent variable is 
a count variable with overdispersion with respect to a poisson distribution, we will use a 
poisson estimator with robust standard errors unless explicitly stated otherwise80. We 
furthermore cluster standard errors by companies in order to exclude that unobserved 
shocks to a company’s patenting level bias the standard errors and lead to an insufficiently 
restrictive confidence interval81. Unsurprisingly, we found strong evidence for persistent 
effects of transitory shocks to our explained variable, as indicated by positive autocorrelation 
of standard errors. We therefore include the lagged dependent variable as explanatory 
variable in all models. Our basic regression model has the following specification: 
 
where st_activityjt-1 counts version releases and amendments per year, Fit-1 is a vector of 
firms specific change such as a measure of Sales and Tobins’s Q, Xjt-1 denotes other 
control variables for time trends such as the overall ICT patent files and the count of patent 
declarations, cjt are standard age dummies and eijt is an idiosyncratic error term.  
                                                          
80
We prefer the poisson estimator with robust standard errors over a negative binomial estimator with 
fixed effects, because the negative binomial estimator cannot totally control for fixed effects and thus 
account for unobserved heterogeneity. 
81
All presented results are robust to clustering standard errors by standard instead of by company. 
119 
 
 We use the standard age dummies, each indicating a one year period in the 
standard lifetime, to control for the timing of standardization. Downstream innovation and 
patenting (taking place after the first release of the standard) is indeed likely to peak around 
periodical revisions of standards. The release of new standard versions or amendments to 
existing versions is labeled as standard activity and included as a control variable. In order to 
exclude immediate feedback (amendments or version releases explained by prior 
innovation), we include this control variable with a one-year lag. 
 We furthermore wish to account for external shocks such as the business cycle or 
technology-related policy. As we already control for standard fixed effects and standard age, 
it is impossible to include year dummies as a further control because of a collinearity 
problem. We therefore control for external shocks by including the overall number of triadic 
patent priorities filed per year in the relevant technological category (respectively IPC class G 
for telecom and IPC class H for IT standards) and the overall number of patent declarations 
made to any formal ICT standard per year in order to capture policy shocks that are more 
specifically relevant to essential patents. 
 
3.3.2 Estimation model 1-4 
Consortia are more likely to be created for important or technologically complex 
standardization projects. Furthermore, the organization of R&D can be different if a 
consortium is created for a standard. For these reasons, the timing of standardization is likely 
to be affected by the existence of consortia. It is thus preferable to estimate all coefficients, 
including controls for standard timing, only on the sample of standards related to an informal 
consortium. This strategy could however bias downwards the estimated effects of consortia, 
if some of these effects are systematically captured by control variables. We therefore 
present results based upon the whole sample in model M1. As expected, the coefficients on 
consortia variables are higher in the larger sample, but the fit of the model is much lower. 
This indicates that heterogeneity between standards with consortia and other standards is 
large. We therefore only estimate standard with accompanying consortia in all following 
models (M2-M4), while acknowledging a potential downward bias on our consortia 
coefficients.  
 In our second model (M2), consortium membership has a significant positive effect 
on the volume of standard-specific patents, but the level of this effect decreases with the 
level of overinvestment. This result is however potentially subject to an endogeneity bias. 
Unobservable variables, such as changes in the strategic importance of the standard for the 
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specific company, may have an impact on both standard specific patents and consortium 
membership. External factors jointly affecting consortium membership and related patenting 
are particularly likely to occur in periods of turmoil, like the internet bubble in 2001. While 
desirable in order to reduce within-groups bias on weakly endogenous variables (Nickell, 
1981; Bloom et al., 2010), the long period of observation (relatively to the fast-evolving world 
of ICT standards) increases the vulnerability to this type of biases. 
 
Unit of Observation = Company Standard Pair DV = Standard Specific R&D Investment (Patent Files) 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 
 Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  Coef.  
Member 
 
0.470 
(0.175) 
*** 
 
0.208 
(0.108) 
** 
 
0.188 
(0.105) 
* 
 
0.193 
(0.098) 
** 
 
0.194 
(0.077) 
** 
 
Member * 
Over 
Investment 
-1.746 
(0.981) 
*** -1.135 
(0.636) 
* -1.172 
(0.705) 
* -1.203 
(0.685) 
* -1.349 
(0.506) 
*** 
Lag1 
Standard 
Activity 
-0.061 
(0.032) 
* 
 
  -0.022 
(0.008) 
*** 
 
-0.022 
(0.008) 
** -0.021 
(0.009) 
** 
 
Lag1 Patent 
Files
1 
 
0.002 
(0.001) 
*** 
 
0.072 
(0.017) 
*** 
 
0.044 
(0.021) 
** 
 
0.04 
(0.022) 
* 
 
0.022 
(0.004) 
** 
 
ICT Patent 
Files
1 
 
0.003 
(0.002) 
** 
 
0.007 
(0.001) 
*** 
 
0.006 
(0.003) 
** 
 
0.007 
(0.003) 
** 
 
0.008 
(0.003) 
*** 
 
Patent 
Declarations
1 
 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
 -0.003 
(0.006) 
 0.002 
(0.009) 
*** 
 
0.004 
(0.01) 
 0.008 
(0.009) 
 
Lag1 Tobin's 
Q 
 
        0.088 
(0.059) 
 
Lag1 Sales
1 
 
        -0.011 
(0.003) 
*** 
 
Standard Year 
Dummies 
Incl.  Incl.  Incl.  Incl.  Incl.  
Log  
Likelihood 
2
 
-17.82  -490.8  -68.55  -59.35  -114.1  
AIC 
2
 35,600  981  137  118  228  
BIC 
2
 35,600  981  138  118  228  
Observations 16,390  4,181  999  884  884  
Groups 1,046  298  174  158  158  
Note: All models are estimated with the conditional fixed-effects poisson estimator with robust 
clustered standard errors (reported in parentheses). Standard errors are robust to arbitrary 
heteroskedacity and allow for serial correlation through clustering by firm. Model 2-4 are restricted to a 
limited time period 2002-2009. ***, **,and * imply significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels of 
confidence, respectively. 
1
Coefficient multiplied by 1,000 to make effects visible. 
2 
Values are reported 
in thousand. 
Table 3: Results of the multivariate analysis – testing consortia membership (firm level) 
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In order to deal with these concerns we restrict the observation period to 8 years from 2002 
to 2009. Furthermore, we also reduce the cross-section dimension of the panel, by restricting 
the sample to stock-market listed companies. These companies are more likely to react in a 
similar fashion to external events. Finally, we identify positive or negative shocks to the 
number of employees in a one year period82, indicating mergers, acquisitions, restructuring 
etc. If this shock takes place after 2005, all observations after the shock are dropped for this 
company, if the shock takes place earlier, we drop all previous observations. Companies with 
more than one shock are dropped altogether for our third model (M3), reducing the sample to 
174 groups and 999 observations.  
 In our last model M4 we furthermore tackle endogeneity more directly by including 
time-varying firm characteristics as control variables. We choose to include the value of 
sales, and Tobin’s Q as a measure of expected profits (both lagged by one year to exclude 
immediate feedback). We opt for not including employees, which is highly correlated with 
sales in the within dimension (both reflecting company growth). Furthermore, the number of 
employees, with respect to the value of sales, is likely to be more important for determining 
whether a company has the possibility to participate in a consortium, but less important in 
independently determining the evolution of patenting83. By including the value of sales as a 
control, we nevertheless face the risk to bias downwards the estimates of the consortia 
effects for smaller companies refraining from joining an expensive consortium. We therefore 
divide the level of consortia member fees84 by the value of sales of the company at the time 
of consortium creation. The first percentile of observations according to this value (the 
companies-standard pairs characterized by the highest consortia fees relative to the value of 
sales) is most at risk to be affected by this effect. We therefore decide to exclude these 
observations, leaving us with 158 company-standard pairs and 884 observations in model 4. 
M1-M4 show robust results. The magnitude of the coefficients decreases but the effects are 
yet more significant, and the signs of the coefficients are unchanged. 
3.3.3 Robustness 
We check for robustness of our results to a correlation of our main explanatory variables with 
past outcomes of the dependent variable. It is plausible that a company’s decision to join a 
consortium depends upon its stock of related patents. In this case, the regressors are 
                                                          
82
distribution, the lower 5% are labeld as negative shocks. 
83
The primary cost of consortium participation is workload, while the cost of patenting is primarily 
financial 
84
Since our goal is to estimate the financial burden to join a consortium we use the low range of 
membership fees (find an overview of highest and lowest membership fees in the appendix 1). 
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predetermined, and the poisson fixed effect estimator yields inconsistent results (Blundell et 
al., 1999). In order to account for this problem, we take advantage of the fact that we have 
information on pre-sample levels of our dependent variable and adopt the methodology 
suggested in Blundell et al. (1999), substituting pre-sample means for fixed effects. The 
results displayed in Appendix 5 are mainly consistent with the results from the fixed effect 
analysis. 
 
3.3.4 Effect of consortium member share model 6-8 
So far we have estimated the effect of consortium membership on the volume of patents of 
the respective company. In this section, we will estimate the effect of the consortium member 
share (indicating how many of the firms contributing to the standard are member of the 
consortium) on the volume of patents filed by members and outsiders. Finally, by estimating 
the effect of consortium member share on patents filed by all companies, we obtain a 
measure of the net effect of consortia. As compared to the previous analysis, this method is 
less prone to endogeneity biases, as the decisions of other companies to join a consortium 
are probably relatively unrelated to a firm’s own current or expected future R&D efforts. We 
are therefore less restrictive regarding the sample, and only drop observations for 2001 or 
earlier and of standards with no consortium within the observation period. On the other hand, 
the member share is sensitive to the membership decision of the firm itself, especially if the 
number of firms on the standard is low85. In order to check for robustness to this sensitivity, 
we present all results for a narrower subsample of standards including at least 6 contributing 
firms. 
 We estimate the effects of consortium member share separately for consortium 
members and non-members and for both. For the purpose of this analysis, a firm is labeled 
as a member over the whole period of observation, if it is consortium member at least once 
within this period. It is labeled consortium outsider if it has never been consortium member 
over the period of observation. We control for time-variant firm characteristics, standard-
company fixed effects, the lagged dependent variable and external shocks. Results are 
displayed in Table 4. 
 
 
                                                          
85
If we substracted the company itself from the consortium size variable, this count would be 
nevertheless sensitive to company membership, as we estimate the effects separately for consortium 
members and non-members. 
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 M6 M7 M8 
 Coef.  Marg. 
Effekt 
 Coef.  Marg. 
Effekt 
 Coef.  Marg. 
Effekt 
 
Member_share 
 
0.884 
(0.328) 
*** 
 
0.884 
(0.328) 
*** 0.337 
(0.445)  
0.337 
(0.445) 
 0.903 
(0.233) 
*** 0.903 
(0.233) 
*** 
Member_share 
*OverInvestment 
-5.489 
(1.923) 
*** 
 
-5.489 
(1.923) 
*** 
-3.65 
(2.177)  
-3.65 
(2.177) 
 
-5.532 
(1.346) 
*** 
-5.532 
(1.346) 
*** 
Lag1 Standard 
Activity 
-0.022 
(0.011) 
** 
 
-0.022 
(0.011) 
** -0.035 
(0.012) 
** 
 
-0.035 
(0.012) 
** -0.027 
(0.009) 
*** -0.027 
(0.009) 
*** 
Lag1 Patent 
Files 
1
 
0.013 
(0.018)  
0.013 
(0.018) 
 0.078 
(0.028) 
*** 
 
0.078 
(0.028) 
*** 0.022 
(0.021) 
 0.022 
(0.021) 
 
ICT Patent Files 
1
 
0.008 
(0.002) 
*** 
 
0.008 
(0.002) 
*** 
0.004 
(0.003)  
0.004 
(0.003) 
 
0.007 
(0.002) 
*** 
0.007 
(0.002) 
*** 
Patent 
Declarations
1
 
0.009 
(0.005) 
* 
 
0.009 
(0.005) 
* 0.008 
(0.017)  
0.009 
(0.017) 
 0.007 
(0.005) 
 0.007 
(0.005) 
 
Lag1 Sales 
1
 -0.003 
(0.004) 
 
 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
 0.003 
(0.003) 
 
 
0.003 
(0.003) 
 -0.002 
(0.003) 
 -0.002 
(0.003) 
 
Standard Year 
Dummies Incl. 
 
Member 
-140.39 
 
280 
281 
1,288 
169 
Incl. 
 
Outsider 
-29 
 
58 
57 
735 
107 
Incl. 
 
Both 
-175 
 
351 
352 
2041 
276 
Consortium  
Log Likelihood 
2
 
 
AIC 
2
 
BIC
 2
 
Observations 
Groups 
Notes: All models are estimated with the conditional fixed-effects poisson estimator with robust clustered 
standard errors (reported in parentheses). Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedacity and allow 
for serial correlation through clustering by firm. ***, **,and * imply significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% 
levels of confidence, respectively. 
1
Coefficient multiplied by 1,000 to make effects visible. 
2 
Values are 
reported in thousand. 
 
Table 4: Results of the multivariate analysis – testing consortia member share (consortia net 
effect) 
Consortium members react to increasing consortium member share by inflating their patent 
filings, but this effect decreases with the level of overinvestment (model 5). Consortium 
outsiders do not react in a statistically significant way to changes in consortium member 
share (model 6). The overall effect (the effect indistinctly for members or outsiders) of 
increasing consortium member share on the volume of standard-specific patents is positive 
and significant, but this effect decreases significantly with the level of over-investment (model 
7). 
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3.3.5 Net effects 
Our results suggest that nearly all effects of consortia depend upon the initial level of 
overinvestment. In order to be able to discuss the effect of consortia on patenting, one 
should therefore relate the estimated coefficients to the sample values of the overinvestment 
indicator. We calculate the net effects from the results of model 5 (for the effect of consortium 
membership) and model 7 (the overall effect of consortium member share in the whole 
sample). We find that the effect of consortia membership is positive for any share of non-
practicing entities not exceeding 6 %. This is the case for 92,12% of the observations. The 
effect of consortia member share on overall volume of patents is positive for any share of 
non-practicing entities below 9 %. This is the case for 94,13% of the observations. These 
results indicate that the effects of consortia membership and consortia member share on 
standard-specific R&D are positive in a broad majority of standards86. However, they also 
suggest that consortia can have a deflating effect in a minority of standards that are 
characterized by a particularly strong patent race pattern. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
The purpose of the paper is to assess how consortia influence the volume of patents filed 
around formal standards, and whether this is efficient. In the first theory section, we defined 
consortia as a means to reduce the degree of rivalry between the firms’ innovations. 
Accordingly, consortium members can obtain essential patents at a lower average cost, by 
better targeting R&D investments. The effect on the volume of patents filed around the 
standard is however ambiguous. By joining a consortium, a firm may indeed file fewer 
patents by cutting irrelevant R&D investments or more of them if it seeks to develop more 
technology inputs for the standard. We have established that consortium membership is 
always pro-efficient if the first effect dominates. A patent-inflating consortium is also pro-
efficient in a public good equilibrium, but it may actually harm efficiency in a patent race 
equilibrium if it induces an excessive inflation of patents around the standard. 
 Our empirical analysis makes it possible to assess which effect actually dominates, 
depending on the investment pattern – public good or patent race – prevailing for a given 
standard. When joint investments are suboptimal (public good pattern), the observed rise in 
                                                          
86
The negative effect of consortia membership and relative consortia size on R&D investment in 
situations of overinvestment is however stronger than this positive effect. 
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patent files indicates that consortium membership induces firms to develop more innovations, 
rather than saving R&D costs. Since royalty-based incentives are weak in this case, this 
suggests that their reaction is chiefly driven by the opportunity of enhancing the value of the 
standard by developing more essential components. Consortia are thus an efficient way to 
supplement the lack of R&D investments when incentives to develop the standards are not 
sufficient. 
 Empirical results differ when the patent race pattern prevails. For most standards, 
new consortium members still increase their patent applications, but in significantly lesser 
proportions than in the public good cases. Since firms have strong strategic incentives to 
develop essential patents, this suggests that there are few opportunities left for developing 
innovations that are relevant to the standard. For some standards featuring strong 
overinvestment, we even observe that consortium members reduce their investments – 
consortia being then used to save R&D costs by eliminating irrelevant R&D investments. 
These results thus indicate that the creation of consortia does not significantly accentuate 
patent races, and rather has a pro-efficient deflating effect for at least a minority of standards 
around which overinvestment is particularly strong. 
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Chapter V : Essential Patents and Standard 
Dynamics 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Les brevets essentiels et les dynamiques des standards 
 
Les standards dans les nouvelles technologies de l’information et de la communication 
(NTIC) doivent répondre au progrès technologique tout en assurant un fondement stable 
pour l’investissement qui s’appuie sur le standard. Les développeurs de standards 
confrontés au changement technologique peuvent souvent faire le choix entre remplacer un 
standard existant par un nouveau standard et mettre à jour le standard existant. En étudiant 
le cas des organismes de standardisation formels (SDOs), nous étudions comment ce choix 
s’opère si le standard incorpore des composantes protégées par des brevets essentiels. 
Utilisant une base de données sur plus de 3.500 standards de NTIC différents, nous 
trouvons que les brevets essentiels  réduisent la probabilité d’un remplacement du standard 
existant, mais augmentent le taux auquel les standards sont mis à jour. Nous argumentons 
que l’augmentation du nombre de mises à jour reflète une augmentation de l’investissement 
des firmes dans l’amélioration du standard. Cependant, le taux plus élevé de mises à jour du 
standard ne peut expliquer qu’en partie l’effet des brevets essentiels sur le taux de 
remplacement des standards. Les frictions autour d’intérêts privés entre firmes associées au 
développement du standard pourraient être une autre explication pour cet effet. 
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1. Introduction 
Technological standards include an increasing number of standard-essential patented 
technologies (Bekkers et al., 2012). A patent is called essential if it is necessarily infringed by 
any implementation of the standard. Recent contributions show that the inclusion of patented 
technology into a standard increases the value of the patent (Rysman and Simcoe, 2008). 
This increased value is an incentive for companies to adjust their patent filing strategies to 
ongoing standardization (Berger et al., 2012), and to build up strategic alliances in order to 
influence the selection process in standardization (Leiponen, 2008). The positioning of the 
firm even has a stronger impact on the inclusion of patented technology into a standard than 
the technological merit of the patent itself (Bekkers et al., 2011).  
While these advances have improved our understanding of the incentives and strategies of 
firms contributing patented technologies to a standard, we know little about the 
consequences of essential patents for standardization and standard users. Essential patents 
can discourage standard adoption, because standard adopters fear to be held up by owners 
of essential patents and to be faced with exorbitant requests for royalties (Lemley and 
Shapiro, 2006). There is also the concern that a high number of patents leads to patent 
thickets (Shapiro, 2001) which hamper and slow down standardization processes. Standard 
setting involving proprietary technologies is often subject to tensions and diverging interest 
between participating firms (Garud et al., 2002). Vested interests in standardization due to 
increasing commercial stakes reduce the speed at which new standards are developed 
(Simcoe, 2012). Nevertheless, it is important to also see the potential benefits of essential 
patents for standardization. Once their proprietary technology included, firms have a private 
interest in improving the standard to protect it from being replaced by rival technologies. 
Holders of essential patents thus become platform leaders for the standard (Cusumano and 
Gawer, 2002), and have an incentive to sponsor standard adoption (Katz and Shapiro, 1986) 
and to promote coordinated technological change (Bresnahan and Greenstein, 1999, 
Cusumano and Gawer, 2002). As a result, essential patents may actually accelerate the 
technological progress of existing standards and encourage their implementation.  
It is the aim of this article to have a more comprehensive understanding of the effect of 
patents on the evolution of standards after their release. Standards need to respond 
continuously to technological innovation, as outdated standards can become an impediment 
to technological progress. In order to integrate new technology, standard setters can often 
choose between replacement and upgrade of the existing standard. While a standard 
upgrade only incrementally improves upon an existing standard, standard replacement 
indicates a more radical change in the underlying technology. On the one hand, in presence 
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of fundamental innovation, standard replacement may be necessary in order to fully integrate 
the advances in the state of the art. On the other hand, standard replacement can induce 
loss of backward compatibility and impose higher implementation costs upon standard users 
compared to standard upgrades. Based upon these insights, we investigate the frequency of 
upgrade and replacement of standards including essential patents, as compared to other 
standards. 
We rely upon a comprehensive database of ICT standards released from 1988 to 2008. This 
dataset includes detailed information for over 3,500 de jure standards issued by formal 
standardization bodies. We match the standards in our sample to a comprehensive database 
of patents declared to be essential and furthermore inform for each standard class the speed 
of technological progress, as measured by the number of patent files in the related 
technological field. 
Essential patents tend to concentrate on highly valuable, technology-intensive standards 
(Rysman and Simcoe, 2008). In order to deal with this bias, we construct an appropriate 
control sample based upon the characteristics of the standard and the technological field. 
Second, we estimate the hazard rate of standard replacement over time, controlling for 
relevant technological events. The results show that essential patents reduce the likelihood 
of standard replacement, but increase the likelihood of upgrade. While standard upgrades 
temporarily reduce the risk of standard replacement, the effect of essential patents on 
standard lifetime cannot be fully explained by more frequent upgrades. This finding provides 
support to the hypothesis that essential patents lock in existing ICT standards and hamper 
discontinuous change. In contradiction with widespread concerns regarding the effect of 
patent thickets on standardization, the effect of including essential patents is independent of 
the number of patents. 
Our findings have several managerial implications. For potential standard adopters, essential 
patents can signal that the standards will be regularly improved and are less at risk of an 
early replacement. Essential patents could thus reduce technological uncertainty, increase 
standard related investments and encourage standard adoption. This positive effect of 
essential patents on standard adoption could counterweigh the well-known negative effects 
associated with the risk of patent holdup. For patent holders, this is an argument for 
transparent disclosure of essential patents, weighing against the profitability of “patent 
ambush” strategies and other incentives for late patent disclosure (Ganglmair and Tarantino, 
2012). For standardizing firms, our findings have ambiguous implications on the costs and 
benefits of selecting patented technology. On the one hand, inclusion of patented technology 
provides the standard with sponsors who have incentives to invest in standard 
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improvements. On the other hand, the inclusion of essential patents may give rise to vested 
interest and compromise future changes of the standard. 
2. Analytical Framework 
2.1 Inertia and momentum in the innovation of network technologies 
Advanced ICT technologies often build upon thousands of complementary technological 
ideas that are individually invented, but brought to the market in a discrete number of 
“generations”.87 If a new, incompatible generation is brought to the market, users must 
decide whether or not to incur the switching cost in order to benefit from the newer 
technology. The value of the new technology to the users however crucially depends upon 
how many other users decide to switch. Markets where adoption decisions are made 
independently can therefore be subject to important coordination failures, such as lock-in of 
outdated technologies, or stranding of adopters of a new technology that fails to attract 
further users (Farrell and Saloner, 1986). 
Adopters of a new technology require that the technology will be kept in place for a sufficient 
time to justify the costs of adoption. These adoption costs are sunk, and some users will not 
take the risk of adopting a new technology when there is uncertainty about future 
technological progress (Balcer and Lippman, 1984). However, if a substantial number of 
users switch to the new technology, users of the old technology are stranded and suffer from 
loss of network effects (Farrell and Saloner, 1985). It is therefore crucial for a provider of a 
new network technology that he can guarantee technological stability over some time. Too 
frequent innovations in the network are socially detrimental. Nevertheless, network 
technologies also exhibit a tendency to lock-in situations and excessive inertia. Once 
markets widely adopt a technology; switching costs and the risks of lock-in increase (Arthur, 
1989).  This lock-in can be the result of the installed base of the whole technology, but also 
of specific network ties resulting from the adoption rate of specific components (Suarez, 
2005). New technologies may thus be introduced at a too low frequency, and the users and 
implementers of the technology incur the opportunity cost of not using the best technology 
available.  
                                                          
87
 Generations of mobile phone standards are good examples for this process. Since the release of its 
first specifications in 1990, the GSM standard has continued evolving in order to integrate new 
functionalities, for instance related to mobile internet connection. Nevertheless, in order to obtain more 
significant increases especially in data transmission rates, UMTS, a new standard building upon a very 
different coding technology, had to be developed (Bekkers, 2001, Bekkers and Martinelli, 2012) 
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Lock-in of installed technologies does however not necessarily prohibit technological 
progress. An installed dominant design can be subject to substantial and sustained 
incremental progress (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978). This incremental progress follows 
trajectories defined by the technological paradigms of the underlying technological basis 
(Dosi, 1982). In contrast with these continuous technological changes along a given 
trajectory, a discontinuous technological change is the shifting to a superior trajectory. 
Christensen and Bower (1996) show that established market leaders tend to lose their 
leadership position when they face a discontinuous technology change. Christensen et al. 
(1998) provide evidence that in the case of continuous progress of a dominant design or 
standard, firms may retain their market positions throughout the successive technological 
generations. Technological incumbents thus have incentives to promote and favor 
continuous technological progress and to prevent discontinuous changes (West and Dedrick, 
2000). The lock-in of a dominant design may however be socially detrimental, if it 
permanently prevents shifting to a different, more promising technological trajectory. 
The socially optimal rate of discontinuous technological change strikes a balance between 
the discrete costs of developing and adopting new technologies on the one hand, and the 
continuous opportunity cost of using an outdated technology or moving along an inferior 
technological trajectory on the other hand. Uncoordinated deployment and adoption of new 
network technologies can deviate from this socially optimal rate in both directions, yielding 
either excessive inertia or excessive momentum (Farrell and Saloner, 1985). Liebowitz and 
Margolis (1995) argue that excessive inertia or momentum can be avoided if technology is 
proprietary. Katz and Shapiro (1986) show that the owner of a proprietary technology has an 
incentive to sponsor adoption costs, thereby contributing to the efficiency of standard 
adoption processes. Clements (2005) however finds that the incentives of an owner of a 
proprietary technology to have a new standard adopted deviate from what would be socially 
optimal and can induce excessive inertia or momentum.  
 
2.2 Formal standardization as coordination device 
Most inefficiencies in the rate of discontinuous technological change in network technologies 
result from the lack of coordination between the users of the technology. Often, these 
inefficiencies can be overcome if users can communicate and coordinate adoption decisions 
(Weitzel et al., 2006). In practice, coordination on adoption decisions in network technologies 
takes place inside more or less formal standard bodies. Participation in this collaborative 
standard development is a crucial factor for the success of companies in technology 
intensive industries (Fleming and Waguespack, 2008). Coordination on standards ensures 
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compatibility and substantially reduces the risk for the developers and adopters of new 
technology (Tassey, 2000, Aggarwal et al., 2011). The different generations of technology 
are embedded in different generations of standards. The issuance and adoption of a new 
standard thus determines the common adoption of thousands of complementary 
technological inventions resulting in a new technological platform88. This process can take 
place more or less frequently, and the technological progress incorporated in a new standard 
can be more or less important.  
The economic literature has addressed the issue of inertia and momentum in standard 
replacement mainly for the case of uncoordinated adoption decisions89. Timing is however a 
crucial problem also for formal standardization. Formal standardization results in better 
coordination on the best technology, but comes at the cost of decreased speed (Farrell and 
Saloner, 1988). Formal standard setting bodies face an important tension between 
responding to an advancing technological frontier and fixing a stable technological basis for 
creating compatible products and investing in applications and implementation (Egyedi and 
Hejnen 2005, Blind and Egyedi, 2008). Technological change exerts a constant pressure on 
standard setting bodies to revise existing standards. Consistently, an empirical analysis of 
factors influencing the lifetime of national ICT standards (Blind, 2007) has revealed that 
standard survival time decreases with the speed of innovation, as measured by patent files in 
ICT in the respective country.  
While standard bodies coordinate on adoption decisions, both advances in the technological 
frontier resulting in opportunities for new standard generations and the development of 
improvements and implementations of existing standards are subject to independent 
investment decisions. Coordinated adoption decisions may be insufficient to prevent 
excessive inertia or excessive momentum, if there is no coordination on the complementary 
investment. Investment in R&D for new standards or applications of existing standards is 
subject to competition, complex strategic alliances (Leiponen, 2008) and potential 
coordination failures (see Chapter 4). The incentives of firms to invest in R&D and to develop 
applications are shaped by the extent to which technology holders can use patents to 
appropriate important parts of the value generated by the standard. 
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 For recent case studies of the interplay between standardization and innovation, see Bekkers and 
Martinelli (2012) and Fontana et al. (2009). 
89
 Farrell and Saloner (1985, 1986), Katz and Shapiro, (1992), De Bijl and Goyal (1995), Kristiansen 
(1998) 
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2.3 The role of essential patents 
Essential patents play an important role in standardization, as they provide incentives for 
firms to develop technologies for standards and to contribute to the effort of standardization. 
Standardization entails a costly private investment into a public good (Kindleberger, 1983). 
Due to this externality, standard makers underinvest in developing and improving standards. 
The prospect to include their proprietary technology into technological standards is an 
important incentive for firms to increase their investment in standardization (Rysman and 
Simcoe, 2008). Patent holders also have a stronger private interest to invest in 
improvements of existing standards if they can recoup the costs through licensing fees. 
Standards are a good illustration of the argument raised by Kitch (1977) that Intellectual 
Property Rights are important for innovation not only as a reward for successful innovators, 
but also to ensure incentives in continuous investment in improving the protected technology. 
Empirical findings show that patents reduce uncertainty to incur investments that are 
complementary to a specific technological choice (McGrath and Nerkar, 2004, Arora et al 
2008). However, there is so far no evidence for such effects of patents that are essential to 
standards. The incentive for owners of essential patents to regularly upgrade a standard is 
expected to be particularly strong when the technological evolution in the sector generates 
pressure for standard replacement. Holders of essential patents have an incentive to develop 
and advocate continuous marginal improvements that avoid challenges from incompatible 
rivaling technologies. West and Dedrick (2000) and Dedrick (2003) show that IPRs are an 
important tool for allowing the owner of a platform to control a coherent evolution of the 
platform architecture. If the inclusion of essential patents signals that the standard will be 
regularly improved, but faces less risk of replacement, essential patents could also be a 
valuable commitment device that encourages standard implementation and reduces welfare 
losses from under-investment in standard adoption. 
In spite of these virtues, essential patents have also drawbacks for standardization. For 
instance, patents on formal standards can generate conflicts among standard makers 
regarding the shares of proprietary technology covered by the standard. Evidence for this 
concern can for instance be found in the survey which is part of the “EU Study on The 
Interplay of IPR and Standards”. Surveyed practitioners see consensus reaching and the 
speed of standardization processes to be the most negatively affected fields when essential 
IPRs are introduced to a standard (Blind et al., 2011). Essential patents can lead to a time-
consuming « war of attrition » in building consensus on a new standard (Farrell and Simcoe, 
2012; Simcoe 2012). Practitioners report cases in which holders of patented technology 
“would only agree to a certain standard if they are allowed to integrate their technology, 
which makes the standardization process more complex and time-consuming and sometimes 
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even induces errors on products”90. Conflicts between holders of technology are even more 
likely to delay standard replacement than the development of a completely new standard. As 
formal standard development is, at least in principle, a consensus decision, owners of 
components of the existing standard can oppose to any standard replacement unless they 
are fully compensated by sponsors of the new standard.  
If holders of standard essential technology exercise a high degree of control over a standard, 
they may on purpose “kill off” the incumbent technology by introducing new versions which 
are not backward compatible (Iizuka, 2007). For the case of network externalities Waldman 
(1993) and Choi (1994) show that firms’ incentives to introduce incompatible new products 
are too high compared to what is socially optimal. These strategies of planned obsolescence 
are especially beneficial in monopoly situations such as the case of holders of essential 
patents (Choi, 1994).  However, in the case of formal standardization, the rules of standard 
setting organizations require consensus decision making. While consensus decision making 
allows single players to oppose to changes and thus to delay or prevent releases of new 
standards, even dominant firms would not have the means to enforce planned obsolescence 
against the interests of other participants. 
From the academic literature and practitioner statements, we thus draw the following 
hypotheses: first, essential patents allow some degree of internalization of the costs of 
standard improvements and therefore provide incentives for patent holders to invest in 
standard upgrades. These incentives are particularly strong if investing in standard upgrades 
is a way of reducing the risk of obsolescence and replacement by a different standard. 
Hypothesis 1: The inclusion of essential patents induces incentives to invest in continuous 
technological progress, which results in more frequent standard upgrades. 
Second, the continuous upgrade of standards delays standard obsolescence. Furthermore, 
holders of essential patents have an incentive to oppose standard replacement and 
exclusion of their proprietary technological components from the standard. Both factors 
concur, and essential patents are expected to delay standard replacement.  
Hypothesis 2: The inclusion of essential patents increases the persistence of existing 
standards and reduces the risk of standard replacement and discontinuous technological 
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 The interview with Dr. Ivstan Sebestyen held in April 13th 2010 was conducted in the context of a 
fact finding.“EU study on the Interplay of IPR and Standards”. Ivstan Sebestyen has been involved in 
the worldwide multimedia standardization work for over 20 years including telecommunication 
standardization experience in CCITT, ITU-T, ISO/IEC, ETSI and DIN and ITU-T and still picture coding 
(JPEG, JBIG). 
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change. We will test these hypotheses empirically using comparative and econometric 
analysis. 
 
 
3. Empirical Methodology 
3.1 Identifying standard upgrades and replacements 
We analyze the rate of standard upgrade and replacement using a comprehensive database 
of international ICT standards drawn from PERINORM. PERINORM is the world’s biggest 
standard database with bibliographic information on formal standards and is regularly 
updated by the SDOs DIN, BSI and AFNOR. We include all ICT standards (ICS classes 33 
and 35) issued by the main formal international SDOs (ITU-R, ITU-T, IEEE, ISO, IEC, JTC1). 
We restrict the analysis to de jure standards issued from 1988 to 2008, and we observe 
these standards until 2010. We start in 1988, because the International Telecommunication 
Regulations issued in 1988 constitute an important policy change, leading to changes in the 
way standards are released. Draft standards, amendments and errata documents as well as 
technical reports and other documents produced by SDOs that are not standards are 
screened out using the document codes in the name of the document. This yields a sample 
of 7,625 standards. For the econometric analysis, we furthermore restrict the sample to 
technological fields where there is a potential for essential patents (fields in which at least 
one standard includes essential patents) and exclude standards with missing explanatory 
variables. This sample comprises 3,551 standards, 4,671 standard versions and 36,179 
standard-year observations. 367 standards and 1,709 standard versions included in this 
sample have been withdrawn during the observation period. 
For every standard version, the database gives precise dates of release and withdrawal. 
SDOs regularly revise their standards to keep up with technological progress. During the 
revision, „a majority of the members of the TC (Technical Committee) decides whether the 
standard should be confirmed, revised or withdrawn“91. We can observe withdrawal of 
standard versions in PERINORM, and identify new versions of the same standard using 
PERINORM information on standard history. To give an example, the MPEG2 Video 
standard version ISO/IEC 13818.2(1996) was withdrawn in 2000 and replaced by ISO/IEC 
13818.2(2000)92. This new version consolidates several corrigenda and amendments made 
to the standard since the release of the first version in 1996. New encoders or decoders 
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 http://www.iso.org/iso/standards_development/processes_and_procedures/stages_description.htm  
92
 MPEG2 is a widely used coding technology for video and audio content. For an overview of the 
second edition, see http://webstore.iec.ch/preview/info_isoiec13818-2%7Bed2.0%7Den.pdf  
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produced according to the new standard are fully compatible with media or devices produced 
according to the previous version. We consider that in such a case where a standard version 
is replaced by a more recent version, the standard is revised and simply upgraded. These 
upgrades reflect continuous technological change along the technological trajectory defined 
by the standard and the embodied technological basis. 
If a standard version is withdrawn without a direct successor, we consider that the standard 
is replaced. In practice a standard is generally not withdrawn immediately when a new 
generation of standards is released. For example, several generations of mobile phone 
standards (GSM and UMTS) and audio and video coding standards (MPEG2 and MPEG4) 
currently coexist. Nevertheless, evolution and deployment of new generations eventually 
lead to the earlier standard being withdrawn. The SDOs point to technological progress of as 
a main reason for withdrawing standards:  “Several factors combine to render a standard out 
of date: technological evolution, new methods and materials, new quality and safety 
requirements93”. Earlier research (Blind, 2007) and our own empirical analysis confirm the 
direct link between standard withdrawal and related technological innovation. We therefore 
use the withdrawal of a standard version without direct successor to indicate standard 
replacement, a discontinuous technical change that renders the standard obsolete.  
We can thus differentiate between standard upgrade and standard replacement and 
calculate the survival rate of standards and standard versions. The survival time of standard 
versions is hereby defined as the time from version release to version withdrawal, and the 
survival time of standards is the time elapsed between release of the first standard version 
and standard replacement. We investigate the effects of our explanatory variables on these 
rates using duration analysis.  
In the case of our example, the standard ISO/IEC 13818.2 is part of a group of standards 
that are closely related. Indeed, this standard defines the video coding technology of 
MPEG2, which also includes other components dealing e.g. with audio coding. These 
connections between standards lead us to worry that the survival rates of the different 
observations in the sample are not determined independently, and that failure to account for 
this could overstate the significance of the results. In order to account for this, we define 
clusters of standards that can be identified as belonging to a common family of standards94.  
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http://www.iso.org/iso/standards_development/processes_and_procedures/how_are_standards_devel
oped. 
94
 We identify clusters using the number until the dots in the case of ISO, IEC, and JTC1, until the 
slash for ITU-T and ITU-R, and using only the numbers and not the letters in case of IEEE (e.g. 
IEEE802.11n is identified as belonging to IEEE802.11) 
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3.2 Explanatory variables 
We match the standards in our sample to a database of declared essential patents. 
Declarations of essential patents have been downloaded from the websites of the SDOs in 
March 2010. The declaration of patent essentiality is made by holders of the patents, and no 
external validation of this essentiality claims is made. There is furthermore no guarantee that 
all essential patents are accurately declared. The existing literature has nevertheless found 
that declared essential patents are a reasonable proxy for essential patents, and that the 
date of declaration proxies the date of inclusion into a standard (Rysman and Simcoe, 2008). 
In the following we will speak of essential patents, empirically approximated by our database 
of patent declarations. We identified more than 8,000 patent declarations for 700 formal 
standards included in our sample. In order to analyze the effect of essential patents on the 
rates of standard upgrades and replacements, we can then compare the respective survival 
rates of standards and standard versions including essential patents with standards in the 
remainder of the sample. This comparison is however subject to several potential biases. 
Essential patents could indicate that a standard has a stronger focus on innovative 
technology, and is thus subject to faster changes in the state of the art. On the other hand, 
patent holders may prefer declaring essential patents on standards with a long expected 
lifetime. Finally, declarations of essential patents could also signal the importance, 
technological complexity or commercial relevance of a technological standard. All these 
factors are likely to have an impact upon the survival rate of standards and standard 
versions. 
 We therefore make use of a broad range of technological indicators including the issuing 
SDO, the ICS (International Classification of Standards), the breadth of the technological 
scope (approximated through the number of ICS classifications, which we will refer to as 
“ICS width”), the number of pages, standard modifications, and references to prior standards 
(backward references). We also count accreditations of the standard that have taken place 
before the standard release at the body in our sample (prior accreditations). This happens 
when the standard has not been first issued by one of the SDOs we observe (for example if a 
national standard is accredited on international level). These standard characteristics are 
time-invariant, and are therefore particularly suitable for the construction of a control group of 
standards whose evolution over time can be compared with standards including essential 
patents.  
However, this sampling approach is not effective to control for time-variant factors and to 
analyze the interplay between essential patents and standardization dynamics. In a second 
step we will therefore propose a multivariate panel analysis, where explanatory variables are 
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allowed to vary over time. In the majority of cases, the patent declaration database informs 
the date of declaration, so that we can match each of these essential patents to its relevant 
standard at any time from the year of declaration.  
We approximate the evolution of the state of the art using information drawn from essential 
patents. Building upon Chapters 3 and 4, we use the technological classification of declared 
essential patents to match patent and standard classes in the field of ICT. We can thus 
identify how many patents are filed in fields that are potentially relevant for the standards in 
the different ICS classes. Thus we can inform for each standard class on a relatively 
disaggregate level the speed at which the state of the art evolves (in the following, we refer 
to this variable as “innovation intensity”). Blind (2007) has shown that the replacement rate of 
national ICT standards increases with the number of ICT patent files in the respective 
country. In our data, we can identify innovation rates that are more closely related to specific 
standards. The yearly patent files in the related field indicate the flow of standard-related 
inventions. Following Hall et al. (2000) and Bessen (2009)95, we accumulate these yearly 
flow data to a standard-related knowledge stock which depreciates at 15% per year. This 
knowledge stock approximates the “technology gap” or distance of the standard to the 
technological frontier. We assume that a new standard release fully integrates the advances 
in the state of the art, so that the technology gap is set back to zero.  
It is also important to control for standardization activities related to the standard that are 
likely to have an impact on the probability of standard replacement. We build a variable 
indicating changes to referenced standards upon which the standard is built (change of 
referenced standard). Changes upstream in the technological architecture are a decisive 
factor of changes of depending downstream standards. For the same reason, we include 
references from other standards (forward references) and accreditations by other SDOs 
(ulterior accreditations). As these downstream standards need to be replaced when the 
standard itself is replaced, forward references and accreditations increase the social cost of 
standard replacement. These variables are likely to capture up to some extent downstream 
investment building upon the standard.  
A full list of variable definitions is provided in Appendix 1. 
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 Park and Park (2006) provide a list of industries and estimate the depreciation rate of related 
patents. ICT standards of our sample can be categorized to the industry code 17: Electrical machinery 
and apparatus n.e.c. (ca. 14%) as well as the industry code 18: Radio, TV and communication 
equipment and apparatus (ca. 16%).  
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3.3 Sampling 
It is the objective of our analysis to compare standards including essential patents with other 
standards. However, essential patents are not randomly distributed over the standards in 
ICT. Many of the factors affecting the likelihood of including essential patents are also likely 
to have an impact on the duration until standard upgrade and replacement.  
We therefore build an appropriate control group in order to be able to present meaningful 
descriptive statistics. First, we eliminate standards issued before 1988. We then carry 
through a propensity score matching based upon a broad range of observable fixed standard 
characteristics. The determinants of the inclusion of essential patents can be classified into 
three groups: first, several technological variables can be used as indicators of complexity or 
value. For instance, the number of standard pages is an indicator of the size of the standard, 
and the technological complexity of the issues that it addresses. Being referenced by other 
standards in the first years of standard life is an indicator of the relevance of the standard for 
further technological applications. We use a reference window of four years, by analogy to 
the common practice of citation windows as indicators of patent significance (Trajtenberg, 
1990). Second, technological classes of standards capture whether a standard is in an 
innovative and patent-intensive field, or rather in less innovative fields, where essential 
patents are less likely to occur. Third, the issuing SDO has a statistically significant impact 
upon the likelihood that the standard includes essential patents. This could be due to more or 
less stringent rules regarding the declaration of IPR, but it could also reflect the fact that 
standardizing firms target patent-friendlier standard bodies as a forum for a standards project 
when they own proprietary technology that they wish to have included (Chiao et al., 2007). 
Appendix 1 presents the results of the regressions through which the propensity scores were 
calculated, and depicts the repartition of the propensity scores over standards including 
essential patents and other standards. 
Building upon this propensity analysis, we eliminate the observations that have a lower 
propensity score than the treated observation (standard including essential patents) with the 
lowest propensity score. We then group the remaining observations into six strata of equal 
size96. Appendix 1 provides details of the calculation of propensity scores and gives an 
overview how standards are distributed over the different strata. The propensity scores 
increase with ascending strata numbers. The share of standards including patents increases 
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 According to Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008), five strata are often enough to remove the bias from the 
data. As our propensity score is very skewed, five strata are not enough to equalize all important 
variables among control and treated within the strata, but more than six strata would leave us with very 
small numbers of treated standards in the lower strata 
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from strata to strata, reflecting that the model is somehow successful in identifying the factors 
explaining inclusion of essential patents.  
4. Comparative Analysis 
 
4.1 Descriptive Survival Analysis 
In this section, we will present results of a comparative statistical analysis. We first compare 
the survival rates of standard versions including essential patents with other standard 
versions. Figure 1a shows the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the likelihood that a standard 
version has not been withdrawn by a certain time (indicated in years after release). Survival 
rates of standard versions including essential patents decrease more rapidly than those of 
other standard versions (Figure 1a). This figure does however not indicate whether the 
observed difference is a causal effect of essential patents, or whether essential patents are 
more likely to be declared for standard versions that would have had lower survival rates 
anyway. For instance, we could expect that patents are more likely to be declared on more 
important standards or on standards that are more responsive to technological change. 
Figure 1b corroborates this concern. Comparing the survival estimates of the different strata 
(strata 1 with the lowest likelihood of essential patents, strata 6 with the highest), we observe 
that standards a priori most likely to include essential patents are upgraded more often.  
  
Figure 1a: Survival estimates of standard 
versions, including and not including patents 
Figure 1b: Survival estimates of standard 
versions, by strata 
In order to control for this selection effect, we have to make the comparisons within the 
strata. Table 1 displays results of a log-rank test of equality of survivor functions of standard 
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versions. We observe the withdrawal of 391 standard versions including essential patents. If 
essential patents had no effect on standard version survival, we would expect only 225 
versions to be withdrawn during the observation period. Carrying through the analysis by 
strata of propensity scores even exacerbates the difference between the observed and 
expected standard version survival rates97. Significant differences are observed within all the 
strata, except for strata 1 and 2, where numbers of standards including essential patents are 
very low. 
Table 1: Log-rank tests of equality of version survival functions 
Standards including and not including patents, by strata, within strata 
We have discussed that standard versions can be withdrawn in cases of either standard 
upgrade or standard replacement.  We will therefore compare the survival rates of standards. 
The survival time of a standard is defined as the time elapsed between release of the first 
version and withdrawal of the last version of the standard (standard replacement). We can 
see on Figure 2a that the survival estimates of standards including patents decrease slower 
than what can be observed for other standards. On figure 2b, we see the survival estimates 
by strata. Standards that are – based upon their observable characteristics – least likely to 
include essential patents (Strata 1 and 2) have significantly lower survival estimates. Patents 
are thus more likely to be declared on standards with a longer expected lifetime.  
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 Some observations are excluded because of missing values. Notice also that we excluded all 
standards with a propensity score that was lower than the lowest score of a standard including 
patents. 
Version 
Upgrade 
 
 
Stratified 
by SDO 
and ICS 
Stratified 
by 6 
PSM 
strata 
Within 
Strata 
1 
Within 
Strata 
2 
Within 
Strata 
3 
Within 
Strata 
4 
Within 
Strata 
5 
Within 
Strata 
6 
 Events  
Patented 
 
Obs: 
Exp: 
391 
225.50 
350 
192.20 
3 
3.20 
14 
9.55 
47 
17.16 
57 
21.25 
79 
39.07 
150 
101,98 
Non-
patented 
Obs: 
Exp: 
5147 
5312.50 
2131 
2288.80 
421 
420.80 
473 
477.45 
392 
421.84 
349 
384.75 
250 
289.93 
246 
294,02 
Chi2 
Pr>chi2 
140,75 167.29 0.01 2.29 58.30 67.73 48.91 32.70 
0,0000 0.0000 0.9076 0.1304 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Figure 2a: Survival estimates of standards, 
including and not including patents 
Figure 2b: Survival estimates of standards, 
 by strata 
To account for this selection effect, we once again carry through the comparison by strata. 
We observe 22 replacements of standards including essential patents. Had these standards 
the same survival functions as other standards, we would expect 67 standard replacements. 
If we carry out the comparisons by strata, we remove the selection bias based upon 
observables. The number of expected replacements decreases to 42, which is still much 
higher than the observed 21. There is thus strong evidence for inequality of survivor 
functions. Differences are statistically significant within strata 5 or 6. The numbers of 
standards including patents are probably too small in the other strata to yield reliable results.  
 
 
Table 1: Log-rank tests of equality of standard survival functions 
Standards including and not including patents, by strata, within strata 
The comparative analysis thus indicates that standard versions including essential patents 
have a shorter expected lifetime, while standards including essential patents have a longer 
Standard 
Replacement 
 
 
Stratified 
by SDO 
and ICS 
Stratified 
by 6 
PSM 
strata 
Within 
Strata 
1 
Within 
Strata 
2 
Within 
Strata 
3 
Within 
Strata 
4 
Within 
Strata 
5 
Within 
Strata 
6 
 Events  
Patented 
 
Obs: 
Exp: 
22 
66.92 
21 
41.89 
2 
1.17 
0 
2.61 
2 
3.25 
5 
4.73 
3 
9.93 
9 
20.21 
Non-
patented 
Obs: 
Exp: 
1864 
1819.08 
714 
693.11 
201 
201.83 
150 
147.39 
108 
106.75 
99 
99.27 
85 
78.07 
71 
59,79 
Chi2 
Pr>chi2 
32.87 12.41 0.61 2.67 0.49 0.02 5.48 8.34 
0.0000 0.0004 0.4349 0.1021 0.4818 0.8985 0.0193 0.0039 
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expected lifetime than comparable standards. These findings are consistent with our two 
hypotheses: essential patents induce more frequent standard upgrades, while reducing the 
likelihood of standard replacement.  
Standards including essential patents have significantly higher survival rates in all SDOs 
except IEC.  The number of IEC standards including essential patents is very low, and only 
two IEC standards including essential patents have been withdrawn in the observation 
period. Also the difference regarding standard versions does not seem to depend upon the 
identity of the issuing SDO. The survival rate of standard versions including essential patents 
is significantly lower for all standard bodies with a large number of standards including 
essential patents. There are no significant differences only in the groups of standards issued 
by ITU-R and ISO. 
4.2 Robustness analysis 
The stratified analysis removes the bias based upon observable standard characteristics. We 
might worry that the remaining, unobservable explanatory factors of patent declaration could 
also have an influence on standard upgrades and replacements. Our matching of standards 
based upon the technological class or the issuing SDO, while ruling out that these 
observable factors affect the comparability of standards, could actually have increased the 
difference between standards in terms of unobservable characteristics. If standards in 
patent-intensive technologies and issued by patent-friendly SDOs nevertheless do not 
include any essential patents, they are likely to be different in some other, unobservable 
respect from standards actually including patents. For instance, we risk comparing important 
standards with less important standards. If our control variables are unable to control for 
these factors, it might be preferable to compare standards including essential patents with 
other standards that do not include essential patents because of observable characteristics, 
such as the technological field or the issuing SDO. 
Based upon this reasoning, we can construct three different control groups. The first group 
includes the standards in the same technological field (ICS) as standards including essential 
patents (list in Appendix 2), but issued by SDOs having few declarations of patents (ITU-R, 
ISO and IEC, see Appendix 2). The second group includes standards in ICS with few 
patents, but issued by SDOs issuing many standards including patents (ITU-T, JTC1 and 
IEEE). The third group consists of standards in patent-intensive ICS issued by SDOs with 
many essential patents. The latter group is over-represented in the upper strata of the 
comparative analysis, but might be a bad control group based upon unobservable standard 
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importance or commercial relevance. No control group is perfect. But each control group is 
different from the standards including essential patents for a different reason, and having 
several control groups allows us analyzing whether our control variables account for the 
unobserved biases (Rosenbaum, 1987).  
Comparing survival estimates between the group of standards including patents and the 
three control groups, we find very significant differences not only between our standards of 
interest and the controls, but also among control groups. If however we stratify by the 
technological indicators used in the propensity score estimation (including the share of IT 
and Telecom standards and the years of standard release) statistically significant differences 
among control groups disappear (see Appendix 2). This indicates that these variables can 
account for the relevant bias in the data (Rosenbaum, 1987). Even accounting for the 
technological characteristics of standards, differences between standards including essential 
patents and the controls remain strongly significant98.  
 
5. Multivariate Panel Analysis 
 
5.1 Estimation 
The comparative analysis has revealed that standards including essential patents are less 
likely to be replaced, but more frequently upgraded. We will next proceed to an econometric 
analysis. This research framework allows us analyzing the effects of essential patents on 
standard upgrades and standard replacement, as well as the interactions between the rates 
of standard upgrades and standard replacements. First, on the version level, we estimate the 
risk of the version to be withdrawn (model 1). Analysis time in this setting is time elapsed 
since version release, and the estimated failure of the observation is withdrawal of the 
standard version. The withdrawal of a standard version can be explained either by standard 
upgrade or standard replacement. We can then differentiate between the effects of essential 
patents on the competing risks of standard upgrade and standard replacement (model 2). 
The two events exclude each other, and we speak of competing risks. SDOs face a choice 
between upgrade and replacement. We will analyze separately this choice using a logit 
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 Applying the analysis to standard upgrade, we find that the bias is X-adjustable between the 
samples of standards issued by the same SDOs (in patent-intensive or other technological fields). 
Other SDOs upgrade their standards less often, even accounting for technological characteristics. This 
leaves us with two valid control groups, displaying very significant differences with the standards 
including patents (Appendix 3, Table 13). 
146 
 
model (model 3): conditional upon a version being replaced, we analyze how essential 
patents affect the likelihood of standard replacement rather than upgrade. 
The effects of patents on standard replacement can then be studied on the standard level 
(model 4). In contrast to the previous analysis, the unit of observation is the standard, and 
observation time is from the release of the first until withdrawal of the last version. In model 
5, we take into account releases of the different versions as events affecting the survival rate 
of the standard. It is possible to analyze the risk of standard replacement using two different 
ways of controlling for upgrades: first, we introduce a variable counting the number of 
upgrades. Second, we include a variable indicating the time elapsed since the last upgrade. 
As the time elapsed since first release of the standard is used for the baseline hazard, this 
version age variable indicates the effect of failure to upgrade on the risk of standard 
replacement. The comparison between Models 4 and 5 allows estimating whether controlling 
for upgrades captures the effect of essential patents on standard replacement. 
The effect of the variables is tested using a Cox model, a semi-parametric survival analysis. 
In the Cox model, the likelihood of withdrawal (hazard) is estimated year by year, conditional 
upon the fact that the version or standard has not already been withdrawn. The estimated 
hazard is a multiplicative of a baseline hazard       , varying over time, and the covariates 
multiplied by constant coefficients: 
                               
      and covariates      are allowed to vary over time, but estimated coefficients    are 
constant over the time of observation. The Cox model therefore rests upon the Proportional 
Hazard (ph) assumption that the real effect of the covariates is independent of the 
observation time. We are unwilling to make this assumption for several factors expected to 
have important and not necessarily linear effects on the timing of standard withdrawal. This is 
the case for the issuing SDO, the technological field, and the period of standard release. In 
order to control for these factors, we use stratified survival analysis. In stratified survival 
analysis, the observed individuals j are classified into strata j. The baseline hazard rate is 
allowed to vary between the strata, but the effect of the explanatory variables is jointly 
estimated in all strata. We stratify jointly by SDO, ICS class and cohorts of standards 
released before and after 2001. 
                                   
The remainder of the variables is included as covariates      in the Cox model. We test for the 
functional form of the variables using the residuals of a stratified null model. It results that the 
count of forward and backward references has non-linear effects on withdrawal rates, and we 
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transform these variables in log. For the remaining variables, we see no indication of non-
linear effects. We then estimate Cox models including all variables and interaction terms 
between variables and observation time. Insignificant interaction terms and variables are 
progressively dropped. Finally we test the ph hypothesis for all the chosen models. Even 
including interaction terms, these tests reject the ph hypothesis unless we further stratify the 
sample. We therefore stratify standards by ranges of standard size (number of pages), and 
standard versions by their position in the series of successive versions (e.g. first version, 
second version, and so on). 
The effect of patents can be estimated in various ways. First, we test for the effect of 
including essential patents or not. This is done via a dummy variable which is one if at least 
one essential patent has been declared (“Patented”). Second, we count the number of 
patents declared over time, and include this count as a second explanatory variable 
(“Patents_cumulative”). The results are presented in Table 399. We report hazard rates, 
which can be obtained from the estimated coefficients as             . The hazard rate of 
patented can then be interpreted as the factor by which the hazard of version withdraw or 
replacement is multiplied if a standard includes essential patents, all other variables being 
held constant: 
            
                              
                    
 
 
 
Version survival 
Replace-
ment vs 
Upgrade 
Standard survival 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Variable name 
Cox 
Regression 
Competing 
risk Cox 
Logit 
Cox 
regression 
Cox 
regression 
Patented 
 
1.41036*** 
z: 3.62 
 -1.26969*** 
z: -2.61 
0.39669** 
z: -2.22 
0.43528** 
z: -1.99 
Patented* 
Upgrade 
 3.70638*** 
z: 6.60 
   
Patented*Re- 
Placement 
 0.02290*** 
z:-5.85 
   
Patented* 
Upgrade_age 
 0.92696* 
z: -1.85 
   
Patented*Re- 
placement_age 
 1.34151*** 
z: 3.69 
   
Patents cumulative 1.00207 
z: 1.33 
1.00214 
z: 1.34 
-0.02486 
z:-0.73 
0.98842 
z: -0.70 
0.98697 
z: -0.78 
                                                          
99
 The number of subjects at risk reported by the competing risk model is twice the number of standard 
versions, as each version faces two different risks. In the logit model, SDO and technology fixed 
effects are controlled for using dummy variables (coefficients not reported) 
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Technology gap 0.48055* 
z: -1.83 
0.52004* 
z: -1.67 
-0.12399 
z: -0.68 
0.89398 
z: -0.51 
0.63356 
z: -0.98 
Technology 
gap_age 
1.10171* 
z: 1.84 
1.09155* 
z: 1.69 
 1.04837** 
z: 2.03 
1.00752 
z: 0.14 
Innovation Intensity 3.03448 
z: 1.33 
2.87475 
z: 1.28 
1.34117* 
z: 1.82 
0.16776 
z:-1.50 
0.41715 
z: -0.65 
Innovation 
Intensity_age 
0.98418 
z: -0.12 
0.99139 
z: -0.07 
 1.6914*** 
z: 3.10 
1.81033*** 
z: 3.21 
log(Backward 
references) 
0.90803*** 
z: -3.08 
0.90924*** 
z: -3.00 
-0.04919 
z: -0.62 
0.85831* 
z:-1.89 
0.86837* 
z:-1.76 
Change of refe- 
renced standard 
1.01430 
z: 0.27 
1.01369 
z: 0.26 
0.20009*** 
z: 3.26 
1.5832*** 
z: 7.45 
1.61017*** 
z: 8.00 
Change of 
referenced 
standard_age 
1.06194*** 
z: 4.88 
1.06241*** 
z: 5.01 
   
log(Forward 
references) 
1.06194*** 
z: 5.31 
1.21710*** 
z: 5.50 
-0.50629*** 
z:-5.46 
0.79521** 
z:-2.20 
0.77905** 
-2.29 
Ulterior 
accreditations 
  0.13872 
z: 1.54 
1.1858*** 
z: 3.14 
1.16642*** 
z: 3.14 
accreditations_ 
age 
  -0.02306** 
z: -2.44 
0.9771*** 
z:-2.92 
0.98025** 
-2.38 
Number of pages   -0.00163** 
z:-1.99 
  
ICS width 
 
  0. 89885* 
z: 1.85 
  
Year 
 
0.96885*** 
z: -2.99 
0.96985*** 
z: -2.93 
-0.00743 
z: -0.32 
1.04108 
z: 1.31 
1.04724 
z: 1.53 
Version 
Age 
  0.18618** 
z: 2.01 
 2.44156*** 
z: 4.29 
Version 
Age_Sq 
    0.97290*** 
-2.85 
Version number   -0.02016 
z: -0.18 
 6.64184** 
2.38 
Version 
number_Sq 
    0.71194** 
-2.01 
Subjects 4671 9342 Cons: 
10.064 
3551 3551 
Failures 1709 1709 Obs: 1399 367 367 
chi2 217.91 372.84 267.00 119.28 155.61 
Log-likelihood -5343.9173 -6422.0711 R2:0.3152 -
1014.5515 
-1005.7632 
Proportional 
Hazard test 
Chi2: 16.35 
Pr:0.1285 
Chi2: 13.76 
Pr:0.4681 
 Chi2: 
12.92 
Pr:0.3751 
Chi2: 19.20 
Pr:0.2585 
Table 3: Results of the multivariate panel analysis. Results of Models 1,2, 4 and 5 
display hazard rates. Models 1 and 2 are stratified by SDO, ICS, cohort and version number, 
Models 4 and 5 by SDO, ICS, cohort and standard size range. 
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5.2 Results 
The econometric results confirm our hypotheses and descriptive findings. First, we confirm 
Hypothesis 1: the inclusion of essential patents reduces the survival rate of standard 
versions, meaning that standards with patents are upgraded more frequently (model 1). This 
effect is significant and sizeable: the inclusion of essential patents increases the rate at 
which standard versions are replaced by more than 40%. We then analyze the survival rate 
of standard versions distinguishing between the two competing risks of standard upgrade 
and replacement. We find that essential patents have very different effects on the two 
different risks: the inclusion of essential patents strongly increases the likelihood of upgrade, 
but strongly reduces the risk of standard replacement (model 2). Both of these effects 
however decrease with the age of the standard version. We then directly model the choice 
between upgrade and replacement (model 3). Conditional upon a standard version being 
withdrawn, the inclusion of essential patents significantly increases the likelihood of the 
version being replaced by a new version of the same standard.  
Essential patents lead to withdrawing standard versions more often, but also increasing the 
likelihood of choosing standard upgrade rather than replacement. The resulting net effect on 
the survival rate of standards is unclear. We therefore estimate the effect of essential patents 
on the hazard of standard replacement and confirm Hypothesis 2: Essential patents reduce 
the likelihood of standard replacement (model 4). This effect as well is significant and 
sizeable: holding constant other variables, the inclusion of essential patents reduces the rate 
of standard replacement by 60 %. As discussed, one potential explanation for this finding is 
that more frequent upgrades delay the obsolescence of standards and therefore reduce the 
risk of standard replacement. Models 1 and 2 have confirmed that the inclusion of essential 
patents increases the rate of standard upgrades. Model 5 furthermore confirms that a 
standard upgrade temporarily reduces the risk of standard replacement. This can be seen 
from the fact that the risk of standard replacement increases with version age100, while 
controlling for the baseline age effect. However, controlling for standard upgrades only 
slightly reduces the magnitude and significance of the effect of essential patents on standard 
replacement (model 5).  
 
 
                                                          
100
 The effect of version age is non linear, but the risk of standard replacement strictly increases with 
version age over the first 16 years of the version lifetime. The longest observed version lifetime in the 
sample is 19 years. 
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5.3 Discussion 
The results show that essential patents increase the rate of standard upgrades, but reduce 
the rate of standard replacement. The inclusion of patented technology into a standard 
provides the holder of essential patents with incentives to regularly invest in further 
improvements of the standard. Arguably, one main incentive for the holder of essential 
patents to invest in improving the standard is to prevent standard replacement by keeping 
the standard up to date. However, this mechanism only accounts for a small part of the 
observable effect of essential patents on the rate of standard replacement. 
These findings indicate that essential patents contribute to reduce the rate of standard 
replacement also through other mechanisms. Earlier findings (Simcoe, 2012) show that 
higher commercial stakes in standardization slow down the development of new standards. 
This effect is arguably much stronger for the replacement of existing standards. We argue 
that essential patents on a standard raise the standardizing firms’ resistance to radical 
changes of the standard excluding patented technological components. This argument 
corroborates suspicions that essential patents increase inertia of technological standards. In 
contradiction with widespread concerns about the negative effects of patent thickets, we do 
however not find any evidence that the evolution of standards is affected by the number of 
essential patents. Indeed, the only significant effect is the difference between standards 
including at least one patent, and those not including any essential patents. 
There are also other, complementary explanations for the effects of essential patents on the 
rate of standard replacement. As has been argued by Liebowitz and Margolis (1995) and 
Katz and Shapiro (1986), holders of proprietary standard components have an incentive to 
sponsor standard adoption and complementary investments. If the installed base of a 
standard and the value of complementary assets increase, the social costs of switching to a 
new standard also increase. We do not directly observe standard adoption. However, we 
have proxies for technological investment building upon the standard. If the technology 
building upon a standard is standardized itself, the more recent standard references the 
standard it builds upon. Using forward references as a proxy, we find that downstream 
investment building upon a standard reduces the risk of standard replacement. For instance 
references by ulterior standards strongly increase the likelihood of choosing standard 
upgrade rather than standard replacement. This finding corroborates our hypothesis that 
standard upgrades generate less problems of backward compatibility. If the number of 
applications building upon a standard increases, the cost of backward incompatibility 
increases, making standard replacement increasingly unattractive.  
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The analysis of the other control variables reveals that our model is able to capture key 
aspects of our analytical framework. We already confirmed in the comparative analysis that 
our control variables capture a significant part of the heterogeneity between standards. The 
panel analysis now also reveals that our variables capture well the time-varying effects on 
standard evolution. The likelihood of standard replacement is strongly associated with the 
“technology gap”, the weighted stock of patents filed in the broader field over the years since 
the last standard release. The technological gap has no effect on very early standard 
replacement, but its effect strongly increases over standard age, and the average sample 
effect is positive and significant. This indicates that standard replacement indeed responds to 
progress in the field of science and technology. We also find that strong related technological 
progress (“innovation intensity”) induces standardizing bodies to choose standard 
replacement rather than upgrade. This finding could indicate that standard upgrades are a 
less effective means of catching up with the technological frontier. The latter argument is 
important, as we have seen that essential patents induce a substitution of standard upgrades 
for standard replacement.  
We also find strong evidence for significant interdependence of standards. Backward 
references to other standards strongly reduce the risk of standard replacement. This 
indicates that a standard building upon a more comprehensive architecture of other 
standards is less at risk of being replaced. If a referenced standard is replaced or upgraded 
(“Change of referenced standard”), there is however a very strong pressure to upgrade or 
replace the referencing standard as well. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
We have presented empirical evidence that essential patents reduce the likelihood of 
standard replacement. This finding could indicate that essential patents lead to frictions in 
standardization, for instance because owners of essential patents oppose to changes in the 
standard that exclude their patents from the standard. We also discussed extensively the 
hypothesis that essential patents lead to more frequent upgrades of the standard, which 
would in turn delay standard obsolescence. While the inclusion of essential patents indeed 
increases the rate of standard upgrades, this effect alone is not sufficient to explain why 
standards including essential patents are less likely to be replaced. We further show that the 
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effect of essential patents, even controlling for the rate of standard upgrade, is positively 
connected to a longer existence of standards. 
Nevertheless, we would not argue based upon the presented evidence that essential patents 
lead to an inefficient lock-in of outdated standards. Indeed, essential patents seem to have a 
positive effect on the rate of standard upgrades. We have argued that these standard 
upgrades do not entail replacement of standard components, explaining why essential 
patents could induce standardizing firms to substitute standard upgrades for standard 
replacements. Essential patents do however not only induce standardizing firms to substitute 
standard upgrades for replacements, but also to overall increase the rate at which they 
revise standards (the sum of upgrades and replacements increases). The latter part of the 
finding can be explained by the fact that essential patents provide incentives for at least 
some standardizing firms to regularly invest into the standard in order to increase its value 
and associated royalty revenue, and to shield the standard from technological rivalry and 
replacement. 
These findings have important implications for management and policy. For standard 
adopters, we argue that essential patents reduce the technological uncertainty associated 
with the adoption of a new standard. Users of a standard including essential patent benefit 
from increasing technological capacities through continuous improvements building upon a 
stable technological basis. Patents may thus signal the commitment of standard setting firms 
to continuously advance the standard. Furthermore, essential patents reduce the risk of 
standard replacement, thereby avoiding the loss of sunk investment in standard 
implementation. These beneficial effects should be weighed against the managerial risks 
arising from uncertainty about future levels of royalties. 
For standard makers, the effects of essential patents can be controversially discussed based 
upon the presented evidence. Essential patents induce more frequent standard upgrades, 
but also inhibit standard replacement. On the one hand, standard upgrades do not seem to 
be as efficient as standard replacements in catching up to the technological frontier. 
Selecting patented technology can therefore inefficiently bind standard makers to a given 
technological trajectory, even when superior alternatives are available. On the other hand, 
standards referenced by other standards are also more likely to be upgraded rather than 
replaced. This could indicate that standard replacement entails significant social costs, 
including for adjustment of downstream applications and technologies building upon the 
standard. Essential patents, by substituting standard upgrades for replacements, could 
therefore reduce the cost of standard momentum for applications building upon the standard. 
The inclusion of essential patents thus reduces technological uncertainty and encourages 
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users of the technology to incur costly and risky investments in standard implementation and 
complementary technology. These investments concur to the commercial and technological 
success of the standard.  
Based upon this new analytical framework, we find a new justification for the argument that 
sponsorship of standards by a technology owner can act as an encouragement of standard 
adoption, and increase socially efficient investment building upon evolving standards. These 
effects of essential patents on the technological evolution of standards deserve more 
attention by policy makers currently working on a refinement of public rules for the treatment 
of patents in standardization in various legislations.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation addresses the lack of empirical evidence in the current economic literature 
on innovation and coordination in ICT standardization. I have built up and analyzed large 
databases of standards and patents, and I have found innovative ways to retrieve economic 
information from patent and standard statistics. My research has focused upon the role of 
essential patents, and how they interact with patent pools and informal standardization 
consortia. I have explored the effects of essential patents, patent pools and informal 
consortia along three research axes: the characteristics of essential patents, the number of 
patents filed in view of technological standards, and the rate of standard upgrades and 
replacements. In this concluding section, I will summarize the main findings of the thesis and 
their policy implications, and I will sketch opportunities for ongoing and future research. 
 
1. Main results and policy implications 
 
1.1 Essential patents are original incentive mechanisms tailored to 
distributed innovation 
An important contribution of this dissertation is to provide empirical evidence for the particular 
characteristics and functions of essential patents. I have shown that for common patents in 
both discrete and complex technologies, there is a strong correlation between measures of 
the social value of the invention and the private value of the patent. This is consistent with 
the traditional analysis of the role of patents as incentive mechanism: an innovator receives a 
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higher reward for a more valuable contribution. The patent system therefore streamlines 
innovation efforts towards the most valuable inventions to be made. This traditional story 
does however not hold for essential patents: within the sample of essential patents, patents 
on more significant or fundamental inventions are not more valuable for their owners. 
Compared with other patents, essential patents are however much more valuable and the 
inventions underlying essential patents are much more significant. SSOs select the 
inventions to be included into a standard, and inclusion into a standard greatly increases the 
return on the patent. The incentives induced by this mechanism differ from the incentives 
induced by common patents: rather than aiming at the most valuable invention, innovators 
have incentives to compete for inclusion of their patents into a standard, at the lowest 
possible cost and for the highest possible number of patents.  
From a policy perspective, this finding corroborates concern regarding the increasing number 
of essential patents around technological standards. Indeed, there is a risk of a patent 
inflation, an increase in patenting on standard-essential technologies without an increase in 
the underlying inventive activity. The main addressee of this policy message are the patent 
offices, who need to further increase their efforts to guarantee the quality of patent 
applications in the context of standard development. The fact that essential patents on more 
significant inventions are not more valuable to their owners does however not mean that the 
system is ineffective. Essential patents are a specific incentive mechanism that streamlines 
R&D investments towards a joint innovation effort, and towards securing claims on the result 
of this joint effort. Policy needs to take this specific function of essential patents into account, 
and I therefore endorse the development that essential patents increasingly evolve to 
become sui generis appropriation mechanisms with particular rights and obligations. It needs 
however to be scrutinized whether the selection mechanism operating through 
standardization sets the adequate innovation incentives.  
 
1.2 Companies can improve their yield in essential patents through 
membership in patent pools and informal consortia  
In this dissertation, I analyze how the selection mechanism operating through standardization 
in SSOs is affected by strategic alliances. I explore how companies can increase the match 
of the standard with their patented technology through membership in patent pools and 
informal consortia. In the second research article, I show that founding and incumbent 
members of a patent pool are able to include into the pool a higher number of essential 
patents of lower significance. These companies thus are more successful in securing claims 
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on the standard, for instance because their patents are more focused. It remains open 
whether this fact is a consequence of pool membership, or whether this finding indicates that 
pools tend to be initially founded by companies with an advantageous position in standard 
development. I also analyze consortia membership as a way to improve the focus of patents 
on the ongoing standardization. I empirically explore how this effect of consortia membership 
influences the overall social efficiency of patenting around technological standards. 
These findings have important policy implications. Indeed, given the importance of SSOs as 
selection mechanism, potential capture of SSOs by single large companies or alliances of 
firms is a subject of concern for competition authorities, consumers and outside innovators. 
For instance the rising importance of informal consortia in formal standard development is 
not welcomed by all stakeholders alike. Examples of companies or alliances of companies 
“pushing their standard through a SSO” have repeatedly triggered much criticism (Egyedi, 
2003). In other cases, evidence sheds light on strategies of companies to opportunistically 
and ex post privatize the returns of a social effort in the development of new standards (for 
instance through adjusting pending patent applications to ensure their match with ongoing 
standardization, Berger et al., 2012). In this context, my findings contribute two insights. On 
the one hand, I enlarge the circle of suspects. Indeed, my results suggest that not only 
consortia, but also patent pools could allow their members to increase the match between 
the standard and their patents. On the other hand, I present results which cast doubts on the 
alleged detrimental welfare consequences of this partial capture of standardization by 
alliances of firms. Indeed, even though in our model consortia membership increases the 
chances to obtain essential patents to the detriment of consortia outsiders, the empirical 
findings suggest that this streamlining or focusing of the R&D has socially beneficial effects 
on the volume of patent filings around technological standards. 
 
1.3 Patent pools and informal consortia have a positive and beneficial 
effect on the number of patents filed around technological standards 
One of the major methodological contributions of this dissertation is a detailed matching 
between standards and the technological classification of patents. This match allowed me to 
measure the extent of standard-related patenting, and to analyze the factors driving this 
figure. I have concentrated upon the effects of patent pools and informal consortia. 
Regarding patent pools, my analysis takes into account the fact that patent pools are to an 
overwhelming majority composed of patents on inventions made before pool creation. The 
interesting question is thus not how patenting evolves after a pool is created, but how 
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patenting is affected by the fact that a pool is expected. In congruence with the predictions of 
the theoretical literature, I have found evidence for a positive effect of expected patent pool 
creation on the extent of patenting. I have furthermore highlighted that patenting takes place 
earlier with respect to standard development when a pool is expected. With respect to 
informal consortia, I have built my empirical analysis upon a theoretical model, which states 
that the effect of informal consortia depends upon whether essential patents induce sufficient 
incentives to invest in standard-related R&D. The empirical findings confirm these 
predictions, and reveal that consortia membership induces an increase in standard-related 
patenting when the R&D incentives are insufficient, and induces a more modest increase or 
even a decrease when R&D incentives are excessive. These findings point to a beneficial 
role of informal consortia in the coordination of standard-related R&D. They also have 
implications for public policy. My results overall endorse the recent permissive policy with 
respect to consortia and patent pools. Indeed, these mechanisms spur investment in 
standard-related R&D, even though the contribution of patent pools and consortia to the 
overall number of standard-related patents appears to be modest. 
 
1.4 Essential patents induce more continuous and less discontinuous 
technological progress of standards 
In the fifth research article, I have analyzed the effect of the inclusion of essential patents on 
the further technological progress of standards. I have distinguished between standard 
upgrades and standard replacement. Through standard upgrade, new functionalities are 
added to an existing standard, while through standard replacement existing standard 
functionalities are replaced by alternatives. Standard replacement thus potentially induces 
loss of backward compatibility and the exclusion of proprietary technology from the standard, 
but may be necessary to fully exploit the potential of a progressing technological state of the 
art. Controlling for the rate of technological progress, I have found that essential patents 
induce more frequent standard upgrades, but delay standard replacement. More frequent 
upgrades of existing standards contribute to longer standard survival, but cannot fully explain 
why standards including patents are less often replaced. 
These novel findings have important implications for standard setters and standard adopters. 
For instance I argue that essential patents signal to potential standard adopters that a 
standard will be kept in place for a longer time and be continuously improved. Such a signal 
can encourage sunk investment in standard adoption and implementation (which in turn 
makes continuous progress of the standard yet more attractive relative to replacement). This 
159 
 
mechanism illustrates the role of essential patents in the coordination between standard 
developers and implementers. But my results also reveal that the inclusion of essential 
patents delay standard replacement beyond the effect attributable to more frequent 
upgrades. This finding confirms that essential patents can induce excessive inertia in 
standardization, for instance through rent-seeking and conflicts of interest. Standard 
developers need to keep in mind that selecting patented technology for a standard also 
means to acquire the owner of this technology as a stakeholder in the standard. This 
stakeholder can play a beneficial role as a sponsor of the standard, investing in continuous 
improvements, but he can also block socially efficient innovation whenever it is contrary to 
his interests.  
While my findings support solid management implications, I have so far not derived direct 
policy implications from my work on standard dynamics. Whether the role of essential 
patents in standard development is overall more beneficial than detrimental is a very 
important question from a policy perspective. My findings do however not allow concluding in 
either direction, because there is so far no empirically tractable model of the socially efficient 
rate of standard replacement. To advance towards such a model is one of the most important 
avenues for future research. 
 
2. Opportunities for further research 
 
This dissertation is the first analytical treatment of a novel and comprehensive database. My 
work on the database, on scientometric indicators and matching methodologies has already 
allowed me to address a series of important questions. Building upon the data and empirical 
methodologies as well as upon the analytical insights elaborated during this Ph.D. thesis, 
there are opportunities for fruitful further research.  This research can proceed following three 
main lines: first, corroborate and generalize the results presented in this dissertation; second, 
address the questions left in suspension by the findings of my thesis; and third, explore 
potential applications of the insights of my research going beyond the field of my analysis. 
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2.1 Corroborate and generalize the results of my thesis: endogenize  
consortia and patent pools, observe technological rivalry 
 
An important part of my dissertation deals with the effects of patent pools and informal 
consortia. In the different research articles, I discuss the fact that consortia and pools are 
more likely to be created for a specific kind of standards (for instance important standards 
with a high level of technological complexity), and that specific kinds of companies are more 
likely to join informal consortia and patent pools. I used various methodologies to avoid 
biases resulting from this endogeneity, for instance through eliminating sources of 
heterogeneity, sampling based upon observable characteristics, and by making use of 
exogenous policy changes. Nevertheless, a full understanding of the mechanisms and 
consequences of potential policy changes requires further progress in the analysis of the 
driving factors of these mechanisms. Only 45 patent pools have been created since 1997 for 
the thousands of standards including essential patents101, and only a limited number of 
standards have been developed in conjunction with informal consortia. In order to evaluate 
whether consortia and pools could represent viable coordination tools for a larger share of 
standards including patents, future research will have to identify the driving factors and 
impediments for the creation and success of consortia and patent pools. 
This research will also allow relaxing some of the stronger assumptions underlying my 
empirical research. For instance, by analyzing the factors which explain the creation and 
success of patent pools, it will be possible to make more appropriate approximations of the 
expectations of companies with respect to future pool creation. These better approximations 
would not only result in more reliable measures of the effect of a prospective pool creation on 
the patenting related to the particular standard, but also in estimations of the overall effect of 
the greater facility to create patent pools on patenting related to all ICT standards.  
Another approximation which has proved helpful in my research is to use the participation of 
non-practicing entities to identify standards for which licensing income alone is a sufficient 
incentive to invest in R&D. In future research on the effects of R&D collaboration on standard 
development, it will be interesting to rely upon more direct measures of technological rivalry. 
As part of the research on this dissertation, I have contributed to build up a measure of the 
complementarity or substitutability of the patented technologies owned by the different firms 
participating in the development of a standard. In future research, this measure can be used 
                                                          
101
 our sample alone includes more than 700 ETSI specifications and 600 standards from other formal 
SDOs; to which an unknown number of standards at IETF and the numerous informal consortia has to 
be added 
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to analyze how technological rivalry affects incentives to collaborate, and to distinguish the 
effects of collaboration between rivals from the collaboration between firms contributing 
complementary assets. 
 
2.2 Address the questions left open in this dissertation: what are the 
welfare implications of the inclusion of essential patents? 
This dissertation has shed much light on the particular characteristics of essential patents, 
the coordination mechanisms used by companies to address the consequences of the 
increasing number of essential patents, and the consequences of essential patents for the 
choice between continuous and discontinuous progress of technological standards. These 
insights have set the basis for an investigation of the welfare implications of the inclusion of 
patented technology in a standard, and for instance the question whether essential patents 
induce excessive inertia in standard replacement. The core of this future investigation is an 
analysis of the empirically observed standard replacement rate with respect to the theoretical 
benchmark, i.e. the socially efficient rate of standard replacement which balances the 
discrete cost of replacement with the continuous opportunity cost of using inferior technology 
(or progressing along inferior technological trajectories). This is the research agenda of a 
project in collaboration with Prof. Reiko Aoki, Hitotsubashi University.  
This research project has the clear ambition to make progress in the normative dimension of 
the analysis. We expect an empirical answer to the question whether ICT standardization in 
formal SSOs is characterized by too much inertia or too much momentum with respect to the 
social optimum. One of the most important deliverables of this research project will be to 
provide tractable guidance for the conduct of future standard development. For instance, we 
will investigate how IPR policies, SSO strategy and coordination among contributing firms 
can address problems of excessive inertia or momentum. These findings will hopefully inform 
decision making in emerging technological fields, and we will apply our analysis to precise 
case studies in close dialogue with practitioners.  
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2.3 Explore the applications of the insights of this dissertation outside 
the field of my analysis: implications of my findings for the economics of 
innovation and macroeconomics 
This thesis has studied ICT standardization in formal SSOs. I have analyzed standardization 
as a more or less institutionalized selection mechanism in the context of cumulative 
innovation by distributed actors. Standardization is a variety reduction mechanism setting the 
basis for further progress, and coordinates investment in continuous and discontinuous 
technological change. This analysis can be applied to mechanisms well beyond the field of 
ICT. It would be interesting to explore potential applications of this analysis in other 
technological fields. To focus upon the institutions of standardization is a promising research 
avenue for economic research: indeed, if innovation is a conjunction of variety and 
standardization (of invention and selection), then standardization is probably the flip of the 
coin that economic analysis is better able to grasp. Economic agents cannot decide what to 
invent, but they can decide which technology to build upon. Standardization is the aspect of 
innovation which is endogenous to economic incentives and institutions, through 
standardization economics shapes the content of the future technology. 
In a joint research project with Julia Schmidt (HEI Genève), I explore the macroeconomic 
implications of the economic function of standards. Our paper “Technological 
Standardization, Endogenous Productivity and Transitory Dynamics”102 explores aggregate 
standard counts as a measure of technology shocks in a Real Business Cycle analysis. 
Standards represent the clustered adoption of bundles of inventions and set the 
technological basis for further innovative activity. We show that the adoption of new 
standards is endogenous to macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, we find that 
standardization is an important driver for investment and long-run productivity. However, 
following a positive shock in the number of standards, aggregate productivity temporarily 
decreases before picking up permanently. This finding is consistent with the analyzed 
tradeoff between the discrete cost and continuous benefit of technological progress in 
standards. Finally, this paper finds that standardization is an essential mechanism for 
anchoring technological expectations as evidenced by the positive reaction of stock market 
data to a standardization shock. We show that this reduction of uncertainty plays an 
important role for incentivizing further incremental innovation.   
  
                                                          
102
 http://www.eea-esem.com/eea-esem/2012/prog/viewpaper.asp?pid=2740, paper shortlisted for the 
2012 FEEM award for the best paper of young economists by the European Economic Association 
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Appendix 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Chapter I 
 
 
Appendix 1 
 
 
The following table summarizes the results of a principal factor analysis of the four main 
indicators of patent quality used by Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004)  
 
 
 
Complex technologies 
Sample 2 
Discrete technologies 
Sample 3 
Variance 0.31715 0.23077   0.52903 0.07807 
Allnscites 0.3053 0.1541 0.4456 0.1267 
Cmade 0.2875 0.3087 0.3543 0.1614 
Claims 0.3462 0.1783 0.2311 0.1825 
Familysize 0.1464   0.2827 0.3893 0.0518 
Number of observations 3004 3139 
 
Table 5: Factor analysis four indicators 
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Appendix 2 
 
List 1 : list of discrete technology classes 
 
19 Textiles:  Fiber Preparation 
26 Textiles: Cloth Finishing 
28 Textiles:  Manufacturing 
29 Metal Working 
38 Textiles:  Ironing or Smoothing 
44 Fuel and Related Compositions 
57 Textiles:  Spinning, Twisting, and Twining 
66 Textiles:  Knitting 
68 Textiles:  Fluid Treating Apparatus 
71 Chemistry: Fertilizers 
75 
Specialized Metallurgical Processes, Compositions for Use Therein, Consolidated 
Metal Powder Compositions, and Loose Metal Particulate Mixtures 
76 Metal Tools and Implements, Making 
87 Textiles: Braiding, Netting, and Lace Making 
99 Foods and Beverages: Apparatus 
100 Presses  
101 Printing  
135 Tent, Canopy, Umbrella, or Cane 
139 Textiles:  Weaving 
148 Metal Treatment 
162 Paper Making and Fiber Liberation 
164 Metal Founding 
228 Metal Fusion Bonding 
229 Envelopes, Wrappers, and Paperboard Boxes 
423 Chemistry of Inorganic Compounds 
424 Drug, Bio-Affecting and Body Treating Compositions 
429 Chemistry:  Electrical Current Producing Apparatus, Product, and Process 
435 Chemistry: Molecular Biology and Microbiology 
436 Chemistry: Analytical and Immunological Testing 
514 Drug, Bio-Affecting and Body Treating Compositions 
518 
Chemistry:  Fischer-Tropsch Processes; or Purification or Recovery of Products 
Thereof 
585 Chemistry of Hydrocarbon Compounds 
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List 2: list of technology classes of essential patents 
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List 3: list of patent pools in our 
sample 
 
 
 1394 
 DVD 6C 
 MPEG 2 
 MPEG 4 Systems 
 MPEG 4 Visual 
 AVC  
 DVB-T 
 
List 4: list of Standard Development 
Organizations in our sample 
 
 American National Standard Institute 
 Alliance for Telecommunications Industry 
Standards 
 European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute 
 Institute for Electrical and Electronic 
Engineering 
  Internet Engineering Task Force,  
 International Organization for Standards 
International Electrotechnical 
Commission 
 International Telecommunications Union  
 Telecommunications Industry 
Association  
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We inform the concrete technological standard that 1.509 patents are essential to and the 
dates of disclosure. If one patent is disclosed as essential to several standards, we retain 
only the standard of the first disclosure. For every standard, we calculate the mean of the 
disclosure dates of all essential patents. For every patent, we generate an age_of_disclosure 
variable, defined as the difference between the disclosure date and the mean disclosure date 
for this particular standard. For the 993 pool patents, we use an earlier database including an 
age_of_input variable, defined as the difference between the date of input of a given patent 
and the date of input of the first patent in the pool. Even though differently constructed, 
age_of_disclosure and age_of_input both allow studying the chronological order of patents 
that are essential for the same technology.  
We created two new variables, founding patent pool, which equals 1 if the patent is a pool 
founding patent and founding_patent_sso which equals 1 if the patent was disclosed before 
the average age of patent disclosure to the respective standard. These variables allow us to 
discriminate between fundamental and incremental innovations. The underlying assumption 
is that founding patents of a pool or a standardization project are more fundamental. We run 
a regression with the two variables founding patent pool and founding_patent_sso as 
explained variable and the factors highlighted in section III as the explanatory variables. 
 
Probit Founding patent SSO Founding patent pool 
Basicness factor 
 
0.24172***   
(0.127) 
0.25693* 
(0.127) 
Impact factor 
 
0.53371***  
(0.196) 
0.50440** 
(0.196) 
Age effect 
 
0.08696*  
(0.094) 
0.16499 
(0.094) 
Dummy Assignee control Y Y 
_cons 
 
-173.9146*  
(187.164) 
- 327.8643 
(187.164) 
Number of obs 2601 369 
Wald chi2(22) 217.33 86.89 
Prob > chi2 0 0 
legend: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
Robust standard erros in parentheses 
 
Table 6: Interpretation basicness factor 
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Table 7: The impact of single patent quality indicators on patent value, as measured by 
litigation and renewal 
179 
 
 
Chapter II 
 
Appendix 1 
     
 
Nationality of the 
first patent 
introduced into the 
pool 
Not-Mixed 
patent 
family* 
Mixed 
patent 
family* 
 
 
      
 
 
US 380 111 
 
 
JP 1181 29 
 
 
both 0 95 
 
 
      
 
 
Sum 1561 235 
 
 
      
 
 
* 
Pool 
includes 
US or 
Japanese 
patent 
Pool 
includes US 
and 
Japanese 
patent 
 
     Table 6 Patent families including US and Japanese Patents,  
Order of Introduction 
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Variable Description Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
Variables regarding patent 
Appyear Year patent applied for 1998.23 3.96 1981 2006 
Gyear Year patent granted 2000.42 4.02 1983 2006 
Nclass U.S. patent technology class (3 
digit) 
    
Allnscites Total cites flow (truncation 
corrected) from other companies 
17.92 29.40 0 251.33 
Genindex Generality of the patent (NBER U.S. 
database) 
0.33 0.37 0 1 
Claims Number of claims for the patent 4.94 9.61 1 99 
Family_size Family size for the patent calculated 
from espacenet 
30.37 83.24 1 700 
 
Variables regarding the timing 
Age_input Age of the input calculated from the 
pool creation date (in months) 
40.26  29.52 0 139 
 
Number_input Chronological number of input into 
this pool 
2.69 2.27 0 11 
 
 
Variables regarding the patent essentiality 
Sections Number of standard sections for 
which the patent is cited 
4.24 2.91 1 24 
Subsections Number of standard subsections for 
which the patent is cited 
13.88 10.84 1 88 
Sections 
corrected 
Number of standard sections for 
which the patent is cited / median 
number of standard sections 
1.41 0.95 .25 8.73 
Subsections 
corrected 
Number of standard subsections for 
which the patent is cited / median 
number of standard subsections 
1.41 0.95 .25 8.73 
Table 7 Summary Statistics 
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   Citations Claims Generality Family Size Essentiality 
scope 
 
 
 
DVD6C 
Late joiners (0) Mean 
Obs. 
14.5855 
95 
21.9705 
102 
0.1149 
34 
19.8055 
36 
1.2529 
101 
Founding 
members (1) 
Mean 
Obs. 
15.2485 
752 
14.1103 
752 
0.2258 
426 
15.5105 
476 
1.5970 
754 
t-statistics t 
Pr(T < t) 
Pr(T > t) 
-0.2284 
0.4097 
0.5903 
4.9257 
1.0000 
0.0000 
-1.9577 
0.0254 
0.9746 
0.7198 
0.7640 
0.2360 
-3.1270 
0.0009 
0.9991 
 
 
 
MPEG2 
Late joiners (0) Mean 
Obs. 
48.4778 
46 
14.1914 
47 
0.7275 
41 
15.0222 
45 
1.2142 
42 
Founding 
members (1) 
Mean 
Obs. 
36.52598 
62 
15.6153 
65 
0.6499 
53 
13.4482 
58 
1.1293 
58 
t-statistics t 
Pr(T < t) 
Pr(T > t) 
1.3706 
0.9133 
0.0867 
-0.6069 
0.2726 
0.7274 
1.4752 
0.9282 
0.0718 
0.8046 
0.7885 
0.2115 
0.9438 
0.8262 
0.1738 
 
 
MPEG4 
Visual 
Late joiners (0) Mean 
Obs. 
37.0503 
9 
28.8888 
9 
0.6002 
4 
13.4 
5 
1 
8 
Founding 
members (1) 
Mean 
Obs. 
12.9227 
122 
14.9927 
138 
0.3609 
74 
13.3703 
81 
.8547 
117 
t-statistics t 
Pr(T < t) 
Pr(T > t) 
3.1961 
0.9991 
0.0009 
2.6560 
0.9956 
0.0044 
1.2390 
0.8904 
0.1096 
0.0055 
0.5022 
0.4978 
1.1568 
0.8752 
0.1248 
 
 
AVC 
H.264 
Late joiners (0) Mean 
Obs. 
26.8134 
18 
20.5294 
51 
0.6751 
5 
11.8 
5 
0.9242 
22 
Founding 
members (1) 
Mean 
Obs. 
10.8593 
48 
22.2112 
71 
0.4946 
21 
13.7083 
24 
1.0340 
49 
t-statistics t 
Pr(T < t) 
Pr(T > t) 
2.0946 
0.9799 
0.0201 
-0.3712 
0.3556 
0.6444 
0.9271 
0.8184 
0.1816 
-0.3978 
0.3470 
0.6530 
-1.0973 
0.1382 
0.8618 
Table 8 T-test patent indicators late joiners vs. founding members, by pool 
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(1) 
NBREG 
(2) 
NBREG 
(3) 
Poisson 
 
DV=Number of 
claims 
DV=Number of 
citations 
DV=Number of  
standard sections 
Outsiders* 
 
6.090** 1.646*** -0.222** 
(3.109) (0.479) (0.099) 
Founding Patent* 
 
 
1.228 0.005 -0.023 
(2.281) (0.328) (0.166) 
Age input 
 
-0.053 -0.008 0.002 
(0.035) (0.006) (0.002) 
Number of claims 
 
 0.015*** 0.001 
 (0.004) (0.002) 
Patent technological 
classes 
Y 
Y Y 
Patent age effect Y Y Y 
Pool dummies Y Y Y 
Observations 1208 1208 1143 
Nb. of clusters 190 190 162 
Legend: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Robust standard error clustered in parentheses. 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1  
Table 9. Marginal effects controlling for the technological classes 
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(1) 
NBREG 
(2) 
NBREG 
(3) 
NBREG 
(4) 
NBREG 
(5) 
NBREG 
(6) 
Poisson 
(7) 
Poisson 
 
DV=Number 
of claims 
DV=Generality index 
 
DV=Number of 
citations 
DV=Number of 
standard sections 
Outsiders 
 
0.385***   0.212* 0.201 0.821*** 0.745*** -0.192** -0.194** 
(0.135) (0.131) (0.132) (0.179) (0.191) (0.098) (0.097) 
Founding Patent 
 
0.126 0.587*** 0.579*** 0.203 0.144 0.009 0.006 
(0.130) (0.152) (0.155) (0.182) (0.189) (0.123) (0.124) 
Age input 
 
-0.003 0.005* 0.005* -0.004 -0.003 0.0005 0.0005 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) 
Number of claims 
 
  0.005**  0.011***  0.001 
  (0.002)  (0.004)  (0.002) 
Patent age effect 
 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
       
Pool dummies 
 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y Y 
       
Obervations 1208 707 707 1229 1208 1164 1143 
Number of clusters 190 141 141 190 190 162 162 
Pseudolikelihood -4463.72 -368.48 -366.39 -4028.52 -3992.41 -1529.91 -1503.78 
Legend: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Robust standard error clustered in parentheses.  
Table 10. Regression results negative binomial, coefficients 
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(1) 
OLS REG 
 
(2) 
OLS 
REG 
(3) 
OLS REG 
(4) 
OLS REG 
(5) 
OLS REG 
(6) 
OLS REG 
(7) 
OLS REG 
 
DV=Number 
of claims 
DV=Generality index 
 
DV=Number of 
citations 
DV=Number of 
standard sections 
Outsiders 
 
6.565*** 0.051 0.040 7.922***   7.151** -0.261* -0.264* 
(2.354) (0.041) (0.043) (2.862) (3.132) (0.139) (0.138) 
Founding Patent 
 
2.430 0.210*** 0.206*** -0.110 -0.528 0.010 0.006 
(2.262) (0.040) (0.042) (3.505) (3.586) (0.172) (0.174) 
Age input 
 
-0.045 0.001* 0.001* -0.100** -0.095* 0.0007 0.0008 
(0.036) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.050) (0.049) (0.002) (0.002) 
Number of claims 
 
  0.001*  0.163***  0.002 
  (0.0007)  (0.055)  (0.003) 
Patent age effect 
 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
       
Pool dummies 
 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
       
Obervations 1208 707 707 1229 1208 1164 1143 
Number of clusters 190 141 141 190 190 162 162 
R-squared 0.08 0.55 0.55 0.32 0.33 0.08 0.08 
Legend: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Robust standard error clustered in parentheses.  
Table 11. Regression results OLS, coefficients 
 
Appendix 6 
 
(1) 
NBREG 
(2) 
NBREG 
 DV= Number of citations DV=Number of citations 
 Coefficients Marginal effects 
Outsiders* 
 
0.787*** 5.131*** 
(0.159) (1.381) 
Founding Patent* 
 
0.070 0.337 
(0.207) (1.016) 
Age input 
 
-0.003   -0.015 
(0.004) (0.017) 
Patent linear age effect 
0.126** 0.592** 
(0.055) (0.274) 
Patent technological classes 
 
Y Y 
Application year dummies Y Y 
Pool dummies Y Y 
Observations 1229 1229 
Nb. of clusters 190 190 
Pseudolikelihood -4011.92  
Legend: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Robust standard error clustered in parentheses. 
(*) dy/dx is for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1  
Table 12. Regression results controlling for the application years,  
technological classes and age of the patent 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) 
NBREG NBREG NBREG NBREG 
 Generality index 
Number of 
citations 
Number of 
standard 
sections 
Number of 
claims 
 
       
Outsiders_MPEG2 -0.252 0.079 0.082 -0.083 
 (0.179) (0.403) (0.086) (0.302) 
 
    
Outsiders_MPEG4 0.889** 1.787*** 0.182 0.934*** 
Visual (0.433) (0.615) (0.152) (0.224) 
     
Outsiders_DVD6C 0.343 0.790*** -0.250** 0.660*** 
 (0.265) (0.194) (0 .107) (0.171) 
     
Outsiders_AVC  3.039*** -0.241** -0.405 
  (0.938) (0.101) (0.295) 
     
Founding_MPEG2 -0.655** -0.357 0.087 0.087 
 (0.292) (0.410) (0.171) (0.375) 
     
Founding_1394  1.142 -0.062 -0.191 0.133 
 (1.088) (0.422) (0.178) (0.266) 
     
Founding_AVC 0.741 1.671*** 0.125 -0.220 
 (0.664) (0.594) (0 .141) (0.320) 
 
    
Founding_dvbt 0.106    
 (0.513)    
     
Founding_DVD6C 1.103*** -0.412** 0.123 0.406** 
 (0.149) (0.190) (0.139) (0.177) 
     
Founding_MPEG4sys  19.440***  -0.256 
  0.954  (0.418) 
     
Founding_MPEG4vis  -0.071 -0.217 0.075 
  (0.340) (.147) (0.242) 
     
Age input -0.007* -0.011*** 0.001 -0.002 
 0.004 (0.004) (0.002) (0.003) 
     
Patent age effect Y Y Y Y 
     
Pool dummies Y Y Y Y 
          
Obervations 707 1229 1164 1208 
Number of clusters 141 190 162 190 
Pseudolikelihood -391.19 -4147.11 -1531.13 -4476.33 
Legend: * p<0.10; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Robust standard error clustered in parentheses.  
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Table 13. Regression results by pools, coefficients 
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Appendix 1 
Pool Pool Launch License Available Standard 
mp3 1992 1992 ISO/IEC11172-3 
MPEG2 1997 during 1997 
ISO/IEC13818-1/ITU-
TH.220.0 
DAB 1998 1998 ETS300401 
G.729 1998 July 1999 G.729 
G723.1 2000 from 2000 G.723.1 
IEEE1394 2000 2000 IEEE1394 
MPEG2AAC 2000 2000 
ISO 13818-7 (MPEG2 
AAC) 
DVB-T 2001 during 2001 EN300744 
MPEGAUDIO 2001 2001 ISO/IEC11172-3 
MPEG4Audio 2002 2002 ISO/IEC14496-3 
MPEG4Visual 2002 2002-11-25 ISO/IEC14496-2 
MPEG4Systems 2003 2003-2-4 ISO/IEC 14496.1 
AMR 2004 2004-2-24 AMR 
AMR-WB+ 2004 2004-10-4 AMR-WB+ 
AVC 2004 2004-7-15 
ISO/IEC14496-
10/ITUH.264 
DRM 2005 2005-3-28 
ETSI ES 201 980 V1.2.2 
(2003-4); ETSI TS 101 
968 V1.1.1 (2003-04); 
IEC 62272-1 Ed. 1 
IEEE802.11 2005 2005-4-14 
IEEE802.11/ISOIEC8802-
11 
UHFRFID 2005 2005 ISO/IEC18000-6 
DVB-MHP 2006 2006-3-2 ETSI … 
MPEG2Systems 2006 2006-4-16 
ISO/IEC13818-1/ITU-
TH.220.0 
OCAP 2006 2007-6-5 . 
NFC 2007 2007-6-5 ISO/IEC18092 
VC1 2007 2007-3-14 . 
G729.1 2008 2009-1-12 G.729.1 
AGORA-C 2009 2009-8-5 ISO 17572-3 
AMR-WB/G.722.2 2009 3Q 2009 G.722.2 
CDMA-2000 2009 2009-6-10 
CDMA Family: 
CDMA2000 1X, 
CDMA2000 1xEV-DO 
and Ultra Mobile 
Broadband (“UMB”) 
G711.1 2009 beginning 2009 G.711.1 
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Table 3: List of patent pools and related standards 
Appendix 2 
 
DV = patent declaration  
Variable  Coef.    (Std.Err.) 
3-4 y. before pool launch  1.230***  (0.290) 
1-2 y. before pool launch  1.245***  (0.276) 
1-2 y. after pool launch  0.598**   (0.300) 
3-4 y. after pool launch  0.611**   (0.293) 
5-6 y. after pool launch  0.278      (0.332) 
Version Release 0.090***  (0.140) 
Amendment 0.220***  (0.042) 
Standard Age 0.161***  (0.008) 
Standard Age Square1 -0.001***  (0.001) 
Standard Year Dummies Included 
Observation 8,730 
Groups 485 
Log likelihood  -5,805 
Notes: All models are estimated using the conditional 
fixed-effects poisson estimator, standard errors (reported 
in parentheses). ∗∗∗, ∗∗,and ∗ imply significance at the 
99%, 95%, and 90% levels of confidence, respectively. 
1
Coefficient multiplied by 100 to make effects visible. 
 
Table 3: Timing of patent declarations around pool 
creation 
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Standard Updates 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
St. without  Pool 567 0.360 0.057 1.361 0.248 0.472 
St. with  Pool 17 3.647 0.818 3.372 1.914 5.381 
t =  -9.1848 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 
Number Pages 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev.  [95% Conf. Interval] 
St. without  Pool 567 89.280 7.504 178.681 74.541 104.019 
St. with  Pool 17 159.882 37.181 153.301 81.061 238.703 
t =  -1.6111 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.1077 
Accompanying Standards Consortia 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
St. without  Pool 568 0.132 0.022 0.526 0.089 0.175 
St. with  Pool 17 1.941 0.466 1.919 0.954 2.928 
t = -12.0743 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 
Declaring Companies 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95 %ConfInterval] 
St. without  Pool 568 7.273 0.652 15.527 45.99 8.553 
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St. with  Pool 17 55.882 18.521 76.366 16.61 95.146 
t =  -9.9426 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 
NPE on Standard Dummy 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
St. without  Pool 568 0.276 0.019 0.448 0.240 0.313 
St. with  Pool 17 0.824 0.095 0.393 0.621 1.026 
t =  -4.9816 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0000 
NPE Share (for Standards with NPEs) 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
St. without  Pool 157 0.296 0.019 .235 .259 0.334 
St. with  Pool 14 0.147 0.021 .077 .102 0.191 
t =   2.3571 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0196 
Gini Coefficient of Essential Patent Dispersion 
Group Obs Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
St. without  Pool 511 0.175 0.010 0.228 0.155 0.195 
St. with  Pool 17 0.267 0.048 0.199 0.165 0.369 
t =  -1.6484 Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0999 
Table 4: T-Test analysis t-tests of explanatory variables by standard with and without patent 
pools 
 
 
Appendix 4: 
PSM Sampling for comparable standards  
Our goal is to identify a comparable sample of standards that are licened individually to 
match it with partly pooled licensed standards. Propensity score matching (PSM) is a widely 
used approach to estimate causal treatment effects. We therefore apply a logit based 
propensity score matching algorithm to identify a common support region for both samples. 
In a first step we search for variables that explain the occurrence of pool formation. It is 
important to only use variables that are unaffected by the treatment (Heckman et al., 1999). 
We therfore only employ variables that are measured before pool formation. In particular we 
only estimate variables until two years after standard release to ensure a uniform measure 
among standards. In the literature it is argued that choosing to many variables might 
excaberate the support problem (Bryson et al., 2002). When including non-significant 
variables to explain the treatment, the propensity score estimates will not be biased but 
increase in their variance. As to Heckman et al. (1998) we therfore include all explanatory 
variables in our estimation and only keep variables when they are statistically significant and 
when they increase the prediction rates. Proceeding that way we dismiss standard 
characteristics such as the number of pages, the number of declaring companies, the 
number of essential patents and the gini coefficient of patent distribution. All of these 
variables did not significantly explain a pool formation and did not increase our prediction 
results. In comparison we found significant results for the occurrence of NPEs on standards, 
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the existance of collaborating standards consortia and the number of standards updates 
(table 5). 
 
DV= Pool Exists Coef.      (SE) Z 
Standard Updates 0.099*    (0.055) 1.81 
Standard 
Consortia 0.259**  (0.114) 2.28 
NPE Share -4.188*   (2.257) -1.86 
Constant -0.882     (0.444) -1.99 
Observations 102 
Pseudo R 0.3038 
Log likelihood -27.091 
Table 5 Probit Regression 
As to our t-test results more than 82% of the standards where we find a patent pool have at 
least one NPE that has declared essential patents on that same standard. We believe this to 
be an objective restriction to identify a comparable sample of standards. As discussed 
earlier, NPEs are an indicator of licensing profits from essential patents. Our PSM estimation 
is thus restricted to standards where at least one NPE declares essential patents and where 
the release of the standard has at least been three years ago. Table 5 shows that standards 
with consortia, with more updates but a lower NPE share explain the formation of pools. The 
latter result indicates that the occurrence of NPEs is positivley connected while a higher 
share is negativly connected. Our former conducted t-test proved these results.  
Figure 3 shows results of our PSM graph of treated (strandards with pools) and 
untreated (individually licensed standards) goups. We apply the nearest neighbor matching 
method where we identify matching partners of treated and untreated standards. We use a 
matching with replacement, where we allow matching an untreated standard observation 
more than once. This method is especially efficient when we have very different propensity 
scores as evidence in figure 10. Matching high with low values would result in bad matches. 
We overcome this problem by allowing replacement which on the other hand increases the 
variance of the estimator (Smith and Todd, 2005).  
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Figure 10 psm matching results 
 
We also apply a maximum propensity score distance (caliper) but our neighbor matches 
remain the same. We conduct a sample statistic test after our propensity score matching. 
Table 6 shows that there are no remaining significant differences between characteristics of 
the standards in the two samples. 
 
 
  Mean % bias % reduct 
bias 
t-test 
Variable Sample Treated Control  T p>t 
Standard 
Updates 
Unmatched 4.384 1.303 101 
7.6 
3.68 0.000 
Matched 4.384 7.230 -93.3 -1.59 0.124 
Standard 
Consortia 
Unmatched 2.231 0.404 113.5 
45.2 
5.03 0.000 
Matched 2.231 1.231 62.1 1.23 0.230 
NPE  
Share 
Unmatched 0.139 0.271 -85.3 
91.4 
-2.28 0.025 
Matched 0.139 0.127 7.4 0.47 0.642 
Table 6 Sample statistics, matched and unmatched samples 
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Time shift analysis 
DV= patent files M5 M5-1 M5-2 
Variable Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.) Coef. (S.E.) 
standard age  before 2002 -0.009*** 
(0.001) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.005** 
(0.002) 
standard age * pool exists before 
2002 
-0.001*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
standard age after 2002 -0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
standard age* pool exists after 2002 -0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
patent files  in G and H 1 0.011*** 
(0.001) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Lag 1 standard  Upgrade -0.016 
(0.01) 
-0.006 
(0.008) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
Lag1 patent Files 0.001** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.001*** 
(0.001) 
Standard Year Dummies Included Included Included 
Added Restriction 
standard time and years 
No restrictions 
 
4 years bef. & 
aft. standard 
release 
M5 
restriction + 
1995-2005 
Observation 10,228 4,232 3,259 
Groups 640 640 466 
Log likelihood -9,044,428 -2,107,350 -1,688,240 
Note: All models are estimated using the conditional fixed-effects poisson estimator 
with robust clustered standard errors (reported in parentheses). Standard errors are 
robust to arbitrary heteroskedacity and allow for serial correlation through clustering 
by firm. ∗∗∗, ∗∗,and ∗ imply significance at the 99%, 95%, and 90% levels of 
confidence, respectively. 
1
Coefficient multiplied by 1,000 to make effects visible. 
 
Table 7 Shift in the patenting timing with respect to standard development 
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Chapter IV 
 
Appendix 1:  
 
Variable Description 
Level of 
Obs. 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Standard 
Specific R&D 
 
Triadic Patent Priority 
Filings by this firm in 
the standard-related 
IPC classes 
 
 
Firm-
Standard-
Year 
 
 
 
31,020 
 
 
 
1,072 
 
 
 
4,022 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
91,121 
 
 
 
Member 
Membership of this 
Company in the 
Consortium related to 
this standard 
Firm-
Standard-
Year 
39,816 
 
 
0.058 
 
 
0.234 
 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
 
Over 
Investment 
The share of non-
producing entities 
for this standard 
Standard 31,312 
 
 
0.120 
 
 
0.138 
 
 
0 
 
 
1 
 
 
Standard 
Event 
Sum of Amendments 
and version 
Releases 
Standard-
Year 
36,918 
 
 
0.292 
 
 
0.979 
 
 
1 
 
 
37 
 
 
ICT Patent 
Files 
Triadic patent priority 
filings 
by all firms in either 
Telecom or IT 
Standard-
Year 
37,621 
 
 
223,320 
 
 
52,748 
 
 
132,721 
 
 
301,890 
 
 
Patent 
Declarations 
Number of patent 
declarations to all 
formal standards 
Year 39,834 
 
 
3,538 
 
 
4,038 
 
 
78 
 
 
13,938 
 
 
Tobin's Q 
Market-to-book ratio 
of the firm 
Firm-Year 11,740 
 
1.702 
 
1.598 
 
0.076 
 
8.257 
 
Sales 
Value of sales per 
year in Million USD 
Firm-Year 
17,780 
 
 
35,694 
 
 
30,172 
 
 
895 
 
 
199,925 
 
 
 
Table 5: Overview over the relevant variables 
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Appendix 2: 
 
Consortia Name 
MatchStan
dard Incl 
Consortia 
Name 
MatchStandar
d Incl 
Consortia 
Name 
MatchStand
ard Incl 
EPCglobal EN300220 No WiMax IEEE802.16 Yes MPEGIF 
ISO/IEC144
96-14 Yes 
DVB  EN300468 No 
Cable 
Laboratories IEEE802.1Q Yes MPEGIF 
ISO/IEC144
96-15 Yes 
DVB  EN301192 No 
FCIA - Fibre 
Channel 
Industry 
Association IEEE802.1Q No MPEGIF 
ISO/IEC144
96-16 No 
DVB  EN301199 Yes MEF IEEE802.1X No MPEGIF 
ISO/IEC144
96-18 Yes 
DVB  EN301790 No IETF IEEE802.21 Yes MPEGIF 
ISO/IEC144
96-19 No 
DVB  EN301958 Yes (GEA IEEE802.3 No ISMA 
ISO/IEC144
96-2 Yes 
EPCglobal EN302208 No AUTOSAR 
IEEE802.3/IS
OIEC8802-3 No MPEGIF 
ISO/IEC144
96-2 No 
DVB  EN302304 No FCIA  
IEEE802.3/IS
OIEC8802-3 No MPEGIF 
ISO/IEC144
96-20 No 
DVB  EN302307 No HGI  
IEEE802.3/IS
OIEC8802-3 No ISMA 
ISO/IEC144
96-3 Yes 
DVB  EN302583 No IETF 
IEEE802.3/IS
OIEC8802-3 Yes MPEGIF 
ISO/IEC144
96-3 Yes 
DVB  EN302755 No MEF 
IEEE802.3/IS
OIEC8802-3 No MPEGIF 
ISO/IEC144
96-4 Yes 
DVB  ES200800 Yes ODVA 
IEEE802.3/IS
OIEC8802-3 No MPEGIF 
ISO/IEC144
96-5 Yes 
IETF ES201108 Yes OIF 
IEEE802.3/IS
OIEC8802-3 No MPEGIF 
ISO/IEC144
96-6 Yes 
IETF ES202050 Yes Rapidio 
IEEE802.3/IS
OIEC8802-3 No TAHI 
ISO/IEC145
43-2-1 No 
IETF ES202212 Yes IETF 
IEEE802.5/IS
OIEC8802-5 No IETF 
ISO/IEC154
44-1 No 
WORLDDAB 
FORUM 
ETS30040
1 Yes INCITS 
ISO/IEC10118
-2 No IETF 
ISO/IEC154
44-12 No 
DVB  
ETS30081
4 Yes INCITS 
ISO/IEC10118
-3 Yes IETF 
ISO/IEC154
44-2 No 
DVD 
ETSIEN30
0468 No INCITS 
ISO/IEC10536
-3 No IETF 
ISO/IEC154
44-3 Yes 
IETF G.711 Yes INCITS 
ISO/IEC10918
-1/ITU-TT.81 Yes IETF 
ISO/IEC154
44-5 No 
IETF G.722 Yes TOG 
ISO/IEC10918
-1/ITU-TT.81 No EPCglobal 
ISO/IEC156
93-2 No 
IETF H.263 Yes INCITS 
ISO/IEC11172
-1 No EPCglobal 
ISO/IEC156
93-3 No 
IMTC H.323 Yes DVD 
ISO/IEC11172
-2 No EPCglobal 
ISO/IEC180
00-1 No 
IMTC H.324 No INCITS 
ISO/IEC11172
-2 No EPCglobal 
ISO/IEC180
00-2 No 
IETF 
IEC61834
11 No DVD 
ISO/IEC11172
-3 No EPCglobal 
ISO/IEC180
00-3 No 
TOG 
IEEE1003.
1/ISOIEC9
945 Yes INCITS 
ISO/IEC11172
-3 Yes EPCglobal 
ISO/IEC180
00-4 No 
PICMG 
IEEE1101.
1 Yes INCITS ISO/IEC11693 No EPCglobal 
ISO/IEC180
00-6 Yes 
OCP-IP 
IEEE1149.
1 Yes INCITS 
ISO/IEC11694
-1 No AIM  
ISO/IEC180
00-6 No 
BPMI  
IEEE1226.
5 No INCITS 
ISO/IEC11770
-3 No AIM  
ISO/IEC180
00-7 No 
OMG 
IEEE1226.
5 No INCITS 
ISO/IEC11889
-1 Yes EPCglobal 
ISO/IEC180
00-7 Yes 
PWG IEEE1284 Yes INCITS 
ISO/IEC11889
-2 Yes ECMA 
ISO/IEC180
92 No 
1355 
Association IEEE1355 No INCITS 
ISO/IEC11889
-3 Yes EUROSMART  
ISO/IEC180
92 No 
1394TA  IEEE1394 Yes INCITS 
ISO/IEC11889
-4 Yes NFC Forum 
ISO/IEC180
92 Yes 
AUTOSAR IEEE1394 No DMPF 
ISO/IEC13818
-1/ITU-
TH.220.0 No INCITS 
ISO/IEC197
94-3 No 
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DVD IEEE1394 No DVD 
ISO/IEC13818
-1/ITU-
TH.220.0 No INCITS 
ISO/IEC197
94-6 Yes 
HAVi IEEE1394 No INCITS 
ISO/IEC13818
-1/ITU-
TH.220.0 Yes ECMA 
ISO/IEC236
51 No 
PWG IEEE1394 No DVD 
ISO/IEC13818
-2/ITU-TH.262 No 
GS1 – 
(Formerly 
EAN) 
ISO/IEC247
30-2 No 
ODVA 
IEEE1588/
IEC61588 Yes INCITS 
ISO/IEC13818
-2/ITU-TH.262 Yes ECMA 
ISO/IEC283
61 No 
ACCELLERA 
IEEE1800/
IEC62530 No TOG 
ISO/IEC13818
-2/ITU-TH.262 No TAHI 
ISO/IECDIS
29341 No 
ACCELLERA IEEE1801 Yes DVD 
ISO/IEC13818
-3 No UPnP Forum 
ISO/IECDIS
29341 Yes 
Homeplug IEEE1901 No INCITS 
ISO/IEC13818
-3 Yes ECMA 
ISO/IECDIS
29500 No 
IVI 
IEEE488.1
/IEC60488
-1 No INCITS 
ISO/IEC13818
-7 No 3GPP2  Q.703 No 
ASTM 
IEEE802.1
1/ISOIEC8
802-11 No 
EUROSMART
  
ISO/IEC14443
-1 No DVB  TS102474 No 
Bluetooth 
IEEE802.1
1/ISOIEC8
802-11 No INCITS 
ISO/IEC14443
-1 No DECT Forum  TS102527 No 
DLNA 
IEEE802.1
1/ISOIEC8
802-11 No NFC Forum 
ISO/IEC14443
-1 No DVB  TS102584 No 
ewc      
IEEE802.1
1/ISOIEC8
802-11 No 
EUROSMART
  
ISO/IEC14443
-2 No DVB  TS102611 No 
HGI  
IEEE802.1
1/ISOIEC8
802-11 No INCITS 
ISO/IEC14443
-2 Yes 
TV Anytime 
Forum TS102822 No 
IETF 
IEEE802.1
1/ISOIEC8
802-11 No NFC Forum 
ISO/IEC14443
-2 No DVB  TS102825 No 
Wi-Fi Alliance 
IEEE802.1
1/ISOIEC8
802-11 Yes 
EUROSMART
  
ISO/IEC14443
-3 No IMS FORUM TS123002 No 
100VG-Anylan 
Forum 
IEEE802.1
2 No INCITS 
ISO/IEC14443
-3 Yes 3GPP2  TS123401 No 
IETF 
IEEE802.1
2/ISOIEC8
802-12 No NFC Forum 
ISO/IEC14443
-3 No 3GPP2  TS123402 No 
Bluetooth 
IEEE802.1
5.1 No 
EUROSMART
  
ISO/IEC14443
-4 No 3GPP2  TS133402 No 
WiMedia 
Alliance 
IEEE802.1
5.3 Yes INCITS 
ISO/IEC14443
-4 Yes DRM TS201980 No 
DISA  
IEEE802.1
5.4 No NFC Forum 
ISO/IEC14443
-4 No IETF V.44 No 
IETF 
IEEE802.1
5.4 No ISMA 
ISO/IEC14496
-1 Yes 3GPP2  X.509 No 
TAHI 
IEEE802.1
5.4 No MPEGIF 
ISO/IEC14496
-1 No ASTM X.509 No 
ZigBee 
IEEE802.1
5.4 No ISMA 
ISO/IEC14496
-10 Yes 
Cable 
Laboratories X.509 Yes 
IETF 
IEEE802.1
6 No MPEGIF 
ISO/IEC14496
-10 No ISMA 
ISO/IEC144
96-
10/ITUH.264 Yes 
   MPEGIF 
ISO/IEC14496
-12 Yes    
Table 6: Linkages between standards and informal consortia 
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Appendix 3: 
Methodology for measuring standard-related R&D 
We identify the precise relevant technological field for each standard by using the 7-digit 
IPC103 classification of the declared essential patents, and then count the patents filed by 
each company and by year in the identified IPC classes. We used all ICT patents filed from 
1992 to 2009 by the companies in our sample at the three major patent offices (USPTO, JPO 
and EPO), using the PatStat database and the merging methods of Thoma et al. (2010). This 
merging yields 13 million patent files. We aggregated these patents to INPADOC patent 
families and informed the IPC classification and the year of priority. To create our explained 
variable, we computed for each company-standard pair and year the number of patents filed 
in the relevant IPC classes for the standard of observation. 
This method is a novel way of measuring standard-specific R&D investment, and we 
therefore conduct a reliability analysis. We compute for each company-standard pair the 
mean number of patents filed in one year periods before and after standard release (t=0) and 
report the standard derivation for high and low values (figure1). The resulting pattern is a 
realistic description of the innovation process around standardization: the number of patents 
filed is highest in the years immediately preceding standard release, and sharply decreases 
after release of the standard. The further we move away from the development phase of the 
standard, the lower are the calculated numbers of relevant patents. We believe that these 
findings are important arguments corroborating our methodology. 
 
Figure1: mean number of patents filed in years before and after standard release 
                                                          
103
 International Patent Classification 
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Appendix 4: 
Empirical Methodology for sorting standards into cases of over- and underinvestment 
Based upon the theoretical model, we use the participation of pure R&D firms to indicate 
overinvestment in a standard. We observe participation of pure R&D firms in a standard 
using our database of companies declaring patents. Only firms that declare patents on a 
respective standard are considered as participants. Firms are classified as pure R&D firms 
using the business description database of Thomson One Banker and the companies 
identified by Layne-Farrar and Lerner (2011).  
Using this classification, we plot the standards with over- or underinvestment in a 
graph. The axes of the scatter plots are the residuals of two regressions of the number of 
patent declarations and the number of filed patents in the field on observable characteristics 
of the standard and the firm. We assume negative residuals to be an indicator of 
underinvestment, whereas positive residuals indicate over-investment. Regarding patent 
files, our first labeling of over- and underinvestment apparently proves to be a sufficient 
classification, since all residual values of the patent file regression are positive (positive X 
values). The identification of underinvestment seems to be less satisfactory. Residuals of 
patent declarations however display ambiguous results. We interpret these results as 
indicating that declarations are a noisy measure of standard specific R&D investment (see 
Chapter 3 for a comparison of patent and declaration counts). 
 
Figure 2: Scatter plot of residual values labeled with over- and underinvestment 
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These results confirm our hypothesis that pure R&D firms indicate overinvestment. In order 
to refine the measurement; we calculate for each standard the share of pure R&D firms 
compared to other firms contributing to the standard. This is the share which we use as 
indicator of overinvestment in this article.  
 
 
Appendix 5: 
Robustness check substituting pre-sample means for fixed effects 
We apply the methodology developed by Blundell et al. (1999) to control for predetermined 
regressors. The authors suggest substituting the pre-sample averages of the dependent 
variable for the group fixed effect. While the fixed effects are estimated over the sample 
period, and thus affected by the feedback of predetermined regressors, the pre-sample 
means are exogenous to the sample period values of the regressors. Analogous to our 
previous analysis, we set the period of observation from 2002 to 2009. In choosing the 
appropriate pre-sample period, we have to trade off endogeneity (several consortia 
memberships observed in the sample period have already existed in the period from 1992 to 
2001) against heterogeneity (closer pre-sample values are a better approximation of the 
sample fixed effect than more remote pre sample information). As this model is intended to 
complement a fixed effect analysis, we choose the average of the period from 1982 to 1992 
as pre-sample values104. We control for the same variables and operate the same sample 
restrictions as in the main model. As our dependent variable is over-dispersed with respect to 
a poisson distribution and we no longer include group fixed effects, we now opt for a negative 
binomial regression. The results are displayed in table 5. The coefficients of the consortia 
membership variables are similar to those in the poisson fixed analysis, but the interaction 
term of consortia membership and overinvestment is no longer significant.  
  
                                                          
104
 Additionally including the closer pre-sample information (1992 to 2002) does not alter significantly the reported results. 
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Unit of Observation = Year 
DV = Standard Specific R&D Investment 
(Patent Files) 
  M11 M12 
 Coef.  Coef.  
Member 0.147 (0.043) *** 
0.224 
(0.075) *** 
Member * Over Investment -1.163 (0.905) *** 
-1.783 
(1.113) *** 
Lag1 Patent Files
1 
0.033 (0.003)  
0.033 
(0.003)  
ICT Patent Files
1 
0.009 (0.001)  
0.009 
(0.001)  
Patent Declarations
1 
0.015 (0.003)  
0.015 
(0.003)  
Lag1 Sales
1 
-0.008 (0.001)  
-0.008 
(0.001)  
Pre Sample Means (1982-
1992) 0.001 (0) ** 0.001 (0) ** 
Standard  Dummies Included  Included  
Log Likelihood -19,564  -19,569  
AIC 39,261  39,270  
BIC 39,646  39,656  
Observations 2,550  2,550  
Groups 349  349  
Notes: All models estimated with the conditional fixed-effects poisson 
estimator with robust clustered standard errors (reported in parentheses). 
Standard errors are robust to arbitrary heteroskedacity and allow for serial 
correlation through clustering by firm. ∗∗∗, ∗∗,and ∗ imply significance at the 
99%, 95%, and 90% levels of confidence, respectively. 
1
Coefficient multiplied 
by 1,000 to make effects visible. 
 
Table 5: Robustness analysis with mean scaling and negative binominal estimation 
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Appendix 1 
 
Patented_dummy 
Indicates that a standard observation includes 
essential patents Time invariant 
Patented 
Indicates a standard has received at least one patent 
declaration by this year Time-variant 
Patented_upgrade 
Interaction term between patented and event-type 
upgrade Time invariant 
Patented_replacement 
Interaction term between patented and event-type 
replacement Time invariant 
Patents_cumulative Cumulative count of patents declared over time Time-variant 
Innovation intensity 
Number of patents filed per year in the technological 
field, normalized by year; indicates strong innovative 
activity Time-variant 
Technology gap 
Cumulative count of patent intensity scores since 
standard release, discount factor 15%; indicates 
distance of the standard to the technological frontier Time-variant 
Backward references Number of standards referenced by the standard Time-invariant* 
Change of referenced 
Counts the number of referenced standards that are 
replaced or upgraded per year Time-variant 
Forward references 
Cumulative count of the references made to the 
standard by ulterior standards in the PERINORM 
database Time-variant 
Referencesafter4 
Number of references received during the first four 
years after first standard release Time invariant 
atleastonereference Referencesafter4 is bigger than 0 Time invariant 
Ulterior accreditations 
Cumulative count of the number of accreditations by 
other SDOs after release of the standard at the 
sample SDO Time-variant 
Prior accreditations 
Count of the accreditations by other SDOs before the 
release of the standard at the sample SDO Time-invariant* 
National Standard 
Indicates that the standard was not first developed at 
the sample SDO (Prior accreditations is higher than 0) Time-invariant* 
Number of pages The number of pages of the standard Time-invariant* 
ICS width 
The number of ICS classes in which the standard is 
classified Time-invariant* 
Year Calendar Year Time-variant 
* 
Number pages, backward references, ICS width and 
prior accreditations can change with a new version   
 
 
 
  
Table 4: Definition of variables 
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Appendix 2 
Calculation of the propensity score 
 
Probit regression  Number of observations: 6531 
  LR chi2(55): 646,62 
  Prob >chi2: 0,0000 
       
Log Likelihood: -992,116   Pseudo R2: 0,2458 
       
       
Variable Coef. Std. Error Z Pr>|z| 95% Confidence 
Interval 
      
number_pages 0,00257 0.00030 8,46 0,000 0,0019 0,0032 
at_least_one_reference 0,27398 0.07319 3,74 0,000 0.1305 0.4174 
references_after_4years 0.00406 0.00321 1,26 0,206 -0.0022 0,0103 
Nationalstandard -0.57748 0,26795 -2.16 0.031 -1.1027 -0.0523 
prior_accreditations 0.41569 0,18716 2.22 0.026 0.0489 0.7825 
ics_width 0.26732 0,20240 1,32 0,187 -0.1294 0.6640 
It -0.15721 0.21168 -0.74 0.458 -0.5721 0.2576 
Telecom 0.64812 0,19895 3.26 0.001 0,2581 1.0381 
Ieee 1.64179 0,38053 4.31 0.000 0.8959 2.3876 
Iso 0,92272 0,40467 2.28 0.023 0.1296 1.7159 
jtc1 1.30466 0.37165 3.51 0.000 0.5762 2.0331 
itu-t 1.83084 0.35116 5.21 0.000 1.1426 2.5191 
Constant -3.80847 0.51554 -7.39 0.000 -4.8189 -2.7980 
Year dummies and ICS-class dummies not reported 
There are observations with identical propensity scores. 
Table 5: Probit regression model used for calculating the propensity scores 
 
 patented_dummy Total 
Pstrata   
0 1 
1 734 7 741 
2 730 11 741 
3 719 21 740 
4 707 34 741 
5 662 78 740 
6 562 180 742 
Total 4.114 331 4.445 
Table 6: Standards with and without essential patents, by strata  
200 
 
Appendix 3 
Sensitivity analysis to unobserved biases using multiple control groups 
 
SDO Number of Standards 
in ICT from 1988 to 
2008 
% of these 
standards including 
patents 
Classified as SDO 
with patents 
ISO 1169 2,10 % No 
IEC 1348 0,59 % No 
JTC1 1704 5,81 % Yes 
ITU-T 3874 6,43 % Yes 
ITU-R 1217 0,41 % No 
IEEE 477 8,59 % Yes 
Table 7: SDOs classified as with or without patents 
 
ICS “with” patents ICS “without” patents 
ICS Standards % patents ICS Standards % patents 
33040 1792 6,25 33020 659 0,30 
33160 589 10,88 33030 62 0,00 
35040 473 17,55 33050 138 2,89 
35110 409 11,25 33060 970 0,93 
35180 98 10,20 33070 53 0,00 
Others 65 25,76 33080 510 4,90 
 33100 193 0,00 
33120 234 0,00 
33140 19 5,20 
33170 516 2,52 
33200 51 1,96 
35020 57 0,00 
35060 229 2,18 
35080 257 0,80 
35140 74 2,70 
35160 97 3,10 
35200 309 5,82 
35240 1606 4,73 
37040 16 0,00 
37060 21 0,00 
Others 1419 0,85 
Table 8: ICS classes classified as with or without patents 
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Table 9: Log rank test of equality of standard survival with multiple control groups 
 
 
Table 10: Log rank test of equality of version survival with multiple control groups 
 
 
  
Standard replacement 
 
 
Test 
without 
strata 
Test 
without 
strata, 
controls 
Test 
with 
strata 
Test 
with 
strata, 
controls 
 Events  
Treated 
 
Obs: 
Exp: 
20 
49,46 
 20 
54.91 
 
Control 1 Obs: 
Exp: 
50 
56,88 
50 
58,74 
50 
59.37 
50 
61,11 
Control 2 Obs: 
Exp: 
674 
549,00 
674 
565,65 
674 
626.80 
674 
652,41 
Control 3 Obs: 
Exp: 
270 
358,66 
270 
369,61 
270 
272.93 
270 
280,48 
     
Chi2 
Pr>chi2 
69,29 49.16 30.16 3,91 
0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,1419 
    
Standard upgrade 
 
 
Test 
without 
strata 
Test 
without 
strata, 
controls 
Test 
without 
strata, 2 
controls 
Test 
with 
strata 
Test 
with 
strata, 
controls 
Test with strata, 
2 controls 
 Events  
Treated 
 
Obs: 
Exp: 
267 
153,69 
  267 
171,03 
  
Control 1 Obs: 
Exp: 
41 
94,77 
41 
89,35 
 41 
88,78 
41 
81,43 
 
Control 2 Obs: 
Exp: 
1064 
992,61 
1064 
936,02 
1064 
960,53 
1064 
1064,75 
1064 
1023,19 
1064 
1045,69 
Control 3 Obs: 
Exp: 
838 
972,93 
838 
917,63 
838 
941,47 
838 
889,44 
838 
838,38 
838 
856,31 
       
Chi2 
Pr>chi2 
146,29 53,07 23,67 101,77 27,82 1,09 
0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,2962 
      
       
202 
 
Innovation et coordination dans les standards NTIC - 
le rôle des brevets essentiels 
 
RESUME : Cette thèse étudie le rôle des brevets essentiels pour la coordination de 
l’innovation dans les standards des Nouvelles Technologies d’Information et de 
Communication (NTIC). Les firmes actives dans la standardisation ont réagi au défi de la 
marée de brevets essentiels en créant des mécanismes innovateurs de coordination, et 
notamment des consortia informels de standardisation et des pools de brevets. La thèse met 
en lumière le mécanisme d’appropriation original que représentent les brevets essentiels. Ce 
mécanisme peut cependant générer des incitations à recourir à des stratégies opportunistes. 
Les pools de brevets peuvent exacerber ces incitations, mais induisent également une 
augmentation du nombre de brevets déposés autour des standards technologiques. Les 
consortia informels ont un effet positif sur le nombre de brevets liés aux standards si les 
incitations à innover sont insuffisantes. L’effet des consortia est plus faible, voire négatif, si 
les incitations à innover sont excessives. Les brevets essentiels influencent le progrès 
technologique des standards, notamment en donnant lieu à un progrès plus continu, 
consistant dans de nombreuses mises à jour et évitant les remplacements de standards. 
 
Mots clés : Standards technologiques, brevets essentiels, pools de brevets, consortia 
 
 
Innovation and Coordination for ICT Standards - 
the Role of Essential Patents 
 
ABSTRACT : This thesis studies the role of essential patents for the coordination of 
innovation in ICT standards.  The increasing number of essential patents around 
technological standards is an increasing challenge for standardizing firms. In response, 
these firms have developed innovative coordination mechanisms, and in particular 
patent pools and informal standards consortia. This thesis sheds light on the function of 
essential patents as a distinctive appropriation mechanism tailored to cumulative 
innovation. This mechanism can however induce incentives for opportunistic strategies, 
which can be even exacerbated by patent pools. Nevertheless, patent pools also lead 
to an increase in the number of patented technologies developed for technological 
standards. Informal consortia induce an increase in the number of standard-related 
patents when incentives to innovate are insufficient. When the incentives to innovate 
are excessive, the effect of consortia on the number of patents is weaker, or even 
negative. Essential patents have an incidence on the technological progress of 
standards. For instance, inclusion of essential patents induces a more continuous type 
of technological progress, consisting in many small standard updates, and avoiding 
discontinuous standard replacements. 
Keywords : Technological standards, essential patents, patent pools, consortia 
 
